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Abstract
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The main question that motivates my PhD thesis is how economic activity in devel­
oping countries is influenced by and, in turn, affects the environment. Since these 
interactions can take many forms, I investigate this issue from three different angles, 
which necessitates both the usage of novel remote-sensing-based datasets and the de­
velopment of a new theoretical framework.
Firstly, the environment can have a direct impact on economic development, the 
most obvious example being natural disasters like cyclones. As the incidence and 
intensity of these events will increase with climate change, it is crucial to estimate 
their short- and long-run costs and the behavioural response of producers to these 
large and mostly uninsured aggregate shocks. I have, thus, created a new digital 
database of cyclone exposure for India to estimate how farmers smooth income in the 
aftermath of these events.
The causality can also run the other way, as economic agents disrupt the environ­
ment. A case in point is deforestation, which is analysed in the co-authored second 
chapter of my thesis. In particular, we use satellite data to study how political decen­
tralisation has affected district-level logging rates in Indonesia. Possible mechanisms 
include local election cycles, the move from monopoly to oligopoly or the need to raise 
revenue in the absence of other natural resources.
Finally, the third chapter assesses to what extent the environment can create pre­
conditions for socioeconomic interaction. More specifically, I analyse how the intro­
duction of heterogeneous space into the standard urban Muth-Mills model generates a 
residential equilibrium where the formal and informal housing markets coexist. This 
new setup is then used to evaluate the usual policy prescriptions for slums and demon­
strates that new insights can be gained by adding the spatial component.
This thesis, therefore, explores possible links between the environment and eco­
nomic development and illustrates the advantages of using methods and data sources 
from other disciplines.
For my grandfather, Peter Bahles senior, without whom I could have never studied
in the United Kingdom
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The issue of economic activity in developing countries being influenced by and, in turn, 
affecting the environment has come to the forefront of public debate. The discourse has 
been fuelled by recent research on anthropogenic climate change, which has shown that 
livelihoods all over the world will be threatened if environmental concerns continue to 
be ignored (IPCC, 2007a). It is therefore crucial to understand the linkages between 
economic activity and the environment if we are to draw wider conclusions on ways 
to decelerate climate change and mitigate its consequences. My PhD thesis explores 
three of these many conceivable linkages.
Until recently, research in this field has been restricted due to limited availability 
of relevant data. Now remote sensing technologies have opened up new data sources 
to economists and can be used to measure natural phenomena objectively in real time. 
This kind of data is particularly valuable for analyses of developing countries, for which 
the record is often incomplete. Moreover, satellite images provide a comprehensive 
picture of the earth’s surface and therefore are able to capture the impact of both 
legal and illegal actions on the environment.
The first two chapters of this thesis make use of these novel data sources to analyse 
two possible linkages between the environment and economic activity. The environ­
ment can have a direct impact on economic development, the most straightforward 
example being the destruction of agricultural output caused by natural disasters. De­
veloping countries are particularly vulnerable to these shocks, because their economies 
depend heavily on the primary sector (FAO, 2009). Given that the frequency and 
intensity of extreme weather events are predicted to increase with climate change 
(Christensen et al., 2007), it becomes all the more important to estimate the associ­
ated short- and long-run costs.
Chapter 1 studies the impact of one particular natural disaster, namely tropical 
cyclones. I construct a new digital database of cyclone exposure for India, which I 
use to estimate the effect of these shocks on the primary sector. In addition, the 
disaggregate nature of the agricultural data allows me to take the analysis further 
and study how producers recover from these large and mostly uninsured aggregate 
income shocks. More specifically, I exploit the interaction between the random timing 
of the cyclone hit and the district-level growing seasons to identify possible income 
smoothing mechanisms. I find that producers smooth income both by increasing their 
production in the growing season immediately following the cyclone shock and by 
changing their crop mix towards more resilient and nutritious crops.
However, the causality can also run the other way, as economic agents disrupt and 
destroy the environment. A case in point is deforestation, which is one of the main 
drivers of anthropogenic climate change (Denman et al., 2007). It is thus important to 
understand how forests can be preserved effectively, as sustainable forest management 
could potentially play a major role in future mitigation strategies (Stern, 2006; Nabu-
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urs et al., 2007). This policy issue is again especially relevant for developing countries, 
whose weak institutions can lead to excessive illegal logging (CIFOR, 2004), which will 
have to be curbed if emissions are to be reduced.
Indonesia provides an insightful case study, as it is experiencing some of the most 
rapid deforestation rates in the world (Hansen et al., 2009). Furthermore, it has 
concomitantly experienced fundamental institutional changes since the overthrow of 
the dictator Soeharto. The co-authored second chapter of my thesis thus uses a new 
satellite-based forest cover dataset to investigate how decentralisation has affected 
deforestation. We analyse a series of possible political economy mechanisms and 
find that the move from a monopoly of forest extraction rights to an oligopoly has 
significantly increased logging. Moreover, fiscal decentralisation has incentivised local 
bureaucrats and politicians to raise revenue through logging. This is particularly the 
case prior to local elections or if districts do not have access to other lucrative natural 
resources, such as oil and gas.
Finally, given that climate change will destroy rural livelihoods, especially in de­
veloping countries (IPCC, 2007a), the pressure on urban areas is set to increase over 
the coming decades. Since city governments in these regions have limited resources 
to finance public housing schemes (Simha, 2006; WB, 2002), this will drive the new 
arrivals into the informal housing market. A variety of policy prescriptions involving 
slum-upgrading and titling programmes have been offered to tackle this looming hous­
ing crisis (UN-Habitat (2003), chapter 7). However, the consequences of these policies 
can only be fully understood if the analysis is integrated into a spatial context; an 
aspect which has been ignored so far.
The third and final chapter of my thesis addresses this issue by studying how the 
environment can create preconditions for socioeconomic interaction. More specifically, 
Chapter 3 provides a new theoretical framework that introduces heterogeneous space 
into the standard urban model of the monocentric city. This generates a residential 
equilibrium where the formal and informal housing markets coexist; a feature that 
is assumed to be exogenously given in other models (Jiminez, 1984; Brueckner and 
Selod, 2008). This new setup is then used to evaluate the usual policy prescriptions 
for slums and demonstrates that new insights can be gained by adding the spatial 
component. In particular, the results suggest that slum upgrading is economically 
inefficient and that resettlement programmes could increase social welfare.
The three chapters of this thesis thus contribute to the wider debate on how our 
economic decisions both axe influenced by and impact upon the environment, and, by 
extension, anthropogenic climate change. The first chapter provides some evidence 
on possible coping strategies in the face of extreme weather events that disrupt the 
usual insurance arrangements. Given that global warming will increase the likelihood 
of such aggregate shocks, the focus of both academics and policy makers should shift 
more towards understanding income smoothing mechanisms. In contrast, the second 
chapter studies one of the root causes of anthropogenic climate change: deforestation.
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The findings suggest that logging rates can only be lowered with a comprehensive 
policy approach that also addresses institutional weakness. Lastly, the third chapter 
deals with the consequences of actual displacement through climate change, which will 
transmit the impact of global warming from the rural to the urban sphere. As these 
population pressures will significantly increase in the coming decades, early action is 
warranted to create the capacities to accommodate this influx.
Given the complexity of the problem, future research should devote more effort to 
understanding the multifaceted relationship between the environment and economic 
activity. Only then will we be able to devise possible adaptation and mitigation 
strategies that will help lower the costs of anthropogenic climate change both for 
current and future generations.
14
1 Income Smoothing and Cyclone 
Damage in India
1.1 In tro d u ctio n
Tropical cyclones axe some of the most devastating natural disasters on the earth 
(Dilley et al., 2005). They are intense whirls in the atmosphere that reach wind 
speeds of up to 250km/h -  the average speed of a TGV (Taylor, 2007). These storms 
usually affect large areas, as a fully-grown cyclone can have a diameter of 1,000km and 
move 300 to 500km in a day (IMD, 2009). In addition, they are often accompanied 
by storm surges and torrential rains, which inundate coastal regions and flood rivers. 
The resulting destruction can be apocalyptic. For instance, the 1999 Orissa cyclone -  
the deadliest Indian storm since 1971 -  affected 17,993 villages in 14 districts (BAPS, 
1999). Official figures put the death toll at 9,893 (though it is believed that as many as 
15,000 people died) and estimated a cost of approximately US$4.5 billion. Moreover, 
around 5 million farmers lost their livelihoods, since 406,000 farm animals perished in 
the storm and 1.7 million hectares of crops were destroyed (USNO, 1999).
The destructive potential of tropical cyclones is bound to increase even further. In 
fact, climate change models predict a higher frequency and intensity of these storms 
over the next few decades (Henderson-Sellers et al., 1998; Kuntson and Tuleya, 2004; 
Emanuel, 2005; Christensen et al., 2007). Developing countries in particular will 
suffer disproportionately from this development. Empirical evidence has shown that 
the impact of natural disasters is larger for poorer, more unequal, and less democratic 
societies (Khan, 2005; Stromberg, 2007; Toya and Skidmore, 2007). Furthermore, their 
economies heavily depend on the primary sector, which is affected most by cyclones. 
Recent figures for India, for example, show that 56.35% of the economically active 
population work in agriculture whose share in GDP is 16.6% (comparable figures for 
the US are 1.75% and 1.1% respectively) (FAO, 2009).
Given the importance of the issue, this paper’s main aim is to estimate the cost of 
tropical cyclones on the primary sector in developing countries. In addition, I inves­
tigate possible mechanisms through which farmers try to cope with these aggregate 
income shocks. I focus on one country -  India -  that is struck by a tropical cyclone 
every two to eight years on average. The great advantage of this case study is that the 
India Meteorological Department has recorded the positions of all cyclones since 1891.
I can thus construct a novel dataset of cyclone exposure, which estimates the disaster 
impact for a long time horizon in a consistent and objective manner (O’Keefe and 
Westgate, 1976; Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Yang, 2008). This dataset is then combined 
with the India Agriculture and Climate Dataset of the World Bank -  the most com­
prehensive district panel of agricultural data currently available for India. Specifically, 
it reports crop-level production information annually from 1956 to 1987.
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Using these two datasets, I can estimate the cost of tropical cyclones on a much 
finer geographical scale than has been feasible previously.1 I find that a one standard 
deviation increase in cyclone exposure lowers output by 7.75%. Rather surprisingly, I 
also find that the area planted increases contemporaneously by 3.02%; an effect which 
persists for three years until recovery is achieved. These seemingly contradictory 
results can be explained by the following observation: most districts in India have 
two and some even three growing seasons (GOI, 1967). That is to say, producers will 
be able to adjust their production later in the same year, if, for instance, they were 
struck by a cyclone in the spring. The annual data thus only captures the net effect of 
the natural disaster, where the destruction caused by the cyclone is counterbalanced 
by the subsequent behavioural response of the producers.
The change in behaviour in itself is warranted, because most farmers are not pro­
tected against cyclone shocks. Firstly, the Indian government only provides short-term 
disaster relief that does not involve any aid for recovery or development (Parasuraman 
and Unnikrishnan, eds, 2000). Secondly, most producers lack formal insurance against 
weather risk, which is rarely taken out in both developed and developing countries 
(Kunreuther and Pauly, 2004; Cole et al., 2009). Finally, since the cyclone affects 
the entire social network, access to informal finance will be disrupted (Besley, 1995a). 
Consequently, farmers will be unable to smooth consumption in the aftermath of the 
natural disaster and will have to adjust their production behaviour instead.
Due to the detailed nature of my dataset, I can identify two possible coping strate­
gies that could explain the observed increase in the area planted. Firstly, the anal­
ysis exploits the interaction between the random timing of the cyclone shock and 
the district-level growing seasons. More specifically, I supplement the World Bank’s 
dataset with district-level growing cycle information to distinguish between cyclone 
events that happen before and after the sowing season of each individual crop. I can 
then test whether production increases after the previous harvest has been destroyed. 
The results show a very consistent picture -  a crop is destroyed if the cyclone hits prior 
to the harvest, but more is planted if it strikes before the sowing season. Farmers thus 
attempt to smooth income by substituting intertemporally across growing seasons. 
Note that the effectiveness of this coping strategy will be dampened, since markets 
are not well-integrated in India (Topalova, 2004; Duflo and Pande, 2007; Guiteras, 
2007). This is confirmed in the data, as local farm harvest prices decline with the 
expansion in production.
The second income smoothing mechanism involves a change in the crop mix. In 
particular, I separate the food crops into two main groups. The first category com­
prises coarse cereals, such as bajra and jowar. These crops are resilient, cheap, and 
highly nutritious. The second group includes more risky and expensive calories like 
rice and wheat. If farmers need to smooth income and (most probably) nutrition
1The only sub-national estimate of natural disasters to date is a state-level analysis of Pugatch 
and Yang (2008) for Mexico.
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after the cyclone shock, we would expect to see a switch towards coarse cereals. The 
evidence suggests that this is indeed the case -  the area planted with coarse cereals ex­
pands by 4.22% resulting in a net increase in output and a decline in prices of 11.47% 
and 2.53% respectively. In contrast, the other food crops are largely destroyed by the 
cyclone (output drops by 13.93%) and are not replanted within the same year. This 
finding can also explain the overall increase in the area planted, since coarse cereals 
can be grown on marginal land whereas other food crops cannot (Sawhney and Daji, 
1961). Farmers thus seem to forgo higher income from low calorie crops to meet basic 
nutritional needs and smooth income after the cyclone shock.
These results document the large and adverse impact of tropical cyclones on the 
primary sector in India. I find that producers attempt to counter the destruction 
-  by planting more crops in the growing season directly following the cyclone shock 
or by changing their crop mix towards cheap calories. However, their response is 
not sufficient. The overall contemporaneous impact on output is still negative and 
sizeable. Moreover, income smoothing continues for another three years until the 
damage is offset completely. Disaster relief should thus not only provide short-term 
supportive measures, but also assistance to rebuild livelihoods. Furthermore, it is 
important to note that these coping strategies are specific to India. The impact of 
cyclonic storms will be larger for developing countries with only one growing season.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I discuss 
the related literature and place the contribution of this paper in a broader context. 
Section 1.3 explains how the cyclone exposure dataset is constructed and discusses the 
key features of the World Bank dataset needed for the empirical analysis. In Section
1.4, I motivate the identification strategy and describe its empirical implementation. 
Section 1.5.1 presents the estimates of the net effect of cyclone exposure on the primary 
sector. In Section 1.5.2, I study how the interaction between the district-level growing 
seasons and the timing of the cyclone shock affects planting decisions. Section 1.5.3 
tests if the crop mix changes in response to tropical cyclones. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 B ackground
This paper is most closely related to the nascent literature on natural disasters. Re­
search in this field has so fax largely focused on estimating the impact of these aggre­
gate shocks at the macro-level (Toya and Skidmore, 2002; Stromberg, 2007; Cuaresma 
et al., 2008). A prominent cross-country analysis has been carried out by Khan (2005), 
who shows that good institutions and democracies can play a crucial role in lowering 
the death toll from natural disasters. Similarly, Anbarci et al. (2005) provide evidence 
that richer and more equal societies have fewer fatalities.
However, even if this relationship is true across countries, recent micro-evidence 
paints a more nuanced picture. For instance, Pugatch and Yang (2008) show nonlin­
earities in the relationship between mortality from hurricanes and the level of devel­
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opment. They argue that reconstruction efforts in more affluent regions have induced 
emigration from poorer to richer states, thus mitigating the impact for both. In ad­
dition, more aid is usually provided by more accountable local governments (Besley 
and Burgess, 2002; Cole et al., 2008) or for natural disasters with wider media cov­
erage (Eisensee and Stromberg, 2007). The impact also differs across income groups, 
since families with lower levels of education (Bluedorn and Cascio, 2005) and income 
(Foster, 1995) suffer most.
The present study contributes to this literature by estimating the effect of tropical 
cyclones on the primary sector in India. By exploiting the finesse of my cyclone 
dataset, I am able to estimate this effect for each district -  a level of disaggregation 
which has not been achieved before. The reasons for focusing on the primary sector are 
as follows. Firstly, agricultural production is most exposed to cyclonic storms. The 
strong winds, and accompanying rains and floods will primarily destroy crops and kill 
livestock (IMD, 2009). Secondly, more than half of the economically active population 
in India (and in most other developing countries) works in agriculture today (FAO, 
2009). Therefore, the full impact of this natural disaster can only be understood if 
the primary sector is taken into account.
Moreover, to the best of my knowledge this paper attempts to disentangle possible 
coping strategies for the first time. So far, little empirical evidence exists on how 
producers recover from aggregate income shocks like natural disasters. For instance, 
the related literature on large temporary shocks merely studies their long-run impact. 
A case in point is the analysis of Miguel and Roland (2006). They show that the ex­
tensive bombing of Vietnam has not permanently changed poverty rates, consumption 
patterns, infrastructure, literacy, and population density. However, they cannot iden­
tify the mechanisms through which recovery has been accomplished. Similarly, Davis 
and Weinstein (2002) provide evidence that the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hi­
roshima and Nagasaki has not had a long-run impact on the distribution of economic 
activity in Japan. But again evidence on possible coping strategies is scarce.2
Given that natural disasters repeatedly strike the same region (Dilley et al., 2005), 
we would expect that forward-looking economic agents will insure themselves against 
these shocks. Nonetheless, empirical evidence has shown that households underin- 
sure against weather risk due to incomplete information about the event probability 
(Kunreuther and Pauly, 2004), credit constraints, and lack of trust (Cole et al., 2009). 
In the case of India, government assistance is not sufficient to offset the negative 
consequences of natural disasters either. That is, relief operations largely focus on 
short-term supportive measures and not on recovery and development (Parasuraman 
and Unnikrishnan, eds, 2000; HPC, 2001).3
2In contrast to these temporary one-off shocks, permanent changes in the productive capacity of 
a region should lead to a behavioural response. For example, Hornbeck (2008) finds that migration 
patterns and population growth changed substantially in response to the extensive topsoil erosion in 
the American Dustbowl.
3This attitude has shifted only recently after the super-cyclone in Orissa in 1999 and the major
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Alternatively, producers could insure themselves more indirectly through bor­
rowing and saving. The academic literature has provided considerable evidence on 
consumption smoothing through both formal and informal credit arrangements in 
developing countries (Deaton, 1992; Udry, 1994; Townsend, 1994; Grimard, 1997; 
Fafchamps and Lund, 1997; Dubois, 2000). Yet, the findings suggest that this is 
far from complete. Moreover, informal insurance networks are particularly vulnerable 
to geographically co-moving shocks like tropical cyclones. In particular, they usually 
rely on local information networks and community sanctions to overcome information 
asymmetries, enforcement problems and transaction costs (Besley, 1995a). Since the 
cyclone will affect the entire social network, producers will be severely limited in their 
ability to smooth consumption through borrowing.
In such an environment of repeated and largely uninsured aggregate shocks, pro­
ducers will have to fall back on income smoothing mechanisms (Morduch, 1995). 
This literature is much more limited, as most of the research to date has focused on 
household-level borrowing and saving behaviour. The existing evidence suggests that 
farmers attempt to smooth income by selling their assets or livestock or by increasing 
their labour supply or off-farm employment (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Dercon, 
2000; Jayachandran, 2006). However, this will be more difficult after a cyclone shock, 
which will have damaged assets, killed domestic animals, and severely disrupted the 
local economy. Moreover, the effectiveness of these coping strategies will be reduced 
if markets are not well integrated. This is the case in India (Topalova, 2004; Duflo 
and Pande, 2007; Guiteras, 2007), where we would expect general equilibrium effects 
to drive down local prices and wages.
This paper studies two alternative income smoothing mechanisms: namely, changes 
in the crop mix and an increase in agricultural production in the subsequent growing 
season. Naturally, these responses will also have local price effects, which will mitigate 
their impact. However, they might be easier to implement after a natural disaster. To 
identify these coping strategies, I take advantage of the detailed nature of my dataset. 
More specifically, I can determine whether a cyclone shock has occurred before or 
after the district-level sowing season of a given crop. The behavioural response will 
be identified by cyclone hits prior to the sowing season. In contrast, shocks after 
planting but before the harvest will capture the cyclone’s destruction. In addition, I 
am able to investigate whether producers adjust their crop mix by switching toward 
cheap calories.
1.3 D a ta
The main difficulty in estimating the cost of tropical cyclones is to obtain a consistent 
and objective measure of the damage caused. Section 1.3.1 outlines how I solve this
earthquake in Gujarat in 2001. Since then an initiative has been launched by the High Powered 
Committee on Disaster Management to develop a comprehensive approach to all natural disasters 
that involves not only disaster relief, but also mitigation and rehabilitation (HPC, 2001).
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problem by using two complementary datasets to predict cyclone exposure. This 
procedure is explained and evaluated in detail in Section 1.3.2. To identify the impact 
of tropical cyclones on the primary sector, I also need to consider the timing of the 
cyclone shock and, most importantly, its interaction with the growing cycle of each 
crop. Therefore, I augment my main agricultural database -  which will be discussed 
at length in Section 1.3.3 -  with district-level sowing and harvesting times. Both 
datasets together then help formulate the identification strategy outlined in Section
1.4. They also prepare the ground for the empirical analysis, the results of which are 
presented in Section 1.5.
1.3.1 Cyclone data sources
To capture the impact of tropical cyclones, I use meteorological measurements. The 
key advantage of this type of data is its objectivity. That is, alternative data sources, 
such as damage assessments done by local or national governments, are known to 
exaggerate the disaster impact (O’Keefe and Westgate, 1976; Albala-Bertrand, 1993; 
Yang, 2008). Furthermore, developing countries might have underreported natural 
disasters in the past. Consequently, any increases in the frequency of events may be 
solely due to better reporting practises (Stromberg, 2007). On-the-ground assessment 
of the damage is equally problematic. For this approach, both pre- and post-disaster 
measurements are necessary, which are often incomplete and inaccurate. Meteoro­
logical data therefore presents a unique opportunity to measure the disaster impact 
objectively.
The raw cyclone data records the position of the centre of the storm every few 
hours. These coordinates make up the so-called cyclone track, which traces out the 
storm’s movement across time and space. To estimate the actual extent of the cyclone 
from this data, a theoretical framework is required.4 These models generally describe 
the wind and pressure fields of the storm. In addition, they calculate the changes 
in its windfall dynamics, as the cyclone moves across the ocean and hits land. The 
final outputs are the so-called wind speed buffers that are constructed around each 
cyclone track. These calculations require the cyclone track itself, measurements of 
the central pressure and wind speed, and a host of auxiliary parameters. Since wind 
speed measurements are based on satellite images, these models cannot be applied 
prior to the 1970s when this data first became available.5 This is problematic, since 
the agricultural data used in this analysis only covers 1956 to 1987.6
4See Lovell (1990) for a comprehensive review. Frequently used models build on the work of 
Holland (1980), Holland (1997), De Maria et al. (1992), or Merrill (2000).
5 E-mail correspondence with Pascal Peduzzi from the UNEP/DEWA/GRID-Europe on the 
24.03.2009.
6Duflo and Pande (2007) have collected district-level data for the six major crops (bajra, jowar, 
maize, rice, sugar and wheat) up to 1999. However, their dataset is incomplete and lacks information 
on several major states, including Bihar, Orissa, and West Bengal. It also does not provide information 
on the minor crops that are crucial for my analysis. I therefore only work with data from the World 
Bank, which is the most comprehensive database on Indian agriculture currently available.
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To solve this problem, I use two cyclone datasets that complement each other in 
terms of precision and data coverage. The first dataset is the so-called eAtlas of the 
India Meteorological Department (IMD), which is a digital database of all storms and 
depressions in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea from 1891 to 2008.7 Since 
this dataset covers a long time horizon, only cyclone track information is available. 
However, the data is comparable across years, as the IMD has applied a consistent 
classification throughout (IMD, 2008). The second more sophisticated dataset has 
been designed by UNEP/DEWA/GRID-Europe PREVIEW (UNEP).8 They employ 
a state-of-the-art GIS model based on Holland (1997) to calculate wind speed buffers 
for all cyclone events that occurred worldwide between 1975 and 2007.
Clearly, the first dataset has the great advantage of covering a long time period. 
In contrast, the second provides a much more precise estimate of cyclone exposure, 
albeit for a shorter time horizon. To take advantage of both datasets, I use the period 
of overlap to predict the percentage of the district’s area affected by a cyclone for 
1891 to 2008.9 Note that this prediction -  which will be explained in more detail in 
Section 1.3.2 below -  only proxies for the extent of the cyclone, not the actual level of 
destruction. Yang (2008) has therefore argued that the cyclone variable should also 
be weighted by population. Unfortunately, this is not possible in this context, as the 
Indian Census only takes place every ten years. Interpolation of the intervening years 
is not desirable, because it fails to capture any declines in the population due to the 
cyclone itself.
1.3.2 M easuring cyclone exposure at the district level
To predict cyclone exposure, I first construct 16 district-level variables from the cy­
clone tracks of the eAtlas. These variables attempt to mimic the main features of 
the UNEP’s wind speed buffers and will be used in the prediction10. To this end, 
both raw data sets are displayed in Figure 1.1. The map, for example, clearly shows 
that stronger cyclones are associated with both larger wind speed buffers and longer 
cyclone tracks. I thus proxy for the size of the wind speed buffers by summing the 
cyclone track length within a district. To capture possible non-linearities in this re­
lationship, I square the track length variable and use it as an additional regressor in 
the prediction. The other 14 variables are constructed similarly and explained in full 
in Appendix A.3.
These 16 controls are subsequently regressed on the dependent variable constructed
7The data can be ordered at http://w w w .im dchennai.gov.in/cyclone_eatlas.htm . Appendix 
A.3 contains additional information on this database.
8The dataset can be downloaded from h ttp ://preview .grid.unep.ch/index.php?preview =  
data&events=cyclones&lang=eng. More information on the data is provided in Appendix A.2.
9I use the district boundaries of 1966 throughout the analysis. This makes the cyclone data 
compatible with the World Bank’s India Agriculture and Climate dataset, which is my main source 
of data for the primary sector (see Section 1.3.3 for more detail).
10Note that the prediction does not change significantly if instead I use the first three principal 
components of these variables, which explain 82.95% of the total variation.
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from the UNEP data. The latter measures the percentage of the district’s area covered 
by a wind speed buffer for the period of overlap, 1977-200311. The dependent variable 
is then predicted out of sample for 1891 to 2008. This yields the so-called cyclone 
exposure variable, which will be the main control of interest in the empirical analysis. 
Note that the standard errors will have to be bootstrapped in the regressions, since 
the cyclone exposure variable is a predicted regressor. Finally, I have recorded the 
date information for each of the 16 eAtlas controls. Therefore, I can determine when 
a cyclone hits a given district, which will be important for the identification strategy 
later on.
Nonetheless, there are two problems with using the eAtlas data for this prediction. 
Firstly, it codes storms with wind strength of 48 knots (equivalent to 88.9km/h) or 
more as cyclones, whereas the UNEP data uses a much higher threshold of 96 knots 
(177.8km/h). Since no wind speed measurements are available for the eAtlas, I cannot 
distinguish weaker from stronger storms. Therefore, all of the cyclone events will have 
to be included in the prediction. As a consequence, there is a risk of overpredicting 
exposure, especially at the low end of the distribution. I therefore construct a second 
severe cyclone exposure variable, which restricts the prediction to being greater or 
equal to 25% of the district’s territory.12
To assess the quality of these predictions, I first compare the dependent variable 
with the cyclone exposure variable for the period of overlap. The correlation between 
these two variables is displayed in Figure 1.2a. It clearly shows that the eAtlas data 
often predicts damage, when none was recorded by the UNEP wind speed buffers. 
This leads to a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of 0.29. The coefficient increases to 
0.44, if the correlation is only calculated for strictly positive values of the dependent 
variable (Figure 1.2b), and to 0.46 for the severe cyclone exposure variable (Figure 
1.2c). Similarly, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient increases from 0.13 to 0.45 to 
0.47 as the sample is restricted further.
The improved fit can also be seen when comparing the distributions of the pre­
dicted variables with the dependent variable for the period of overlap. Figure 1.3a 
shows that the distribution of the UNEP data is twin-peaked with a large mass at very 
low and high levels of the percent area affected. Thus, it has a large standard error of 
3.44 around its mean of 33.46%. The distribution of the predicted cyclone exposure 
variable is instead centred on its mean of 22.74% with a standard error of only 0.47 
(Figure 1.3b). Yet, once the distribution is truncated for the severe cyclone exposure 
variable (Figure 1.3c), it more closely resembles the UNEP data -  it is then skewed 
to the right and its mean and associated standard error almost double to 39.41% and 
0.83 respectively.
These results seem to suggest that the severe cyclone exposure variable better fits
11 For the period of overlap tropical cyclones only reach the Indian shore between 1977 and 2003.
12 This threshold effectively restricts the distribution of the predicted variable to the top 30% (con­
ditional on being positive). Any increases in this threshold lower the sample size significantly.
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the UNEP data and should thus be used in the regression analysis. However, it is 
important to note that the truncation considerably limits the number of district-level 
cyclone events. For the final sample period ranging from 1956 to 1987, the number of 
district-level cyclone events drops from 1138 to 273 through the restriction. This will 
significantly lower the precision of the estimates in the empirical analysis. These two 
factors will have to be weighed against each other before making a final decision on 
which variable to use.
The second problem with the eAtlas data concerns measurement error. Firstly, I 
need to use a much simpler model than the UNEP team to estimate the percentage 
of the district’s area affected. Moreover, the eAtlas cyclone tracks only roughly follow 
the movement of the UNEP wind speed buffers, which can be clearly seen in Figure 
1.1. To address this issue, I construct a third variable, which solely relies on the 
eAtlas data. More specifically, I simply calculate the district’s minimum distance to 
the nearest cyclone track. However, this minimum distance variable only provides a 
lower bound estimate of cyclone exposure, since its correlation with the UNEP wind 
speed buffers is only 0.12 in absolute value as opposed to 0.44 for the cyclone exposure 
variable. It will thus be used as a robustness check in the empirical analysis.
Table 1.1 displays the summary statistics for all three eAtlas-based cyclone vari­
ables for the sample period used in this analysis, 1956-1987. The data is reported for 
all observations in Panel A and for the respective cyclone samples in Panel B. The 
overall probability of being exposed to a cyclone is very low; on average only 2.37% 
of the district’s area is exposed to the cyclones as measured by the cyclone exposure 
variable -  a figure that drops to 1.05% for the severe cyclone exposure variable. Sim­
ilarly, the minimum distance to the nearest cyclone is large on average at 775.40km. 
However, if a district is struck by a cyclone, exposure increases dramatically to 21.41% 
and 39.54% for the cyclone exposure and severe cyclone exposure variable respectively. 
The average minimum distance to the nearest cyclone track also drops significantly 
to 237.46km.
1.3.3 D ata for the primary sector
The outcome variables for this analysis were retrieved from the World Bank’s In­
dia Agricultural and Climate Dataset (WB).13 This is a comprehensive district-level 
database for the primary sector that provides production information on an annual ba­
sis for 1956 to 1987 -  note that a year is defined as an agricultural year, which roughly 
runs from April to the following March. The sample includes 271 districts within 13 
states (which use the 1966 boundaries) covering almost 80% of the Indian territory.14 
I only lack information on two agriculturally important states, namely Kerala and 
Assam. Nonetheless, this is not a major concern for the current analysis, since both
13The data can be downloaded from http://ip l.econ .duke.edu /dthom as/dev_data/index.htm l. 
For more information on the dataset see Appendix A.4.
14The full list of states included in the analysis is provided in Appendix A.I.
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states are not hit by a tropical cyclone during the sample period. Consequently, they 
would have only contributed to the estimation of the fixed effects.
The great advantage of this dataset is that it contains crop-level information on 
farm harvest prices, agricultural output, and area planted for each district. This data 
is available for 6 major and 14 minor crops, which cover a wide variety ranging from 
cereals to fibre crops.15 It also reports price and quantity information for variable 
inputs, such as fertilizer, agricultural labourers, bullocks and tractors. Unfortunately, 
this data is only available at the district level. This makes it impossible to calculate 
crop-level profits or to analyse potential changes in the production technology in 
response to the shock. Moreover, the labour and capital data is collected only in 
decennial and quinquennial censuses respectively. Therefore, it fails to capture the 
disaster impact, making it unsuitable for the present study.
Instead, the empirical analysis focuses on the crop-level variables measuring the 
area planted, output and farm harvest prices. Note that I adjust prices with the 
agricultural GDP deflator for 1980. I also construct three additional outcome vari­
ables. First of all, I capture the value of production by calculating earnings as the 
product of prices and quantities. Secondly, to measure productivity, I compute yields 
that are equal to the ratio of earnings to the area planted. Finally, I proxy for the 
nutritious value of the crops by converting the output data into its calorie content. 
These calculations use weights obtained from MeDINDIA -  a premier health portal 
in India.16
Nonetheless, more information is needed to identify the impact of tropical cyclones 
on the primary sector. The reason for this is that cyclone events occur throughout the 
agricultural year.17 These shocks thus have a differential effect across crops depending 
on their position in the growing cycle. The situation is further complicated by the 
fact that most Indian districts have two and some even three growing seasons (GOI, 
1967). Consequently, some crops within the same agricultural year are affected by the 
cyclone, whereas others are planted only after the shock. To disentangle these effects, 
the WB dataset is augmented with a district-level crop calendar (GOI, 1967).18 This 
growing season information allows me to distinguish which crops in my sample were 
sown before or after a given cyclone shock.19
Section 1.4 now explains how this distinction helps identify the impact of tropical
15The six major crops are bajra, jowar, maize, rice, sugar, and wheat. The 14 minor crops are 
barley, cotton, gram, groundnut, jute, other pulses, potatoes, ragi, rapeseed and mustard, sesamum, 
soy, sunflowers, tobacco, and tur.
16The calorie information was downloaded on 22nd of July 2010 at http://www.m edindia.net/ 
p a tien ts/fo o d ca lo r ies /in d ex .a sp
17For the cyclone exposure variable, storms occur from February-December, whereas for the severe 
cyclone exposure variable, shocks occur from April-December.
18 Appendix A.5 provides more information on the construction of this dataset.
19Note that the final dataset only includes crops for which sowing and harvesting times axe reported 
in the crop calendar, or for which I could calculate the sowing and harvesting times from the state- 
level data. For details of these calculations refer to Appendix A.5. I have also dropped non-annual 
crops from the analysis, as cyclones in several years could impact on their production and it is difficult 
to disentangle these effects.
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cyclones on agricultural production and crop mix choices.
1.4  Id en tifica tion  s tra teg y
1.4.1 M otivation
The identification strategy is built on the following two observations about tropical 
cyclones. Firstly, the movement and intensity of each storm is solely determined by 
climatic and oceanic conditions (IMD, 2009). The cyclone shock is therefore exogenous 
to the primary sector allowing me to estimate its causal impact on agricultural output 
and production choices. Note that this effect is heterogeneous across districts due 
to the non-random movement of tropical cyclones. For example, in this dataset, 
8.4% of all districts suffer one third of all cyclone shocks prior to 1956. We would 
thus expect producers in these high-risk regions to anticipate the event and adjust 
their production behaviour accordingly. However, since they constitute such a small 
fraction of the sample, the estimates are too imprecise to identify a differential effect. 
I therefore restrict myself to estimating the average cost and behavioural response.
Secondly, tropical cyclones form throughout the year and can affect the same 
district in different months.20 As has been explained in Section 1.3.3, the impact of the 
shock thus differs across crops within the same agricultural year due to the presence 
of multiple growing seasons. Specifically, some crops axe hit by the cyclone prior to 
their harvest. Their output is hence destroyed. However, there is a second group of 
crops that has not been sown yet. Given that cyclone shocks axe largely uninsured, 
producers can thus respond in a variety of ways. For instance, they might intensify 
their input use in the subsequent growing season to raise yields. Alternatively, farmers 
could expand production by using land that was supposed to be fallow21. They might 
also plant more resilient crops such as coarse cereals that can flourish on marginal land 
(Sawhney and Daji, 1961). These crops have the added advantage of a high calorie 
content22, which will help farmers smooth both income and nutrition in the aftermath 
of the natural disaster.
Given that producers can respond to the shock within the same year, a simple 
regression of cyclone exposure on agricultural output will not estimate the total level 
of destruction. Instead it will provide a measure of the net effect of a tropical cyclone. 
That is, it will capture both the damage caused and the subsequent behavioural 
response of the producers. These two effects counterbalance each other and it is not
20Cyclone shocks occur from February to December for the cyclone exposure and minimum distance 
variables and from April to December for the severe cyclone exposure variable. However, the prime 
cyclone season runs from May until November, with more than three quarters of all shocks occurring 
during that time period for all three cyclone measures.
21 Summer and winter crops are often planted in rotation, which can include fallow periods. For 
example, the maximum production of barley can only be achieved if the land is not cropped in the 
preceding summer (Sawhney and Daji (1961), p. 116). The suitability of a given combination of crops 
depends on local climate, soil characteristics, and the availability of irrigation facilities.
22The average calorie content of coarse cereals is 343.6 calories per lOOg, whereas the corresponding 
figure for all other food crops is 294.8 calories per lOOg.
1 INCOME SMOOTHING AND CYCLONE DAMAGE IN  INDIA 25
clear a priori which effect should outweigh the other. It is therefore an empirical 
question to determine if the change in behaviour is sufficient to offset the impact 
of the natural disaster. I can estimate this overall effect by regressing the cyclone 
exposure variable on the production data for the entire universe of crops.
I can even take the analysis one step further and break up the overall effect into 
its individual components. To do so, I exploit the interaction between the timing of 
the cyclone shock and the multiple growing seasons in my sample. For example, I 
distinguish between cyclones that occurred before and after the sowing time of the 
so-called winter crops -  i.e., crops planted in the second half of the agricultural year. If 
these two cyclone variables axe then regressed on the output of winter crops only, I can 
separately identify the cyclone impact and coping strategy. That is, if the district was 
hit by a cyclone at the beginning of the year, farmers should have smoothed income 
by expanding production and thus output in the second growing season. However, 
shocks that occurred towards the end of the year should have destroyed the standing 
winter crops with no room for recovery. The converse argument can be applied to the 
summer crops, where the destruction of the harvest in the previous year should have 
led to an increase in production in the next growing season.
Furthermore, I investigate if farmers change their crop mix towards coarse cereals 
in response to the shock. As has been argued above, producers might choose to 
plant more coarse cereals after a cyclone shock to ensure a steady income and cheap 
calories. However, by doing so farmers forgo higher income. That is, coarse cereals are 
generally of low economic value -  on average, they fetch prices half the size of other 
food crops in my sample. Therefore, we would expect this change in the crop mix 
to be only temporarily. I can test for this coping strategy by splitting the data into 
coarse cereals23 and all other food crops24. I then estimate the net effect of cyclone 
exposure for both groups separately and test for the persistence of the shock.
Section 1.4.2 now describes how this identification strategy is implemented.
1.4.2 Empirical Im plem entation
Firstly, I estimate the net effect of tropical cyclone on agricultural production with 
an OLS fixed effects regression, as follows:
Vcdt = «  +  P cyclonedt +  \ d +  Vc +  I t  + tc d t, (!)
where y ^ t  is either the area planted, output, farm harvest price, earnings, yields, 
or calorie content of crop c in district d in year t, and cyclonedt is one of the three 
district-level cyclone exposure variables discussed in Section 1.3.2. The coefficient /?
23The following crops are included in the coarse cereal category: bajra, barley, gram, jowar, and 
ragi.
24The following crops are included in the other crop category: groundnut, jute, maize, potato, 
rapeseed and mustard, rice, sesamum, sugar, tur, and wheat.
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thus captures the net causal impact of cyclone damage on agricultural production and 
crop mix choices. The regression also controls for time-invariant crop and district 
fixed effects, A^  and pc respectively.25 In addition, 7* controls for common macro 
shocks26, because agricultural policy is set by the central government. Given that the 
cyc lo n e  exposure  variables are predicted regressors, the standard errors are clustered 
at the district level and bootstrapped. Lastly, the regression is weighted by the share 
in initial production of crop c in district d, since there is substantial variation in 
output across crops and districts -  the 5th percentile of the output variable is 44 tons, 
whereas the 95th percentile is 150,800 tons.27
To investigate the dynamics of cyclone’s net impact, I simply include three lags of 
the cyclone exposure variable into equation (1):
Vcdt = a  +  f t o  cyc lo n edt +  0 n  c y c lo n e ^ ^  +  0 i  2 cyc lo n edt_ 2 +  0 i 3 cyc lo n edt_ 3
(2)
+  Ad +  /xc +  7* +  ecdt
The results are robust to the inclusion of more lags. Since the effects generally lose 
significance with the second or third lag, I focus the analysis on this specification. 
On the one hand, we would predict that the coefficients on the lags are statistically 
significantly different from zero, as producers take time to recover from the shock. 
Yet, these coefficients should lose significance over time, as the empirical literature on 
large temporary shocks does not find lasting changes in production behaviour (Davis 
and Weinstein, 2002; Miguel and Roland, 2006).28
Furthermore, I can carry out a falsification exercise to verify that I am indeed 
capturing the impact of an exogenously determined natural disaster. Specifically, I 
include three leads of the cyclone exposure variable into regression (2). Their coef­
ficients should be jointly insignificantly different from zero, if I am indeed capturing 
the impact of an exogenously determined natural disaster. That is, there should be 
no pre-trends in the data that are captured by the cyclone variable after controlling 
for common macro shocks.
Secondly, I disentangle the direct impact of the cyclone on agricultural production 
from the subsequent behavioural response of the producers to shock. To do this,
25The inclusion of crop-by-district fixed effects does not change the results substantially. This is not 
surprising, as each crop category comprises several varieties, which the dataset does not distinguish 
separately (Sawhney and Daji, 1961). Thus, there should not be much variation in the observed 
suitability of one crop across districts, as farmers have already chosen the optimal variety. Moreover, 
districts are small geographical units, so that most of the variation is absorbed by Ad.
26The results are robust to the inclusion of crop-by-year fixed effects. This finding makes intuitive 
sense, as it is a well-known fact that markets are not well-integrated in India (Topalova, 2004; Duflo 
and Pande, 2007; Guiteras, 2007). In fact, my results below show that farm harvest prices do respond 
to local shocks. Hence, it is unlikely that crop-level shocks equally affect all districts within India.
27This weight is calculated as the share in total production of crop c in district d  for 1956-1958. 
If the crop was not produced during this time period the output level in the first year that it was 
planted is used for the calculation of the share.
28 As has already been mentioned in footnote 2, permanent production shocks can have general 
equilibrium effects, as behavioural responses are adjusted (Hornbeck, 2008).
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I estimate the following weighted OLS fixed effects regression -  with clustered and 
bootstrapped standard errors -  for the sample of winter and summer crops separately:
Vcdt =& +  ftipre-sowing cyclonedt +  fapre-harvest cyclonedt+
(3)
*d +  pc +  I t  +  Ccrff,
where pre-sowing cyclonedt and pre-harvest cyclonedt measure the cyclone exposure 
for all event prior to the sowing and harvesting season of the winter or summer crops 
respectively. The coefficient ft\ thus captures the behavioural response of the produc­
ers. In contrast, the coefficient ft2 measures the direct impact of the cyclone on the 
outcome variable. To estimate the persistence of these effects, I include three lags of 
pre-sowing cyclonedt and pre-harvest cyclonedt into equation (3).
Finally, to test for changes in the crop mix, I simply run equations (1) and (2) on 
the sample of coarse cereals and all other food crops one at a time. The sample of 
coarse cereals comprises bajra, barley, gram, jowar, and ragi. The other food crops 
include groundnut, jute, maize, potato, rapeseed and mustard, rice, sesamum, sugar, 
tur, and wheat.
Section 1.5 now presents the results of the empirical analysis.
1.5 R esu lts
1.5.1 The net effect o f tropical cyclones on agricultural production
I begin by estimating equations (1) and (2) using the cyclone exposure variable and the 
entire sample of crops. These results are presented in Table 1.2. Columns 1-6 provide 
the estimates for the area planted, output, farm harvest prices, earnings, yields, and 
calorie content respectively. Panel A displays the estimates for the contemporaneous 
effect (obtained from estimating equation (1)) and Panel B for the medium-run impact 
(i.e., the estimates of equation (2)). Note that the regressions for the calorie content 
exclude zero-calorie crops like cotton and tobacco, which is why column 6 has fewer 
observations than columns 1-5.29
As expected, I find an overall reduction in output if a district is struck by a 
cyclone. In fact, column 2 of Panel A shows that a one standard deviation increase 
in the cyclonedt variable lowers the quantity produced by 7.75%. Rather surprisingly, 
I also find that the area planted increases by 3.02% in response to the cyclone event 
(Panel A, column 1). This finding shows that farmers are indeed able to counter 
the aggregate income shock within the same agricultural year by expanding their 
production -  a response which will be explored in more detail in Sections 1.5.2 and 
1.5.3. However, it is important to note that this change in behaviour is not sufficient 
to offset the damage caused by the tropical cyclone. In fact, the reduction in output 
estimated above captures the net impact, where the traces of destruction have been
29The results in columns 1-5 are robust to the exclusion of the zero-calorie crops.
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lessened but not removed by the behavioural response. Moreover, given that these 
two effects are diametrically opposed, the net impact on prices, earnings, yields, and 
calorie content is indeterminate and insignificant.
Panel B estimates the dynamic impact of cyclone exposure on agricultural pro­
duction by including three lags of the cyclonedt variable into the regression. The 
medium-run behavioural response -  estimated by calculating the sum of the immedi­
ate effect and all three lags -  is even larger than in the main specification. At the end 
of three years the area planted has increased by 9.49% (Panel B, column 1, sum of 
lags). This continued expansion in production translates into a similar rise in output, 
earnings, and calories in the three years after the shock (the sum of the three lags 
only increases by 13.19%, 22.97%, and 13.14% respectively). However, due to the 
negative contemporaneous effect of the cyclone, the medium-run impact is positive 
but insignificant (Panel B, columns 2, 4, and 6 , sum of lags). That is to say, recovery 
from a cyclone shock is slow -  the behavioural response only manages to offset the 
damage after three years. This is not surprising given that an average cyclone shock 
affects 21.41% of the district’s area. Finally, it is interesting to notice that the in­
crease in output also leads to a medium-run reduction in local prices of 2.33% (Panel 
B, column 3, sum of lags). This last finding supports the long-standing assumption in 
the academic literature that markets are not well-integrated in India (Topalova, 2004; 
Duflo and Pande, 2007; Guiteras, 2007).
These results are robust to using alternative measures of cyclone exposure. To 
illustrate this, Table A .l in the appendix shows the estimates of the contemporaneous 
effect for the severe cyclone exposure variable in Panel A and the minimum distance 
variables in Panel B. The estimates for the severe cyclone exposure variable are of 
similar magnitude and sign. However, they are less precisely estimated, because the 
number of cyclone shocks is restricted considerably through the truncation of the 
predicted values. I therefore prefer the cyclone exposure variable. The findings for the 
minimum distance variable are also of similar magnitude but opposite sign, because 
this variable is smaller the closer the district is to the cyclone track. Nonetheless, given 
that it is less correlated with the UNEP data than the cyclone exposure variable30, I 
use the latter for the remainder of the empirical study.
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is important to establish that I am indeed 
capturing the impact of tropical cyclones. I therefore carry out a falsification exercise 
by including three leads of the cyclonedt variable into the regression. Table 1.3 presents 
these results. Reassuringly, the coefficients of the leads are jointly insignificant for all 
six outcome variables. Furthermore, the main results from Table 1.2 remain largely 
unchanged: tropical cyclones destroy output, but farmers respond by increasing pro­
duction. However, this behavioural response is not sufficient to counterbalance the 
damage caused in the year of the shock. Districts only recover after three years. This
30The correlation with the UNEP wind speed buffers is only 0.12 in absolute value for the minimum 
distance variable, but 0.44 for the cyclone exposure variable.
1 INCOME SMOOTHING AND  CYCLONE DAMAGE IN  INDIA 29
evidence enhances confidence that I am indeed capturing the causal impact of cyclone 
damage on agricultural production.
Further analysis is now needed to disentangle the ways in which farmers cope with 
these large and mostly uninsured aggregate income shocks. By taking advantage of 
the detailed nature of my dataset, I can identify two possible coping strategies: income 
smoothing across growing seasons and changes in the crop mix towards cheap calories 
discussed in Sections 1.5.2 and 1.5.3 respectively.
1.5.2 Coping strategy 1: incom e sm oothing across growing seasons
As has been explained in Section 1.4, I can identify the destruction caused by the 
cyclone and the subsequent behavioural response separately by following a simple 
logic. Specifically, I use the date of the natural disaster and the district-specific 
growing seasons to distinguish between cyclone events that occurred before or after 
the sowing time of a given crop. Shocks prior to planting will identify the behavioural 
response. In contrast, the cyclone’s destructive potential will be captured by all events 
that happened after sowing but before the harvest. Given that there are about 20 
crops in the sample, I group them according to the two main growing seasons in India; 
namely, the summer crops that are planted at the beginning of the year and the winter 
crops, which are sown in second half. This identification strategy has already been 
formulated in equation (3) and is now estimated for each group separately.
The results show a very consistent picture -  crops are destroyed if the cyclone 
hits prior to the harvest, but more are grown if it strikes before the sowing season. 
This is clearly illustrated in Table 1.4, which presents the findings for the winter crops 
only.31 The results in Panel A show that farmers expand their production of winter 
crops if a cyclone hits prior to their sowing season; a one standard deviation increase 
in the pre-sowing cyclonedt variable increases the area planted, output, earnings, and 
calorie content by 9.97%, 18.77%, 11.16%, and 13.83% respectively (columns 1, 2, 4, 
and 6, cyclone before sowing). The effect on yields is insignificant, because both the 
area planted and output increase. These effects persist in the medium-run as shown 
in Panel B (columns 1, 2, 4, and 6, cyclone before sowing, sum of lags).
On the contrary, cyclone events before the harvest only affect output. We would 
expect this coefficient to be larger than the net effect estimated in Table 1.2, which 
also captures the mitigating behavioural response. This is the case, as a one standard 
deviation increase in the pre-harvest cyclonedt variable lowers the quantity produced 
by 11.55% (Panel A, column 2, cyclone before harvest) -  the net effect is only —7.75%. 
As a second consistency check, it is important to notice that there is no effect on the 
area planted (Panel A, column 1, cyclone before harvest). This makes intuitive sense, 
since the pre-harvest cyclonedt variable only captures the effect of tropical cyclones
31A crop is defined as a winter crop if it is sown in a given district after the first week of August. 
These crops are then harvested in the winter time or early spring of the following year. The results 
are robust to changing the cut-off date.
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after planting decisions have been made. Finally, production does not change in the 
medium run -  the estimates for all six outcome variables are insignificant in Panel
B. This provides suggestive evidence that farmers only adjust their behaviour in the 
growing season, which is at a lower risk from cyclone shocks.
Analogous results are obtained for the summer crops shown in Table 1.5. In 
fact, the highly significant coefficients in Panel A exhibit a similar pattern: a one 
standard deviation increase in the pre-sowing cyclonedt variable increases the area 
planted, output produced, earnings, and calorie content by 5.34%, 22.63%, 23.10%, 
and 21.46% respectively (columns 1, 2, 4, and 6, cyclone before sowing). This time 
the cyclone shock also has a negative and highly significant impact on local prices, 
which decline by 1.33% (columns 3, cyclone before sowing). These effects persist in 
the medium run and are even stronger and more significant than for the winter crops. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that yields now also increase in the medium run 
(column 5, cyclone before sowing, sum of lags). This suggests that the production of 
summer crops expands both along the extensive and intensive margin. Lastly, similar 
to Table 1.4 a tropical cyclone hit before the harvest only lowers production by 13.66% 
(Panel A, column 2, cyclone before harvest). There is, again, no persistent impact.
The evidence clearly shows that cyclones destroy output and that this effect is 
larger than the overall results would suggest. In addition, producers attempt to 
smooth income after a cyclone shock by expanding production in the subsequent 
growing season of the same agricultural year. Specifically, they plant high calorie 
crops on new land -  an effect which persists in the medium run. The following section 
now explores this change in the crop mix in more detail.
1.5.3 Coping strategy 2: changes in the crop m ix towards cheap calories
This section explores the second income smoothing mechanism that I can identify 
using my detailed dataset. In particular, it investigates if farmers adjust their crop 
mix towards coarse cereals after a cyclone shock. As has been argued above, these 
crops need few inputs and can grow on a variety of soils, including low-quality land. 
This will make it easier for producers to smooth income if the tropical cyclone has 
destroyed their capital and variable inputs. Moreover, coarse cereals have a high 
calorie content on average. Farmers will thus be able to meet basic nutritional needs 
after the natural disaster struck by planting these crops. Nonetheless, since they 
have a low economic value, we would expect any changes in the crop mix to be only 
temporary. To study this coping strategy, I estimate equations (1) and (2) for the 
sample of coarse cereals and other food crops successively.
Table 1.6 presents the results for the coarse cereals. Similar to Table 1.2, the 
estimates capture the net effect of cyclone exposure. Consistent with our expectations, 
the findings clearly show that farmers choose to produce more coarse cereals after a 
cyclone shock. As a matter of fact, they increase production so much that the damage
1 INCOME SMOOTHING AND CYCLONE DAMAGE IN  INDIA 31
is offset completely, i.e. the area planted, output, and calorie content experience a net 
increase of 4.22%, 11.47%, and 11.70% respectively (Panel A, columns 1, 2, and 6). 
This rise in output leads to a contemporaneous drop in local farm harvest prices of 
2.53% (Panel A, column 3). Given these opposing forces, the impact on earnings and 
yields is again indeterminate and insignificant (Panel A, columns 4 and 5).
Furthermore, the estimates of the dynamic effects in Panel B show that farmers 
continue to put more effort into the production of coarse cereals in the years after 
the shock. However, this increase is solely along the intensive margin, as output 
and calorie content rise (and prices fall) without a concomitant increase in the area 
planted (Panel B, columns 2, 3, and 6, sum of lags). This effect could be driven by 
a more intensive application of fertilizer, which can substantially increase yields of 
coarse cereals (Sawhney and Daji, 1961). Unfortunately, I am unable to investigate 
this mechanism further, as the input data is not available at the crop level.
The evidence for all other food crops is presented in Table 1.7. It complements 
the story of income and nutrition smoothing. In particular, Panel A shows that these 
crops are largely destroyed by the cyclone shock and not replanted within the same 
year. The destruction is sizeable -  a one standard deviation increase in the cyclone^ 
variable reduces output by 13.93% (Panel A, column 2). There is no significant con­
temporaneous effect on any of the other outcome variables. It should also be noted 
that the production of other food crops is not adjusted in the medium run. The re­
sults in Panel B of Table 1.7 show no statistically significant sum of lags for any of the 
six outcome variables. This is not surprising, since these crops have yields that are 
on average three times higher than those of the coarse cereals and fetch prices that 
are twice as large. Profit-maximising farmers will therefore prefer to grow other food 
crops.
Summarizing the results of the last three sections yields a consistent story of the 
impact of tropical cyclones on the primary sector in India. First of all, the destruc­
tion caused by a tropical cyclone is sizeable. Given that farmers are largely unin­
sured against these aggregate income shocks, they have to change their production 
behaviour. Due to there being multiple growing seasons in India, they will be able to 
expand production in the growing season directly following the cyclone shock. They 
also change their crop mix towards cheap calories, such as coarse cereals, to smooth 
both income and nutrition. This will lessen the impact of the natural disaster, but 
will not be sufficient to offset the damage in the year of the cyclone hit. However, 
producers continue to smooth income after the shock until recovery has been achieved 
about three years after the hit.
1.6 C onclusion
This paper has shown that the impact of tropical cyclones on the primary sector 
in India is devastating. Using a new digital database of cyclone exposure, I show
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that farmers need on average three years to recover from the aggregate income shock. 
Given that natural disasters are largely uninsured, producers have to change their 
production behaviour in an attempt to smooth income and nutrition. By exploiting 
the detailed nature of my dataset I can identify two coping strategies. On the one 
hand, producers smooth income intertemporally by expanding their production in the 
growing season directly following the cyclone shock. On the other, they change their 
crop mix towards coarse cereals, which are highly resilient crops that provide cheap 
calories.
These results clearly show that the focus of disaster relief on short-term supportive 
measures is insufficient. The first relief operations should be seamlessly followed by 
medium-run aid to help rebuild sustainable livelihoods and smooth income. The atti­
tudes towards introducing a development component into disaster relief have shifted 
only recently in India. Since the aforementioned super-cyclone struck Orissa in 1999 
and a major earthquake hit Gujarat in 2001, an initiative has been launched by the 
High Powered Committee on Disaster Management to develop a more comprehensive 
approach towards natural disasters (HPC, 2001). The findings of this paper stress the 
need to push ahead with this initiative, especially since climate change will enhance 
the frequency and intensity of cyclonic storms.
However, more research is needed to identify effective mitigation and rehabili­
tation methods. Furthermore, due to data limitations the analysis cannot study the 
behavioural response of districts that are historically more exposed to cyclone damage. 
The coping strategies and recovery process might be quite different in more vulnerable 
communities. More disaggregated data is needed to investigate this further. Finally, 
it is important to note that the possibilities to smooth income and nutrition are excep­
tional in India. The impact of tropical cyclones will be more pronounced in developing 
countries where there is only one growing season and land is already fully exploited. 
It thus becomes even more important to help producers recover from the shock and 
protect themselves more effectively against future shocks.
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A  D a ta  ap p en d ix
This appendix provides information complementary to Section 1.3 on the variables 
used in this paper.
A .l The district sample
The district sample used in this analysis is the same as in the World Bank’s India 
Agriculture and Climate Dataset. It covers 271 districts within thirteen states of 
India (Andhra Pradesh, Bihax, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Madhya 
Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal). 
Kerala and Assam are the only major agricultural states that are not included in the 
dataset. However, both states were not hit by a cyclone during 1956-1987, which is 
the time horizon of the agricultural data. It also provides no information on Himachal 
Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, the Union Territories, and the small states in the 
Northeast of India. This does not limit the analysis, since these states are not very 
important agriculturally and only Pondicherry was hit by a cyclone during the sample 
period. The dataset corrects for any changes in the district boundaries by using the 
1966 borders throughout the sample period.
A.2 The tropical cyclone w ind speed buffers dataset, 1975-2007
The tropical cyclone wind speed buffers have been designed by UNEP/DEWA/GRID- 
Europe PREVIEW (Project for Risk Evaluation Vulnerability Information and Early 
Warning) for the Global Assessment Report on Risk Reduction (ISDR, 2009). The 
data is made available on the Global Risk Data Platform and can be downloaded at 
h t t p : //p re v ie w .g r id .unep. ch/index.php?preview=data&events=cyclones&lang= 
eng. This database compiles cyclone tracks of more than 96 knots for 1975-2007 from 
the Regional Specialized Meteorological Centers of the World Meteorological Organi­
zation and the Tropical Cyclone Warning Centers. The wind speed buffers are then 
estimated with a state-of-the-art GIS model based on (Holland, 1997).
I import this data into the ArcGIS software and extract the buffers for the Indian 
subcontinent. These polygons are then overlaid with a district map of 1966, which 
corresponds to the boundaries used by the World Bank’s India Agriculture and Cli­
mate Dataset. On this basis, I am able to calculate the area covered by the wind speed 
buffers for each district. Furthermore, I use the 1966 boundaries to calculate the dis­
trict’s total area. Both of these variables are exported into STATA, where the cyclone 
data is collapsed by month and year. Subsequently, I calculate the percentage of the 
district’s area covered by the wind speed buffers. It is possible that the area affected 
is larger than the total size, since more than one cyclone can hit the same district in 
a given month. However, since this is only the case for 3.47% of the observations, I 
restrict this variable to being less than or equal to 100%.
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A .3 The eA tlas cyclone tracks dataset, 1891-2008
The cyclone track information for 1891-2008 has been obtained from a digital database 
of the India Meteorological Department (IMD). The data can be ordered at h t tp :  
/ / www.im dchennai.gov.i n / cy clo n e_ eatlas .h tm . This is an electronic version of 
the hard copy editions of its widely referred atlas Tracks of Storms and Depressions 
in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, which were published by IMD in the years 
1964, 1979 and 1996.
Since this dataset covers a long time horizon, only cyclone track information is 
available. The IMD has developed a consistent classification for all years to distin­
guish cyclones from depressions and minor storms. More specifically, a class 1 storm 
corresponds to wind speed of less than 33 knots, which is characteristic of depressions. 
Cyclonic storms with a strength of 33-47 knots axe coded as class 2 disturbances and 
all events with wind speeds of more than 47 knots are allocated to the class 3 group, 
which corresponds to severe cyclones. This analysis only focuses on the class 3 events, 
since they most closely correspond to the commonly used definition of a cyclone.
The raw data is supplied in terms of coordinates that mark the start and end point 
of a fine segment, which is allocated either to class 1, 2 or 3. In addition, information 
is provided on the start and end date of each line segment. I import this data into 
the ArcGIS software and create unified cyclone trades for the class 3 disturbances. 
I then overlay this data with the 1966 district map used for the wind speed buffers 
and calculate the total track length for the district itself and all the districts within a 
400km radius. This data is exported into STATA and collapsed by month and year.
To select suitable right-hand-side variables for the prediction, it is helpful to ex­
amine the UNEP data in Figure 1.1. Several features are noteworthy:
• The wind speed buffers are much larger for stronger cyclones, which suggests 
a possible non-linear relationship between the area affected and the strength of 
the storm. I calculate the total track length of a cyclone within a district. This 
variable measures the exposure to the storm. Furthermore, I square this measure 
to model possible non-linear effects.
• A single cyclone usually affects several districts at once. The maximum distance 
from the ‘eye of the storm ’ to the outmost boundary of the wind speed buffers is 
about 400km. This impact should be smaller for districts further away, as Figure
1.1 clearly shows that wind speeds decline monotonically with distance from the 
‘eye \  I construct the total track length variable for all districts within a 400km 
radius. I then sum this data across two mutually exclusive groups: the first set 
of districts comprises the nearest neighbours that share parts of the district’s 
boundary. The second group includes all those districts that are within a 400km 
radius, but do not directly adjoin the district. We would expect that cyclone 
shocks that hit the nearest neighbours should have a much larger impact on the
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district. I square the total track length variables for both neighbour groups to 
model possible non-linear effects. This yields four more variables.
•  The wind speed buffers do not penetrate more than 160km into the country. I 
restrict the eAtlas data accordingly.
I construct 10 additional variables, which capture the fact that cyclones in India are 
on average much stronger in autumn (IMD, 1979). That is, I create a dummy equal 
to 1 if the district is hit by a cyclone in a given year and month. This variable is then 
interacted with a dummy that switches on in or after September. I also calculate the 
total number of cyclone hits for the two neighbourhood groups respectively to measure 
exposure. I then create similar interactions with the autumn dummy. Furthermore, 
I capture possible non-linear effects by squaring the total number of cyclone hits for 
the two neighbourhood groups and interacting them with the autumn dummy.
These 16 variables are then regressed on the percentage of the district covered by 
the UNEP wind speed buffers for 1977-2003.32 The estimated coefficients are used 
to predict the percentage of the district’s area exposed to a cyclone shock out of 
sample. Note that I have to set 8.25% of the predicted values equal to zero, since they 
are estimated to be negative. This cyclone exposure variable is then also restricted 
to damage more than 25% of the district’s territory to determine the severe cyclone 
exposure variable. Both variables are then summed across months to create annual 
measures to match the agricultural data.
Finally, I construct the third cyclone variable, which is solely based on the eAtlas 
cyclone track data. In ArcGIS, I calculate the Euclidian distance to the nearest cyclone 
track for 125 x 125 metre cells. I then use the zonal statistics tool to calculate the 
district’s minimum distance to the nearest cyclone track. The data thus obtained is 
imported into STATA and collapsed by year.
A .4 The data for the primary sector, 1956-1987
The data for the primary sector comes from the World Bank’s India Agricultural and 
Climate Dataset, which has been constructed by Sanghi, Kumar and McKinsey and 
used in Dinar et al. (1998). It can be downloaded at h t tp : / / ip l .e c o n .d u k e .e d u /  
dthom as/dev_data/index.htm l.33 This dataset is the most comprehensive dataset 
on the agricultural sector in India. It covers the time period of 1956-1987, where one 
year refers to an agricultural year.
This database contains district-level information on farm harvest prices, agricul­
tural output and area planted broken down for six major (bajra, jowar, maize, rice, 
sugar, and wheat) and 14 minor crops (barley, cotton, gram, groundnut, jute, other 
pulses, potatoes, ragi, rapeseed and mustard, sesamum, soy, sunflowers, tobacco, and
32Despite the fact that the period of overlap ranges from 1975-2007, cyclones only reach the Indian 
shore between 1977 and 2003.
33More information on the dataset is also provided at http://ip l.econ .duke.edu /dthom as/dev_  
d ata /d atafiles/ind ia_agric_clim ate.h tm .
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tur). The dataset also contains district-level price and quantity information for inputs, 
such as fertilizer, agricultural labour, cultivators, tractors and bullocks. However, the 
data on the labour and capital inputs is interpolated, which makes it unsuitable for 
this analysis. Therefore, the analysis only uses the crop-level data on area planted, 
output, prices (deflated to 1980 INR), earnings (defined as the product of deflated 
prices and output) and yields (defined as the ratio of earnings to the area planted).
The output data is also converted into its calorie content by using information 
obtained from MeDINDIA, which is a premier health portal in India. The calorie 
content per lOOg was downloaded for each individual crop on the 22nd of July 2010 at 
h ttp ://w w w .m e d in d ia .n e t/p a tie n ts /fo o d c a lo rie s /in d e x .a sp . For several types 
of crops more than one calorie estimate was available. For instance, the website 
distinguishes between several types of gram, whereas the WB dataset only provides 
information on the overall category. I have thus taken the average of these values. In 
addition, I have used the value of unprocessed crop for maize, rice, and wheat.
A .5 The crop calendar
The raw data was entered from the Indian Crop Calendar (GOI, 1967). This pub­
lication lists the dates of sowing, harvesting and marketing times for each crop and 
district. The listed dates are averages, so that actual crop- and district-specific dates 
for these agricultural activities differ from plot to plot and from year to year. The 
crops listed in this publication include the 25 most important crops in India, but only 
the most relevant crops were fisted for each district. The Crop Calendar does not 
discuss how the crop selection decision was determined at the district level. Not all 
339 districts in India (in 1961) were accounted for in the Crop Calendar, but most 
were. Missing data was replaced by the state-level minimum (maximum) for the start 
(end) of the respective crop and season.
The sowing and harvesting dates in the Crop Calendar were fisted in a variety of 
forms. Usually a range of dates was provided in which sowing or harvesting could 
occur. This range of dates could either be precisely fisted in terms of dates or simply 
fist a range of months. I convert the start and end points of the date range into 
individual calendar dates by taking the largest possible window. For example, sowing 
in ‘April-May’ would be coded as a sowing start date of ‘1st of April’ and a sowing end 
date as ‘31st of May’. The precise calendar dates are then converted into the serial 
number for that day of the year, counting Jan 1st as 1 and December 31st as 365. Note 
that the agricultural season in India runs from roughly May to the following April. 
Hence, many of the sowing/growing/harvesting windows span two different calendar 
years. The numbering is continued accordingly.
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Figure 1.1: UNEP wind speed buffers and eAtlas cyclone tracks, 1977-2003
| 5 - highesl
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Figure 1.2: Correlation between the % area exposed as measured by the UNEP wind 
speed buffers and as predicted by the eAtlas cyclone tracks, 1977-2003
(a) % area exposed, N=906
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Figure 1.2: Correlation between the % area exposed as measured by the UNEP wind 
speed buffers and as predicted by the eAtlas cyclone tracks, 1977-2003 
(b) % area exposed > 0 for the UNEP data, N=108
o  -
o
CD
o .
CO
o .
correlation=.436
o  .
0 20 40 60 80 100
Cyclone exposure, predicted
•  % area affected, unep 95% Cl
  Fitted values
1 INCOME SMOOTHING AND CYCLONE DAMAGE IN INDIA 40
Figure 1.2: Correlation between the % area exposed as measured by the UNEP wind 
speed buffers and as predicted by the eAtlas cyclone tracks, 1977-2003
(c) % area exposed > 25 for the UNEP data and eAtlas prediction, N=33
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of the % area exposed as measured by the UNEP wind speed 
buffers and as predicted by the eAtlas cyclone tracks, 1977-2003 
(a) % area exposed > 0 for the UNEP data, N=108
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of the % area exposed as measured by the UNEP wind speed 
buffers and as predicted by the eAtlas cyclone tracks, 1977-2003
(b) % area exposed > 0 for the eAtlas prediction, N=855
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of the % area exposed as measured by the UNEP wind speed 
buffers and as predicted by the eAtlas cyclone tracks, 1977-2003
(c) % area exposed > 25 for the eAtlas prediction, N=258
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics of the cyclone exposure variables, 1956-87 
P a n e l A : T o ta l sa m p le
(i) (2) (3)
D ata Source Cyclone exposure Severe cyclone Minimum
exposure distance
Mean 2.368 1.049 775.402
Std deviation 7.964 6.751 525.177
Minimum 0 0 0
Maximum 93.245 93.245 2242.576
N 10287 10287 10287
P a n e l A : C y c lo n e  e v e n ts  o n ly
(i) (2) (3)
D ata Source Cyclone exposure Severe cyclone Minimum
exposure distance
Mean 21.408 39.539 237.461
Std deviation 12.878 13.999 163.460
Minimum 2.244 25.107 0
Maximum 93.245 93.245 625.848
N 1138 273 1138
N otes: The cyclone exposure and severe cyclone exposure variables are measured 
in percent. The m inimum distance variable is measured in kilometres. Data 
sources and construction are described in full in Appendix A.
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Table 1.2: The net effect of a cyclone shock
Panel A: T he contem poraneous effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LHS var Area Output Price Earnings Yield Calories
Cyclone exposure 70.634**
(32.187)
-168.947*
(101.963)
-0.077
(0.052)
-136.167
(203.595)
-1.031
(1.886)
-37.950
(43.776)
N
R-squared
104,288
0.731
104,288
0.629
104,288
0.640
104,288
0.689
104,288
0.247
89,056
0.624
Mean LHS var 
Mean Cyclone
30,168
(69,282)
21.408
(12.878)
28,066
(76,537)
21.408
(12.878)
269
(210)
21.408
(12.878)
51,059
(137,751)
21.408
(12.878)
2,649
(13,851)
21.408
(12.878)
11,368
(29,079)
21.408
(12.878)
Panel B: T he persistence o f the cyclone shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LHS var Area Output Price Earnings Yield Calories
Cyclone exposure 
Lag 1 
Lag 2 
Lag 3
65.117**
(30.620)
75.174**
(35.522)
81.884***
(28.304)
0.082
(35.130)
-180.195*
(101.450)
221.999***
(54.991)
148.040**
(62.600)
-82.497
(66.612)
-0.061
(0.053)
-0.130***
(0.039)
-0.209***
(0.048)
-0.088*
(0.046)
-187.982
(197.584)
433.905***
(150.699)
327.191
(288.282)
149.689
(243.392)
-1.142
(1.777)
0.134
(1.123)
5.122**
(2.358)
1.729
(1.579)
-42.571
(43.219)
94.320***
(21.341)
60.948**
(26.124)
-39.257*
(22.777)
Sum of lags 
Joint p
222.257**
(98.484)
0.014
107.347
(175.674)
0.000
-0.487***
(0.114)
0.000
722.802
(663.568)
0.011
6.842
(4.739)
0.084
73.440
(74.638)
0.000
N
R-squared
104,288
0.731
104,288
0.629
104,288
0.641
104,288
0.689
104,288
0.247
89,056
0.624
Notes: The cyclone exposure is measured in percent. The area data is measured in hectares, the output 
data in tons, and the farm harvest price and earnings data in 1980 Indian Rupees. The yield variable is 
defined as the ratio of earnings to area planted. The calorie content is obtained by converting the output 
volume into its calorie equivalent. Data sources and construction are described in full in Appendix A. The 
standard errors are clustered at the district level and bootstrapped. The standard errors and the standard 
deviations of the dependent variable and the cyclone exposure variable are shown in parentheses. *** 0.01, 
** 0.05, * 0.10
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Table 1.3: A falsification exercise
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LHS var Area Output Price Earnings Yield Calories
Cyclone exposure 63.950** -200.615** -0.089* -284.618 -1.234 -49.359
(28.649) (98.136) (0.052) (210.865) (1.690) (42.520)
Lag 1 73.899** 229.777*** -0.105*** 469.779*** 0.072 96.443***
(35.906) (56.580) (0.040) (157.727) (1.169) (21.808)
Lag 2 80.461*** 127.659* -0.235*** 230.660 5.015** 54.110**
(26.448) (65.037) (0.049) (290.973) (2.398) (26.876)
Lag 3 -1.833 -75.226 -0.064 179.555 2.638* -37.308*.
(34.018) (63.208) (0.046) (238.230) (1.531) (21.472)
Lead 1 15.337 58.105 0.177 209.678 0.608 14.119
(34.155) (92.156) (0.147) (193.757) (1.821) (34.509)
Lead 2 24.998 27.798 -0.151 144.153 1.444 15.146
(34.258) (48.192) (0.136) (155.401) (1.599) (18.666)
Lead 3 7.676 142.495* -0.019 226.059 0.995 48.985
(40.036) (74.570) (0.051) (177.261) (1.250) (27.891)
Sum of lags 216.476** 81.596 -0.493*** 595.377 6.492* 63.885
(93.120) (172.362) (0.112) (668.487) (3.677) (73.660)
Joint p lags 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.080 0.000
Joint p leads 0.793 0.207 0.307 0.405 0.717 0.228
Joint p 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.046 0.000
N 104,288 104,288 104,288 104,288 104,288 89,056
R-squared 0.731 0.629 0.641 0.689 0.247 0.624
Notes: The cyclone exposure is measured in percent. The area data is measured in hectares, the output 
data in tons, and the farm harvest price and earnings data in 1980 Indian Rupees. The yield variable is 
defined as the ratio of earnings to area planted. The calorie content is obtained by converting the output 
volume into its calorie equivalent. Data sources and construction are described in full in Appendix A. The 
standard errors are clustered at the district level and bootstrapped. The standard errors and the standard 
deviations of the dependent variable and the cyclone exposure variable are shown in parentheses. *** 0.01, 
** 0.05, * 0.10
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Table 1.4: The impact of cyclones on winter crops
Panel A: The contem poraneous effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LHS var Area Output Price Earnings Yield Calories
Cyclone before sowing 282.457** 645.684** -0.011 625.270** -15.919 163.349***
(132.097) (295.005) (0.148) (256.348) (11.601) (45.805)
Cyclone before harvest -71.464 -206.946* -0.136 -292.612 13.030 -55.945
(53.526) (105.781) (0.097) (300.605) (13.229) (34.900)
N 34,144 34,144 34,144 34,144 34,144 31,520
R-squared 0.791 0.531 0.729 0.580 0.580 0.538
Mean LHS var 28,197 34,217 265 55,718 2,766 11,747
(57,933) (87,593) (237) (126,290) (6,789) (29,923)
BEFORE SOWING
Mean Cyclone 20.060 20.060 20.060 20.060 20.060 20.060
(9.949) (9.949) (9.949) (9.949) (9.949) (9.949)
BEFORE HARVEST
Mean Cyclone 26.882 26.882 26.882 26.882 26.882 26.882
(19.096) (19.096) (19.096) (19.096) (19.096) (19.096)
Panel B: The persistence o f the cyclone shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LHS var Area Output Price Earnings Yield Calories
Cyclone before sowing 
Cyclone before harvest
314.276**
(139.585)
-40.503
(51.810)
791.583**
(346.068)
-155.642*
(93.808)
0.008
(0.157)
-0.117
(0.103)
791.405***
(295.048)
-216.406
(273.642)
-15.803
(11.881)
10.952
(12.809)
200.130***
(54.745)
-36.483
(28.877)
BEFORE SOWING 
Sum of lags
Joint p sowing
910.358**
(372.960)
0.097
3549.928*
(1853.006)
0.020
-0.202
(0.382)
0.249
3134.418**
(1353.758)
0.037
-58.313
(49.933)
0.364
778.903***
(207.951)
0.001
BEFORE HARVEST 
Sum of lags
Joint p harvest
-206.901
(138.287)
0.413
-383.647
(618.848)
0.153
-0.670
(0.409)
0.037
-1439.218
(980.837)
0.066
39.638 
(26.382 ) 
0.116
-288.464
(188.914)
0.022
N
R-squared
34,144
0.791
34,144
0.531
34,144
0.729
34,144
0.580
34,144
0.581
31,520
0.539
Notes: The cyclone exposure variable is measured in percent. The area data is measured in hectares, the 
output data in tons, and the farm harvest price and earnings data in 1980 Indian Rupees. The yield variable 
is defined as the ratio of earnings to area planted. The calorie content is obtained by converting the output 
volume into its calorie equivalent. A crop is defined as a winter crop if its sowing time starts after the first 
week of August. Data sources and construction are described in full in Appendix A. The standard errors 
are clustered at the district level and bootstrapped. The standard errors and the standard deviations of the 
dependent variable and the cyclone exposure variable are shown in parentheses. *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10
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Table 1.5: The impact of cyclones on summer crops
Panel A: The contem poraneous effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LHS var Area Output Price Earnings Yield Calories
Cyclone before sowing 88.947** 303.744*** -0.193*** 603.190*** 0.524 128.179***
(43.599) (66.973) (0.049) (186.703) (1.287) (26.618)
Cyclone before harvest 52.312 -198.447* -0.034 -162.452 -2.234 -49.461
(33.016) (107.286) (0.057) (219.496) (1.487) (45.708)
N 70,144 70,144 70,144 70,144 70,144 57,536
R-squared 0.817 0.754 0.629 0.761 0.224 0.729
Mean LHS var 31,127 25,072 271 48,791 2591 11,159
(74,163) (70,337) (196) (142,944) (16,211) (28,604)
BEFORE SOWING
Mean Cyclone 26.881 26.881 26.881 26.881 26.881 26.881
(18.682) (18.682) (18.682) (18.682) (18.682) (18.682)
BEFORE HARVEST
Mean Cyclone 24.819 24.819 24.819 24.819 24.819 24.819
(17.264) (17.264) (17.264) (17.264) (17.264) (17.264)
Panel B: The persistence o f th e cyclone shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LHS var Area Output Price Earnings Yield Calories
Cyclone before sowing 
Cyclone before harvest
71.958*
(40.209)
37.907
(33.887)
260.962***
(60.424)
-190.127*
(112.677)
-0.161***
(0.047)
-0.038
(0.058)
489.226***
(179.494)
-166.545
(228.955)
-0.115
(1.299)
-2.022
(1.583)
112.734***
(24.625)
-46.009
(47.834)
BEFORE SOWING 
Sum of lags
Joint p sowing
235.688**
(116.969)
0.082
461.670***
(149.457)
0.000
-0.378***
(0.129)
0.000
1687.151**
(661.826)
0.001
13.970***
(4.869)
0.045
177.721***
(55.661)
0.000
BEFORE HARVEST 
Sum of lags
Joint p harvest
80.109
(186.114)
0.046
642.078
(541.156)
0.093
0.411
(0.291)
0.514
1607.884
(1160.888)
0.468
54.181
(17.020)
0.203
309.636
(222.057)
0.337
N
R-squared
70,144
0.817
70,144
0.754
70,144
0.630
70,144
0.761
70,144
0.224
57,536
0.729
Notes: The cyclone exposure variable is measured in percent. The area data is measured in hectares, the 
output data in tons, and the farm harvest price and earnings data in 1980 Indian Rupees. The yield variable 
is defined as the ratio of earnings to area planted. The calorie content is obtained by converting the output 
volume into its calorie equivalent. A crop is defined as a summer crop if its sowing time starts before the 
second week of August. Data sources and construction are described in full in Appendix A. The standard 
errors are clustered at the district level and bootstrapped. The standard errors and the standard deviations of 
the dependent variable and the cyclone exposure variable are shown in parentheses. *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10
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Table 1.6: The impact of cyclones on coarse cereals 
P an el A: T h e con tem p oran eou s effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LHS var Area Output Price Earnings Yield Calories
Cyclone exposure 121.061*
(68.783)
182.549***
(63.572)
-0.260***
(0.072)
67.097
(147.146)
-0.562
(0.916)
64.906***
(22.415)
N
R-squared
26,528
0.826
26,528
0.579
26,528
0.487
26,528
0.577
26,528
0.278
26,528
0.578
Mean LHS var 45,496 25,242 163 40,030 970 8,805
(88,937) (46,661) (58) (75,619) (995) (16,321)
Mean Cyclone 23.485 23.485 23.485 23.485 23.485 23.485
(15.865) (15.865) (15.865) (15.865) (15.865) (15.865)
P an e l B: T h e p ers isten ce  o f  th e  cyc lon e  shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LHS var Area Output Price Earnings Yield Calories
Cyclone exposure 131.494* 200.374*** -0.281*** 73.622 -0.546 71.165***
(70.622) (64.159) (0.078) (149.156) (0.999) (22.653)
Sum of lags -2.455 624.290** -1.264*** 7.712 -2.823 221.748**
(251.522) (301.322) (0.158) (503.789) (2.364) (106.494)
Joint p 0.042 0.001 0.000 0.134 0.000 0.001
N 26,528 26,528 26,528 26,528 26,528 26,528
R-squared 0.826 0.579 0.491 0.578 0.278 0.578
Notes: The cyclone exposure variable is measured in percent. The area data is measured in hectares, 
the output data in tons, and the farm harvest price and earnings data in 1980 Indian Rupees. The 
yield variable is defined as the ratio of earnings to area planted. The calorie content is obtained by 
converting the output volume into its calorie equivalent. The following crops are included in the coarse 
cereal category: bajra, barley, gram, jowar and ragi. Data sources and construction are described in full 
in Appendix A. The standard errors are clustered at the district level and bootstrapped. The standard 
errors and the standard deviations of the dependent variable and the cyclone exposure variable are 
shown in parentheses. *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10
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Table 1.7: The impact of cyclones on all other food crops 
P a n e l A: T h e  co n tem p o ra n eo u s effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LHS vax Area Output Price Earnings Yield Calories
Cyclone exposure 48.903
(38.637)
-278.174**
(127.485)
-0.063
(0.063)
-259.045
(256.783)
-0.852
(2.200)
-67.372
(52.990)
N
R-squaxed
62,528
0.860
62,528
0.694
62,528
0.608
62,528
0.741
62,528
0.670
62,528
0.684
Mean LHS var 
Mean Cyclone
26,844
(62,210)
25.160
(17.551)
35,038
(92,771)
25.160
(17.551)
242
(119)
25.160
(17.551)
63,866
(167,307)
25.160
(17.551)
3,085
(5,392)
25.160
(17.551)
12,455
(32,975)
25.160
(17.551)
P an el B: T h e  p ers isten ce  o f  th e  cyc lon e shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LHS var Area Output Price Earnings Yield Calories
Cyclone exposure 41.904
(36.528)
-281.309**
(126.407)
-0.058
(0.064)
-322.650
(240.568)
-1.357
(2.108)
-68.597
(52.010)
Sum of lags 
Joint p
168.266
(115.080)
0.003
-166.198
(223.637)
0.000
-0.248
(0.183)
0.000
572.705
(835.625)
0.016
6.530
(5.100)
0.087
-17.356
(92.264)
0.000
N
R-squared
62,528
0.860
62,528
0.694
62,528
0.608
62,528
0.741
62,528
0.670
62,528
0.684
N otes: The cyclone exposure variable is measured in percent. The area data is measured in hectares, 
the output data in tons, and the farm harvest price and earnings data in 1980 Indian Rupees. The 
yield variable is defined as the ratio of earnings to area planted. The calorie content is obtained by 
converting the output volume into its calorie equivalent. The following crops are included in the other 
crop category: groundnut, maize, potato, rapeseed and mustard, rice, sesamum, sugar, tur, and wheat. 
Data sources and construction are described in full in Appendix A. The standard errors are clustered at 
the district level and bootstrapped. The standard errors and the standard deviations of the dependent 
variable and the cyclone exposure variable are shown in parentheses. *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10
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Table A.l: The net effect of a cyclone shock: alternative cyclone variables 
P an el A: S evere cyclon e exp osu re variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LHS var Area Output Price Earnings Yield Calories
Sev cyclone exp 72.257**
(29.576)
-157.345
(101.554)
-0.046
(0.047)
-129.021
(203.123)
0.028
(1.682)
-32.198
(43.628)
N
R-squared
104,288
0.731
104,288
0.629
104,288
0.640
104,288
0.689
104,288
0.247
89,056
0.624
Mean LHS var 
Mean Cyclone
30,168
(69,282)
21.408
(12.878)
28,066
(76,537)
21.408
(12.878)
269
(210)
21.408
(12.878)
51,059
(137,751)
21.408
(12.878)
2,649
(13,851)
21.408
(12.878)
11,368
(29,079)
21.408
(12.878)
P anel B: M inim um  d istance variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LHS var Area Output Price Earnings Yield Calories
Min distance -0.191
(0.317)
2.061**
(0.896)
0.002***
(0.000)
4.244**
(1.972)
0.048**
(0.019)
0.616*
(0.359)
N
R-squared
104,288
0.731
104,288
0.629
104,288
0.640
104,288
0.689
104,288
0.247
89,056
0.624
Mean LHS var 
Mean Cyclone
30,168
(69,282)
21.408
(12.878)
28,066
(76,537)
21.408
(12.878)
269
(210)
21.408
(12.878)
51,059
(137,751)
21.408
(12.878)
2,649
(13,851)
21.408
(12.878)
11,368
(29,079)
21.408
(12.878)
Notes: The severe cyclone exposure variable is measured in percent. The minimum distance variable is 
measured in kilometres. The area data is measured in hectares, the output data in tons, and the farm 
harvest price and earnings data in 1980 Indian Rupees. The yield variable is defined as the ratio of earnings 
to area planted. The calorie content is obtained by converting the output volume into its calorie equivalent. 
Data sources and construction are described in full in Appendix A. The standard errors and the standard 
deviations of the dependent variable and the cyclone exposure variable are shown in parentheses. The 
standard errors are clustered at the district level and bootstrapped. *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10
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2 The Political Economy of Trop­
ical Deforestation34
2.1  In tro d u ctio n
Satellite imagery reveals vast expanses of forest extending across the Amazon Basin, 
the Congo Basin, and South East Asia. These tropical forests are seen as critical 
to slowing global climate change (Stern, 2006; Nabuurs et al., 2007). They are also 
particularly rich in biodiversity. Last but not least, they are surrounded by large and 
relatively poor populations who could derive significant economic benefits over the 
medium to long run if the forests are sustainably managed (Curran et al., 2004).
And yet it is precisely these tropical forests that are being cut down. Repeated 
satellite imagery reveals that tropical forests, unlike the great forests in the Northern 
hemisphere, have been experiencing rapid rates of deforestation (Hansen and DeFlries, 
2004). It is estimated that relative to a baseline of 1900 the majority of tropical 
forest has already been felled, with the rate of deforestation accelerating in the last 
two decades (Holmes, 2002; FW I/GFW , 2002; Hansen et al., 2008). Today tropical 
deforestation accounts for almost 20% of global emissions of greenhouse gases (Hooijer 
et al., 2006; IPCC, 2007b; Kindermann et al., 2008). This is more than is contributed 
globally by the transportation sector as a whole, and is roughly equivalent to the total 
greenhouse gas contribution of the United States. In fact, tropical deforestation places 
Indonesia just behind the US and China as the third largest producer of greenhouse 
gases worldwide.
Understanding what lies behind tropical deforestation has therefore become a 
pressing issue. And here political economy factors are coming to the fore. While 
there is an extensive literature on the optimal management of forest resources (e.g., 
Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Samuelson (1976), Dasgupta (1982), Brown (2000)), and 
while most countries’ official policy seeks to implement these types of sustainable 
logging systems, actual practice diverges significantly from best practice. Local bu­
reaucrats and politicians have much to gain by allowing logging to take place outside 
official concessions (Barr et al., 2006) or by sanctioning the transport and process­
ing of illegally harvested logs (Casson, 2001a). On net, in many cases over 50% of 
the wood yield involves some illegal action -  the figure for Indonesia, for example, 
is estimated at 60-80% (CIFOR, 2004). In this context, viewing deforestation as the 
result of optimal forest extraction policies implemented by a central planner misses 
the reality of what happens on the ground. Instead, what matters are the incentives 
that local politicians and bureaucrats face to either protect tropical forests or to allow 
their destruction.
34This chapter draws on work that was carried out jointly with equal share by Robin Burgess (LSE), 
Matthew C. Hansen (SDSU), Benjamin Olken (MIT) and me.
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This paper investigates how local political economy incentives affect deforestation. 
We focus on one country -  Indonesia -  which is home to one of the largest and 
most valuable tropical forest reserves in the world (FW I/GFW , 2002). Although all 
Indonesian forests are legally controlled by the national forest ministry, local district 
governments have a substantial de facto role, particularly as the gatekeepers for illegal 
logging. By using imagery from the MODIS satellite, which was put into orbit in 
December 1999, we are able to monitor, at a 250m by 250m resolution, what has 
happened to forest cover on an annual basis across the whole of Indonesia for the 
period 2000 to 2008 (Hansen et al., 2009). The fineness at which we can monitor 
forests also allows us to compare and contrast deforestation across localities and in four 
land use zones -  the Production and Conversion Forest where logging is legal (within 
specific concessions) and the Conservation and Protection Forest (where logging is 
strictly illegal).
Using this data, we investigate how the incentives faced by local bureaucrats and 
politicians affect the rate of deforestation. First, building on insights from the indus­
trial organization of corruption (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Olken and Barron, 2009), 
we show that Indonesian district governments appear to engage in Cournot competi­
tion with one another in the market for wood. To demonstrate this, we take advantage 
of the fact that between 1998 and 2008, the number of districts in Indonesia increased 
by 65%, from 292 to 483, with districts splits occurring at different times in different 
parts of the country. As wood markets in Indonesia are defined by geographical fea­
tures (mountains and rivers) which map well onto provincial boundaries, we can test 
the Cournot model by examining whether increased competition between districts (as 
proxied by increasing numbers of districts within a province) affects the propensity 
to extract forest resources. The fineness of our data also enables us to distinguish 
between the effects of one’s own district splitting (which also introduces a degree of 
disorganization as state capacity is re-established) and other districts splitting (which 
raises competition within the provincial wood market and affects incentives to log now 
versus later).
Using this approach, we find that districts do indeed engage in Cournot compe­
tition with one another, so that splitting up control of the forests into smaller and 
smaller jurisdictions leads to increased logging overall. Using the MODIS satellite 
data, we estimate that subdividing a province by adding one more district increases 
the overall deforestation rate in that province by 7.89%, with the increase coming 
at equal rates in forest zones where logging may be legal or illegal (the Production 
and Conversion Forest) and zones where all logging is illegal (the Conservation and 
Protection Forest). We find similar magnitudes when we examine official production 
records from forest concessions, validating the satellite data and suggesting that some 
of the increase may be occurring through district governments facilitating additional 
extraction in the Production Forest. Consistent with the Cournot model, we show 
that the increase in political jurisdictions drives down prices in the local wood mar­
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ket: adding one more district to a province reduces local prices by 3.29%, implying a 
local demand elasticity for logs between 2.3 and 4, depending on specification.
Second, we test whether local election pressures influence the rate of deforesta­
tion. Starting in 2005, local district heads began to be chosen through direct popular 
elections rather than being indirectly selected by the local legislature. When direct 
elections first arrived in a district was determined by when the district head’s term 
came to an end, and the timing of these terms, in turn, was determined by the timing 
of district head appointments under Soeharto (Skoufias et al., 2010). This introduces 
asynchronicity in district elections which is plausibly orthogonal to patterns of forest 
loss and which we exploit to examine whether logging, and in particular illegal logging, 
increases in the run-up to these elections. Using this approach, we document a “polit­
ical logging cycle” where local governments become more permissive vis a vis logging 
in the years leading up to elections. We find that deforestation in zones where all log­
ging is illegal increases by as much as 42.7% in the year prior to an election. Although 
logging then falls after the election, on net direct elections increase deforestation in 
zones where all logging is illegal by 51.5% over the entire election cycle.
Third, just as the rents from facilitating logging may become more or less valuable 
depending on where governments are in the political cycle, their value (and hence 
the incentive to allow logging) will depend on what alternative sources of rents gov­
ernments have access to. Oil and gas reserves axe highly unevenly distributed across 
Indonesia and the revenue sharing rules put in place by post-Soeharto governments, 
which give greater weight to the districts and provinces where these resources em­
anated from, mean that the distribution of revenue from these sources is also highly 
unequal. We exploit the variable availability of oil and gas revenues over time and 
space to examine whether they blunt or sharpen incentives to extract forest resources 
both immediately after these hydrocarbon resources become available and over the 
medium term. Consistent with other examples in the economics of corruption (Olken, 
2007; Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2009), we find that these two alternate sources of 
rents are substitutes in the short-run. In the medium term, however, we find that 
they become complements.
These results document that the incentives faced by local politicians and bureau­
crats -  the potential rents they can obtain from restricting logging vs. allowing more, 
the timing of rent extraction with regard to political needs, and the availability of 
alternative sources of rents -  strongly affect patterns of deforestation in Indonesia. If 
optimal logging rules were being followed, none of these factors should matter. The 
fact that they do highlights the lack of full control central governments have over nat­
ural resources in developing countries, and suggests that incorporating the incentive 
compatibility constraints for local agents of the state is crucial to designing effective 
forestry policies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss 
the background on how political change and deforestation in Indonesia and on how
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we study these processes using a variety of data sets. Section 2.3 examines how the 
splitting of districts affected deforestation, which we interpret in the light of a model 
of Cournot competition. In Section 2.4 we study the interaction between patterns 
of deforestation and the timing of elections. Section 2.5 investigates whether having 
access to alternative sources of public finance incentivises or disincentivises districts 
to engage in logging. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2  B ackground  and  D a ta
Indonesia comprises an archipelago of islands in South-East Asia stretching from the 
Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. It is a vast country. From tip-to-tip (from Sabang 
in Aceh to Merauke in Papua), Indonesia is 3,250 miles across; this is the same as 
the distance from Tampa, Florida to Juneau, Alaska. The conditions in Indonesia 
are ideal for the growth of forests and without the involvement of humans, Indonesia 
would be largely covered in forest.
In this section we first trace out the dramatic political changes that Indonesia 
has experienced in its recent past, and document how these change have resulted in 
a tug of war over the control of the forest sector. We then outline how we monitor 
forest loss using satellite data, and discuss how we capture political changes in our 
data. This section thus prepares the ground for the analysis of the political economy 
of deforestation which ensues in the subsequent three sections.
2.2.1 B ackground.
2.2.1.1 D ecen tra lisa tion  in  P o s t-S o eh a rto  Ind o n esia  The East Asian crisis 
brought to an end the thirty-two regime of President Soeharto on May 21st, 1998. 
He and his family had governed Indonesia as a personal fiefdom since 1967, and 
particularly in later years his New Order regime had become synonymous with the 
Soeharto family extracting rents from all key sources of economic activity in the 
country (Fisman, 2001).
Soeharto’s departure ushered in one of the most radical reconfigurations of a mod­
ern state (Bertrand, 2008), combining a democratic transition with a radical decen­
tralisation of power. Amidst fears that the multi-ethnic country would break apart, 
substantial administrative and fiscal authority was devolved to the approximately 
300 district governments.35 Off-Java regions which were rich in natural resources like 
forests, and oil and gas were particularly strident in their demands and wanted systems 
of control over these resources to be revised and for more of the revenue from their 
extraction to accrue to them (Cohen, 1998; Tadjoeddin et al., 2001; WB, 2003; Hof- 
man and Kaiser, 2004; Wulan et al., 2004). The decentralisation laws (ROI, 1999a,b), 
which were passed in 1999 and took effect in 2001, devolved approximately 25% of the
35 Unusually, Indonesian decentralisation transferred power to the approximately 300 district gov­
ernments rather than the approximately 30 provincial governments, since districts, unlike provinces, 
were perceived to be too small for separatist tendencies (Hull, 1999; Niessen, 1999).
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national budget to the districts in the form of block grants and dramatically increased 
their authority over almost all sectors of government. Local governments also received 
a substantial share of the natural resource royalties originating from their district.36 
Districts were administered by Bupatis (district heads), who were in turn indirectly 
selected by local legislatures.
The allure of self-government where districts could enjoy significant new political 
and fiscal powers led to a significant amount of district splitting. The total number 
of districts increased from 292 in 1998 to 483 in 2008. In contrast, the number of 
districts in Indonesia had remained largely unchanged during the New Order regime 
(1967-1999) (BPS, 2007). District splits thus represented a significant mechanism for 
the further decentralisation of power in the country (Cohen, 2003; Fitrani et al., 2005). 
W hat they also did, however, was to introduce a certain amount of disorganization 
as many districts lacked the human resources, technical capacities, and institutional 
structures to take on these new administrative powers (Tambunan, 2000).
Soon after decentralisation took effect, pressure mounted for a new reform, since 
it was felt that the 1999 Regional Governance law (ROI, 1999a) gave too much con­
trol to the local parliament and, thus, made the system susceptible to corruption 
(Mietzner, 2007) and elite capture (Erb and Sulistiyanto, 2009). Consequently, in 
2004 a revised decentralisation law (ROI, 2004) considerably increased accountability 
by introducing direct election of the district head. Direct elections were to be held 
after the incumbent district head selected by the previous system had served their 
full tenure. This tenure, in turn, was dependent on when the terms of district heads 
appointed under Soeharto had to come to an end. This introduces asynchronicity in 
district elections.37 Since the timing was driven by idiosyncratic factors from previous 
decades, it can be viewed as plausibly exogenous with respect to forest loss; indeed 
Skoufias et al. (2010) demonstrate that the timing of district elections is uncorrelated 
to virtually all pre-existing socioeconomic or geographic characteristics.
2 .2.1.2 Im p lications for th e  F orest S ector During the Soeharto regime, the
1967 Basic Forestry Law (ROI, 1967) gave the national government the exclusive 
right of forest exploitation in the so-called Forest Estate (Kawasan Hutan); an area 
of 143 million hectares equivalent to three-quarters of the nation’s territory (Barber
36In particular, an oil-producing district receives 6% of oil royalties and 12% of natural gas royalties; 
a further 6% (oil) and 12% (gas) is shared equally among all other districts in the same province. 
Districts are also allocated a large share of the one-off license fee for large-scale timber concessions 
(Iuran Hak Pengusahaan Hutan or IHPH) and of two types of volume-based royalties, the Refor­
estation Fund (Dana Reboisasi or DR) and Forest Resource Rent Provision (Provisi Sumber Daya 
Hutan or PSDH ). Specifically, the producing and non-producing districts are each allocated 32% of 
the royalties. Furthermore, the district that contains the concession can keep 64% of the one-off fee 
with the rest going to the central government. Exceptions were made for the separatist provinces 
of Aceh (Special Autonomy Law 18 of 2001) and Papua (Special Autonomy Law 21 of 2001), who 
receive substantially larger shares. For a detailed discussion of Indonesia’s transfer system refer to 
Brodjonegoro and Martinez-Vazquez (2002).
37For instance, only one-third of all districts (434) held direct elections in June 2005. By 2007, 
about 30% of all districts still had a district head that had not been elected directly.
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and Churchill, 1987; Barber, 1990). The entire Forest Estate was managed by the 
central Ministry of Forestry, based in Jakarta. The Ministry in turn awarded a small 
group of forestry conglomerates (with close links to the regime’s senior leadership) 
most of the timber extraction concessions in the Forest Estate, amounting to an area 
of about 69 million hectares inside the area designated as Production Forest (CIFOR, 
2004). These exploitation rights were non-transferable, issued for up to 20 years and 
required the logging companies to manage the forest sustainably through selective 
logging (ROI, 1970). The second category inside the Forest Estate was the Conversion 
Forest, in which the largest wood producers could use Wood Utilization Permits (Izin 
Pemanfaatan Kayu or IPK)  to clear-cut the forest and set up plantations for industrial 
timber, oil palm or other estate crops. Logging was prohibited in the remaining zones 
of the Forest Estate, which were designated for watershed (the Protection Forest) and 
biodiversity protection (the Conservation Forest).
The control over these forest zones, both in terms of issuing logging permits and 
enforcement, changed with the passing of the Regional Autonomy Laws in 1999. Dur­
ing the period from 1999-2002, district governments were legally allowed to issue a 
variety of small-scale, short-term forestry permits.38 These licenses, both for the Pro­
duction and Conversion Forest, often directly overlapped with the large-scale logging 
concessions and sometimes even the boundaries of national parks and protected ar­
eas.39 In 2002, under pressure from the main forest concession holders, the national 
government revoked the right of district governments to issue these small-scale permits 
(ROI, 2002).
Even though after 2002 district governments were no longer able to issue logging 
permits, they still continued to play an important de facto role in forest management. 
In particular, the 1999 laws delegated enforcement of forestry laws to the districts, 
with some supervision from the central government, and these enforcement powers 
were not revoked in 2002. This means that, in most cases, the local forest office -  the 
people who enforce logging quotas and who issue the log transport documents that 
accompany each log from source to destination -  are directly or indirectly answerable 
to the head of the district.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this move has drastically curtailed the enforce­
ment capacity and has led to the sharp rise in illegal logging since the collapse of
38Government Regulation 62/1998 (ROI, 1998) gave the districts the authority to manage the so- 
called ‘Privately Owned’ and ‘Community Forest’ outside of the Forest Estate. Furthermore, they 
were given the authority to allocate small-scale Forest Product Extraction Licenses (Hak Pemungutan 
Hasil Hutan or HPHH) inside the Forest Estate. Ministerial Decree 310/1999 stipulated that dis­
tricts governments could issue HPHHs inside the Conversion or Production Forest, but outside the 
boundaries of the large-scale concessions. However, Ministerial Decree 317/1999 established a proce­
dure through with customary (adat)  communities could obtain HPHHs for inside the boundaries of 
large-scale concessions as well.
39 CIFOR and partners have conducted a series of district-level case studies to show the widespread 
proliferation of small-scale logging and forest conversion licenses. Prominent examples include Barr 
et al. (2001), Casson (2001b), McCarthy (2001), Obidzinski and Barr (2003), Samsu et al. (2004), 
and Yasmi et al. (2005).
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the Soeharto regime (Casson and Obidzinski, 2002; Smith et al., 2003; Soetarto et 
al., 2003). District governments are believed to play an important role, particularly 
through the issuance of transport documents. Since even illegally harvested logs need 
a transport document (these are required at processing and export), and since these 
are usually issued by the district forest office, district governments have become in 
many ways the main gatekeepers for illegal logging. By controlling the amount of these 
transport documents issued, and by deciding when to turn a blind eye to enforcement 
and when to crack down, district governments can play a substantial de facto role in 
the rate of deforestation, even if their de jure role is limited. Estimates suggest that 
illegal logging makes up as much as 60-80% of total logging in Indonesia, making it a 
US$1 billion a year market (CIFOR, 2004). It is thus likely that these forces play a 
substantial role in determining the total amount of deforestation.
2.2.2 D a ta
2.2.2.1 C o n stru c tin g  th e  sa te llite  d a ta se t Given the prevalence of illegal log­
ging, it is crucial to develop a measure of deforestation that encompasses both legal 
and illegal logging. To do so, we use data from the MODerate Resolution Imaging 
Spectroradiometer (MODIS) satellites to construct an annual measure of forest change 
for each year from 2001-2008. The resulting dataset traces, at 250m by 250m resolu­
tion, the patterns of deforestation across the entire country over time. This section 
describes how the forest change dataset is constructed from the raw satellite images.
There are two main challenges in constructing satellite-based images of deforesta­
tion. First, humid tropical regions like Indonesia have persistent cloud cover that 
shrouds the region year round. This makes it impossible to use high-spatial resolution 
sensors, like Landsat, which are usually used to measure forest cover change (Asner, 
2001; Ju and Roy, 2008). Since these satellites typically only revisit the same area 
once every 1-2 weeks, cloud-free images are rarely recorded. Instead, it is necessary 
to draw on moderate-resolution sensors, such as the MODIS that pass over the same 
spot every 1-2 days. This considerably increases the likelihood of obtaining some 
good quality images, but at the cost of 250m by 250m resolution instead of the ap­
proximately 40m by 40m resolution available via Landsat. We start with the basic 
thirty-two day composites of the MODIS Land Surface Reflectance bands (Vermote 
et al., 2002) and the MODIS Land Surface Temperature Product (Wan et al., 2002) 
available on the NASA website, which aggregate daily images into monthly images to 
reduce cloud effects. We further aggregate them into annual composites to produce a 
cloud-free image of each pixel.
Second, one needs to take the composite of MODIS images and build a computer 
algorithm to discriminate between forest and non-forest. For each pixel, the MODIS 
satellite collects 36 “bands” , each of which measures the strength of electromagnetic 
radiation in a particular part of the spectrum. That is, each pixel is essentially a
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36-dimensional representation of the average electromagnetic radiation coming from 
a particular 250m by 250m spot. By contrast, the human eye, with its three types of 
cones, measures only three “bands” , which correspond roughly to the blue, green, and 
red areas of the visual spectrum. The raw MODIS data is thus considerably richer 
than just a visual image at comparable resolution.
The key idea of remote sensing is developing an algorithm that identifies what sig­
natures or set of signatures -  i.e., what combinations of means and correlations among 
various parts of the 36-dimensions of spectrum that MODIS sees -  best discriminate 
between forest and non-forest. For example, plants absorb electromagnetic radiation 
in the red visual range for use in photosynthesis, but reflect or scatter radiation in 
the near-infrared range. One common metric therefore examines the so-called NDVI 
(Normalized Difference Vegetation Index), which captures the difference in intensity 
between light in the red range and in the near-infrared range, and therefore identifies 
one signature for plant life (Gausman, 1977; Tucker, 1979; Curran, 1980).
In practice, one can do much better than using NDVI by exploiting additional 
dimensions of the data (see Wulder (1998) for a literature review). For example, 
forests tend to be cooler than surrounding areas, so bands that measure temperature 
can also be used (Gholz, 1982). Moreover, trees have different spectral signatures than 
other types of crops and plants (Curran, 1980). To take maximal advantage of the 
richness of the MODIS data, we use a statistical learning procedure known as a “tree 
bagging algorithm” to determine which spectral signatures best correspond to forest 
(Breiman et al., 1984; Breiman, 1996).
Specifically, we start with much higher resolution “training” images. For each of 
these images, experts have manually examined the image and coded each cell into 
forest, non-forest, or forest change (deforestation). We then apply the statistical tree- 
bagging algorithm to automatically group the MODIS data into naturally occurring 
groups that share common electromagnetic signatures, and then determine which of 
these sets of signatures corresponds to the manually-coded forest, non-forest, or forest 
change cells in the training dataset. This is akin to a regression, except tha t it allows 
for complex correlations between bands to be used in the prediction, rather than just 
means, and allows very flexible functional forms.
One then can extrapolate over the entire MODIS dataset to predict, for each year, 
the probability that a given pixel was deforested. We code a pixel as deforested if 
the probability exceeds 90% in any year; once it is deforested, we consider it defor­
ested forever. The reason for this is that, especially in a humid tropical environment 
like Indonesia, once the original forest is cleared other crops or scrub brush emerges 
quickly; since the forest takes at least several decades to regrow, this regrowth is not 
actual tree cover. Deforestation thus is often represented by a pixel that is “green” 
one year, “brown” the next year, and then “green” again. Given this, Hansen et al. 
(2009) have shown that the key to detecting true forest change is the high probability
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of being deforested in a single year, rather than appearing “brown” year after year.40
The final outputs are annual forest change estimates for 2001-2008 for each of the 
34.6 million pixels that make up Indonesia. Note that these estimates will provide a 
lower bound for forest change, as a 250m by 250m pixel is only coded as deforested 
if the majority of the area represented by the pixel is felled. This will reliably pick 
up clear-cutting, but will not necessarily capture selective logging if the forest canopy 
remains largely intact, and therefore may under-estimate total logging. It will also 
capture deforestation due to large-scale burns, which can be either intentional (for 
land clearing) or unintentional.41 This cell-level data is then summed by district 
and forest zone (i.e., the four forest categories in the Forest Estate: the Production, 
Conversion, Protection and Conservation Forest). This yields our final left-hand-side 
variable d e f orestdzt, which counts the number of cells deforested in district d in forest 
zone z  and year t.
Figure 2.1 gives an idea of what our underlying forest cover data looks like. To 
do this we zoom in onto a small area, since the detailed nature of this dataset makes 
it impossible to visualize the 34.6 million pixels that make up Indonesia in a single 
map. It focuses on one of the main hotspots of deforestation during this time period 
(Hansen et al., 2009), namely the province of Riau on the island of Sumatra. The 
deforested cells are indicated in red, forest cover is shown in green and non-forest 
cover in yellow. The map clearly shows that substantial amounts of forest have been 
deforested during the period from 2001 to 2008. Furthermore, forest clearing seems 
to spread out from initial areas of logging, as access will be easier from already logged 
plots.
In addition to the satellite data, we also examine official logging statistics from 
the annual ‘Statistics of Forest and Concession Estate’ (Statistik Perusahaan Hak 
Pengusahaan Hutan), published by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics for 
1994-2007. These statistics report the quantity of logs cut at the province level and 
the associated price by wood type, for 114 different types of wood.42 Because they 
are derived from production data, they include both clear-felling as well as selective 
logging; on the other hand, they capture only logging that was officially reported by 
the forest concessions, and so likely miss most illegal logging. Since they report the 
wood cut from the legal part of the Forest Estate, they should be compared to the 
satellite data from the Production Forest. This data also includes data on the price 
of woods; since market prices are determined by both legal and illegal logging, these 
prices will reflect the market equilibrium for both types. We use this second dataset 
as a consistency check for our satellite data and to examine impacts on prices, as
^Hansen et al. (2009) have compared the 90% thresholds to other thresholds and found that, in 
verification, 90% is reasonable.
41 However, we show in Section 2.3 below that we obtain remarkably similar results in the Production 
Forest for the satellite-based deforestation measure and official logging statistics, suggesting that much 
of what we are picking up is, indeed, logging.
42We drop the ‘other’ (Lainnya) and ‘mixed wood’ (Rimba Campuran) category, since their com­
position varies considerably across provinces and over time.
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described in further detail in Section 2.3 below.
2.2.2.2 D escrip tive s ta tis tic s  o f fo rest change Figure 2.2a illustrates the dis­
tribution of district-level logging across Indonesia over time. In particular, it shows 
the number of cells cleared at the district level in 2001 and 2008. We focus our anal­
ysis on the main forest islands of Indonesia: moving from West to East, these are 
Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua. The remaining islands (Java, Bali, Nusa 
Tenggara Barat, Nusa Tenggara Timur, and Maluku), shown in white, have negligible 
forest cover in the baseline period and are not included in our sample. In this map, 
low levels of logging are shaded in green, whereas high levels of forest clearing are 
indicated in orange and red. The figures suggest that most of the deforestation occurs 
in Kalimantan and in the lowlands of Sumatra along its eastern coast. From 2001 to 
2008, there is a shift in deforestation in Kalimantan from the West to the East, and 
there is an intensification in deforestation in Sumatra, particularly in the provinces of 
Riau and Jambi in the east-centre of the island. There is also some intensive logging 
in the Southern part of Papua in 2001, but high clearing rates are not maintained in 
this area over time.
Table 2.1 reports the trends in forest cover over time in more detail, and Table
2.2 displays the summary statistics for our main measure of deforestation. The data 
in both tables is reported for the entire Forest Estate, the subcategories of the For­
est Estate where logging may be legal (Production/Conversion Forest) and where all 
logging is illegal (Conservation/Protection Forest) as well as the individual subcate­
gories of the Forest Estate. Table 2.1 shows the changes in the forest area measured 
in 1,000 hectares for our forest island sample. Total deforestation between 2000 and 
2008 amounts to 4.894 million hectares or 48,940 square kilometres; this is roughly 
twice the size of Vermont.
Most of this change occurs in the Production Forest, where about 3.02 million 
hectares were deforested. Much smaller changes are reported for the other forest 
zones: 1.12 million hectares were deforested in the Conversion Forest and only 0.73 
million hectares were deforested in the Conservation and Protection Forest combined. 
However, this last estimate will only provide a lower bound of the actual changes on 
the ground, since logging is prohibited in these parts of the Forest Estate. To the 
extent illegal logging is selective and, thus, occurs on a much smaller scale, moderate 
resolution sensors like MODIS will underestimate these changes.
Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics of our main left-hand side variable, de- 
forestfat, which counts the number of cells cleared for district d in forest zone 2 and 
year t. To facilitate comparison with Table 2.1, the measurement of this variable has 
been converted into 1000 hectares. On average, 704 hectares are deforested annually 
at the district level. However, the variance of the 2,901 hectares suggests that there is 
a lot of variability in deforestation both across years and districts. The pattern of the 
results mimics the previous findings, i.e. most of the changes occur in the Production
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Forest, where on average 1,451 hectares are deforested in each district and year.
2.2.2.3 Political Economy D ata To capture increasing competition in the wood
market, we take advantage of the extensive partitioning of districts following the 
collapse of the New Order regime. Figure 2.3 illustrates the distribution of district 
splits in our forest island sample. It displays the total number of districts that the 
original 1990 district partitioned into by 2008. High numbers of splits (3-7) are denoted 
by orange and red in the figure, whereas low numbers of splits (0-2) are denoted by 
blue and green. It is evident from this map that district splits happen all over the 
country. Most districts split at least once or twice, so that very few of the 1990 districts 
remain intact. In addition, the map suggests that the largest districts in 1990 split 
into more new administrative units.
We construct two sets of variables for the districts and provinces using the official 
publications on regency and municipality codes of Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat 
Statistik or BPS).43 Note that we use the 1990 boundaries as a reference point, because 
17 new districts were formed between 1990 and 1999 (BPS, 2007).44 For the province- 
level data, we simply calculate the total number districts and municipalities within 
the 1990 boundaries of province p  on island i in year t, Num D istrictsInProVpa .45 In 
addition, we construct two more variables at the district level. Firstly, we count into 
how many districts and municipalities the original 1990 district d on island i split in 
a year t, NumOwnD istrictSdu• Secondly, we sum across all the other districts within 
the same province, NumOtherDistrictsdit-
We also obtain other district-level covariates as follows. To examine the impact 
of political election cycles, we obtain district-level election schedules obtained from 
the Centre for Electoral Reform (CETRO)46, and use them to construct a dummy 
for the year the election for district head was held, Electiondit- To examine the 
impact of other sources of rents available to district governments, we examine oil and 
gas revenues per capita at the district level, PCOilandGaSdt-47 We obtained the 
revenue data from the Indonesian Ministry of Finance (Menteri Keuangan) webpage 
(h ttp ://w w w .d jp k .d ep k eu .g o .id /d a tad jp k /5 7 /) and the population data for 2008, 
which is published by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics. It is important to 
note that new districts often do not record their own share of revenue for the first few
43 The most up-to-date lists of regency and municipality codes is available on the BPS webpage at 
h ttp :/ /d d s .bps.go . id /eng/aboutus.php?mstkab=l.
44During the Soeharto regime, only 3 new kabupaten or kota were created outside of Jakarta prior 
to 1990: Kota Ambon (PPRI No. 13 Thn. 1979), Kota Batam (PPRI No. 34. Thn. 1983), and Kab. 
Aceh Tenggara (UURI NO. 4 Thn. 1984). Jakarta itself was split into 5 city parts in 1978.
45Each province is located on only one of the four islands -  Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and 
Papua. We use the island subscript, i, as we will allow for differential time trends by island in the 
empirical analysis below.
46CETRO is an Indonesian NGO (h ttp ://www. c e tr o . o r . id/newweb/index.php). We use the most 
up-to-date district-level election schedule available, which provides election dates up to 2011.
47 Oil and gas is by far the largest source of natural resource rents for districts. For instance, 
in 2008 the average district-level revenue from oil and gas was 114.515 billion rupiah, whereas the 
corresponding figure for forestry was 5.302 billion rupiah.
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years after the split, as the district is not fully functioning yet. We therefore allocate 
each new district the revenue share of its originating district until it reports its own 
share of revenue for the first time.
Figure 2.4 displays oil and gas revenue per capita in 2008 at the district-level. 
These natural resources are much more spatially concentrated than forest, so that 
most districts receive none or very little revenue shown as blue and green respectively. 
The districts that receive the largest share of revenue from oil and gas extraction are 
located in Eastern Kalimantan and in the province of Riau on Sumatra. Moreover, 
the map shows that there is some heterogeneity across districts within each province, 
where provinces are delineated with thick black borders. These differences are due to 
the revised revenue sharing rules, where the producing and non-producing districts 
each receive the same percentage of oil and gas revenue, which is then split evenly 
between the districts in each category (ROI, 1999b). Since the non-producing districts 
are usually larger in number, their final share of revenue will be smaller.
2.3  C ournot co m p etitio n  b e tw een  d istr ic ts
2.3.1 Theory
Although there is a large literature on optimal forest management, the forestry litera­
ture tends to consider how an optimal central planner should manage forest resources, 
trading off the growth rate of trees with discounting (e.g., Samuelson (1976), Das­
gupta (1982); see Brown (2000) for a survey).48 In this section, we consider what 
happens if, rather than a central planner making optimal forest extraction decisions, 
forest decisions are made by individual actors -  in our case, district governments -  
who interact with one another through a common product market.
For simplicity, in this section we abstract away from issues involved in tree re­
growth and instead treat forests as an exhaustible natural resource. This is consistent 
with substantial de facto logging practice in many tropical forests, including those 
in Indonesia, where virgin forests are heavily logged, and then either left in a de­
graded state or converted to a non-forest use, such as palm plantations. This type of 
non-sustainable clear-cutting and land conversion is also the type of forestry we will 
primarily be able to observe in the satellite data .49
We suppose that each period, district governments choose the quantity of forest to 
extract. As discussed above, this can occur in a variety of ways: by determining how 
many illegal log transport permits to issue, how many conversion permits to issue, 
etc. Once they determine quantities, prices are determined through the market. We
48 The other strand of the literature considers multiple actors with competing property rights over 
the same forest (e.g. Larson and Bromley (1990), Ligon and Narain (1999)). However, to the best 
of our knowledge none consider the type of oligopolistic competition we study here, where each actor 
has full control rights over its own forest and strategic interactions occur through the product market.
49 One could generalize the model to allow forests to regrow at some slow rate; we speculate that 
this would not substantially affect the qualitative predictions we consider here, which concern the 
strategic interactions between districts.
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assume that transport costs across different parts of Indonesia, the need to process 
logs locally before export (Indonesia bans the export of raw, unprocessed logs), and 
capacity constraints at local sawmills combine to generate local downward-sloping 
demand curves for logs in each market; this assumption is discussed in more detail 
below.
The problem districts face is thus that of oligopolistic competition in a non­
renewable natural resource. Lewis and Schmalensee (1980) show that many of the 
standard, static Cournot results generalize to this setting. In particular, they show 
that a greater number of actors in a market -  in our case, more districts -  leads to 
lower prices and greater resource extraction.50 We will test this implication in the 
empirical section below.
Lewis and Schmalensee (1980) also discuss what happens if inventories or marginal 
costs of extraction vary among producers. When marginal costs are unequal, they 
demonstrate that it is possible that the low-cost firm will dominate extraction first, 
with the high-cost firm increasing its extraction later when it faces less competition 
in the product market from the low-cost firm. In our empirical setting, when districts 
split, the marginal costs of issuing illegal logging permits may be higher initially, as the 
new district government needs to spend time organizing a new district government, 
implement new regulations, learning how to evade the national monitoring system, 
etc. Only after several years when the district government is fully operational will the 
marginal cost of extraction return to where it was before. Under such a framework, 
the Lewis and Schmalensee model suggests that the other districts in the market will 
raise production immediately, knowing that they face more competition from other 
districts in the future. Prices will fall somewhat initially, with a greater fall in prices 
later as the marginal costs for the new district declines. We examine these predictions 
in the empirical work below.
2.3.2 Empirical Tests
To examine the impact of Cournot competition between districts, we will take advan­
tage of the fact that the number of districts has increased dramatically over the period 
we study. As discussed above, across all of Indonesia, the number of districts increased 
from 292 prior to decentralisation to 483 in 2008. The increase is even more dramatic 
in the forest islands (Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua) that are the focus 
of this study -  from 146 districts prior to decentralisation to 311 districts in 2008, an 
increase of 213%. We exploit the staggered timing of these changes in administrative 
boundaries to identify the relationship between the number of administrative units 
and logging and to test the theoretical model outlined above.
50Because the resource is subsequently depleted more quickly with more actors, they also show that 
the price rises more quickly with higher N  than with lower N  as the resource moves more quickly 
towards exhaustion. In our case, since the rate of extraction is small relative to the reserves (e.g., 
about 0.5% per year), the increase in prices may happen too slowly to be observed in our data.
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As analyzed in detail in Fitrani et al. (2005), the splitting of districts was driven 
by three principal factors: geographic area, ethnic clustering, and the size of the 
government sector.51 From the perspective of this paper, the key question is not 
whether a district splits, but rather the timing of the split. Several idiosyncratic 
factors appear to influence the timing. First, the process of splitting a district is 
quite cumbersome, involving a number of preliminary steps (e.g., formal agreement of 
the district legislature, the district head, the provincial governor, and the provincial 
legislature; documentation of the new districts’ ability to meet fiscal requirements; 
documenting a reason for the split (ROI, 2004), and, ultimately, the passage of a 
special law by the national parliament for each split that will take place). The amount 
of time each of these steps take varies, which in turn influences the total amount of time 
required. Moreover, there was a national moratorium on splits from 2004 (when the 
criteria for splits were revised) through 2007. This moratorium also creates plausibly 
exogenous delays in timing of splits, as many districts that may have been close to 
completing the process in 2004 had their split postponed by three years due to the 
moratorium .52 In the empirical analysis below, we test for whether the timing of these 
splits is associated with trends in deforestation, though a priori there is little reason 
to believe they would be.
To test the predictions of the theory, a key question is what definition we should 
use for the “market” of wood products. While wood and wood products axe traded on 
international markets (and, hence, one would expect the market to be global), there 
are several factors that make wood markets in Indonesia more local. In particular, 
since 2001 Indonesia has banned the export of raw logs. Instead, all timber felled in 
Indonesia must first be transported (either by river, when possible, or by road) to 
local saw mills, plywood mills, and paper mills, where it is processed before export. 
Capacity constraints at these mills thus determine local wood prices, and non-trivial 
transportation costs for raw logs imply that prices may differ across regions. We focus 
on the province as the key definition of a market, since provincial boundaries are 
coincident with the major river watersheds used for transporting logs.
We will examine several empirical predictions of the Cournot theory outlined 
above. First, taking a province as a measure of the market, we use panel data to 
test whether the number of districts in the province affects the prices and quantity
51 Specifically, the Soeharto era districts were often quite large, so naturally they find that districts 
that were larger geographically are more likely to split to make administration easier. Second, there 
are often ethnic tensions in Indonesia, particularly off Java. Those districts where the different ethnic 
groups were clustered geographically were more likely to split. Finally, the block grant fiscal transfer 
had a fixed-component per district. While this gives all districts an incentive to split, they find that 
it is particularly likely in those districts with a large wage bill, which presumably are in greater 
need of the revenue. They find little consistent relationship between natural resources and splitting, 
with positive coefficients in the 1998-2000 period and negative coefficients in the 2001-2003 period, 
implying a zero effect on average. Details of these regressions can be found Fitrani et al. (2005).
52Unfortunately, we do not observe when the district began the process of filing for a split, as we 
only observe the date the final split law was passed by the Parliament, so we cannot exploit this 
three-year moratorium directly as an instrument.
2 THE POLITICAL ECONOM Y OF TROPICAL DEFORESTATION 66
of wood felled in the province. For this purpose, we will use our two complementary 
sources of forestry data; namely, the price and quantity records from the official gov­
ernment publications and the new satellite-based forestry dataset. For the price and
quantity data, we will run an OLS fixed effects regression, as follows:
log (ywipt) = PNum D istrictsInProvpit +  pwpi +  rjwit +  ewipt, (4)
where ywipt is the price or the quantity of wood type w harvested in province p 
(located on island i) and year t , and N um D istrictsInP rovpit counts the total number 
of districts in province p in year t.53 The regression also controls for wood-type-by- 
province and wood-type-by-island-by-year fixed effects, pwp and rjWit respectively. The 
robust standard errors are clustered at the 1990 province boundaries. Since there is a 
substantial variation in quantity of wood across wood species and provinces -  the 5th 
percentile of the quantity variable is 42 m3, whereas the 95th percentile of the quantity 
variable is 204,804 m3 -  this regression is weighted by the volume of production of
wood type w in province p  in the first year that we have data.
For the satellite-based forestry data, we will run a fixed-effects Poisson Quasi- 
Maximum Likelihood regression (Hausman et al. (1984), Wooldridge (1999); see also 
Wooldridge (2002)), with robust standard errors clustered at the 1990 province bound­
aries. Specifically, this estimates, by MLE, equations such that
E  (deforestpit) =  p,pi exp (/3Num DistrictsInProVpa  +  rju) (5)
where, as in equation (4), ppi is a province fixed-effect, and rju is an island-by-year 
fixed effect. In estimating (5), the Poisson QMLE model effectively weights each 
observation by deforestpit. Thus, if one takes logs of equation (5), the coefficient 
(3 in equation (5) is directly comparable to the coefficient /3 in equation (4); both 
represent the semi-elasticity of deforestation with respect to the number of districts 
in the province, where observations are weighted by quantities.54 The reason we use 
the Poisson specification for the satellite data, rather than estimate a log dependent 
variable with OLS, is that we use the satellite data’s identification of the precise 
location of logging to separately estimate equation (5) for each land use zone. This 
allows us to differentiate between impacts in land use zones where logging may be 
legal as well as illegal (the Production and Conversion Forest) vs. the land use where 
all logging is illegal (the Conservation and Protection Forest). When we split the 
forestry data up by zones, we have many observations where the dependent variable 
is 0, so the Poisson model is more appropriate.
53As discussed above, there are four islands in our sample: Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and 
Papua. Each province is located on only one island.
54 The only difference is that equation (4) is weighted by initial volumes in production (loggingwpo), 
whereas the Poisson model implicitly uses contemporaneous volumes for weights (loggingWpt) (see 
VerHoef and Boveng (2007)). We show below that using contemporaneous weights when estimating 
equation (4) produces virtually identical results.
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Second, we will examine the impact of splits at the district level. In particular, we 
will test whether splits affect deforestation in the district that splits vs. how it affects 
deforestation in the remainder of the province. We estimate via Poisson QMLE a 
model such that:
E  {def orestdit) =  Vdi exp((3NumOwnDistrictSdit +  7NumOtherDistrictsdit +  Vit)
(6)
where deforestdit is the number of cells cleared in district d (located on island i ) 
between year t  — 1 and t, NumOwnDistrictSdit counts into how many districts the 
original 1990 district d split into by year t, and N um O ther D istricts dit counts into 
how many other districts there are within the same province in year t. It also includes 
district fixed effects Udi and island-by-year fixed effects rju. The robust standard 
errors are now clustered at the 1990 district boundaries. The Poisson QMLE is again 
estimated separately by land use zones.
2.3.3 R esu lts  using official p ro d u c tio n  s ta tis tic s
2.3.3.1 R esu lts  Table 2.3 begins by estimating equation (4), using the data on 
prices and quantities from the official forest concession reports. Columns 1 and 2 
provide the estimates for our main specification, which includes all wood types and 
covers the period 2001-2007.55 Columns 3 and 4 show the results for the same sample 
period, but restrict attention to a balanced panel of wood types, where we observe 
production of the wood type in all years for a given province. Columns 5 and 6 present 
the results for all wood types for a longer time horizon that also includes the years 
of the pre-decentralisation period for which the official logging publications were also 
available, i.e. for 1994-2007. Panel A displays the estimates for the contemporaneous 
effect, and Panel B estimates the medium-run impact by including 3 lags of the number 
of districts variable in equation (4). Columns 1, 3, and 5 present equations where the 
natural log of prices axe the dependent variables, and columns 2, 4, and 6 present 
equations where the natural log of quantities axe the dependent variables.
Consistent with the theory, the main results in columns 1 and 2 of Panel A show 
that adding one additional district in a province decreases prices by 1.7% and increases 
the quantity of logs felled by 8.9%. Similar results axe obtained for the alternative 
samples shown in columns 3 through 6, which are not statistically significantly different 
from the main specification.
Since increasing the number of districts is essentially a supply shock, one can infer 
the slope of the demand curve from the ratio of dLnQ uantity  to dLnPrice. Combining 
the estimates from columns 1 and 2 implies a demand elasticity of —5.24. Given that 
markets are separated only by transportation costs, we would expect that demand for 
forest products should be quite elastic, consistent with the high elasticity we find in the
55 Data is not yet available for 2008, so this is the most comparable time period to that used in the 
satellite data analysis below.
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data. Moreover, the Cournot theory suggests that the equilibrium elasticity is related 
to the number of market participants, so with an average of 13 districts per province 
by the end of our sample we would also expect a high elasticity in equilibrium.56
Panel B estimates the medium-run impact of the number of districts on prices 
and quantities by including 3 lags of the NumDistrictsInProVpn  variable.57 The 
medium-run impact estimated by calculating the sum of the immediate effect and all 
3 lags is even larger than in the main specification: at the end of 3 years prices have 
fallen by 3.29% and quantities increased by 13.1%. The estimated coefficients also 
become even more precisely estimated. The demand elasticity drops slightly to -3.89. 
As in Panel A, the estimates for the balanced panel and the longer time horizon are 
again similar in magnitude and significance. The higher long-run response suggests 
that it takes some time for the market players to fully adapt to the new, higher level of 
logging; we will explore more precisely the reasons for this in the district-level analysis 
below.
2.3 .3 .2 A lte rn a tiv e  specifications Table 2.4 examines a series of alternate spec­
ifications. Panel A of Table 2.4 reestimates Panel A of Table 2.3, but instead of 
weighting by the quantity in the first year, we instead weight by current quantities. 
This weighting is most similar to the one applied by the Poisson Quasi-Maximum 
Likelihood estimator to be used in the analysis of the satellite data below (see foot­
note 54). The results do not change substantially and are similar in magnitude to 
Panel A in Table 2.3. The standard errors become slightly larger, which marginally 
lowers the significance of the results.
Panel B and C replicate the results in Panel A of Table 2.3 using different measures 
to count the number of districts within the province. In Panel B, we exclude from 
the district count kotamadya (major cities), which do not control any forest and 
hence should not affect logging. The results are virtually identical to the main results 
in Panel A of Table 2.3. Conversely, Panel C offers a falsification exercise by only 
counting kotamadya within a province in calculating the number of districts. As one 
would expect (since kotamadya do not control forests), we essentially only find noise, 
as all of the coefficients apart from column 6 are insignificant.
Finally, to test for differential trends in provinces with more splitting, Panel D 
includes three leads of the district variable as well as three lags. The observation 
count drops slightly, since we lose 2007 (since we do not yet know the number of 
districts in 2010, and hence can’t calculate the third lead for 2007). The medium-run 
impact of district splits on prices and quantities is robust to the inclusion of leads 
and is similar in magnitude and significance to Table 2.3. For our main specification
56Specifically, a very simple Cournot model with zero marginal cost predicts that the elasticity of 
demand in equilibrium should be equal to —N , where N  is the number of districts in the province. 
Since the number of districts with forests averages 13 per province, one would also expect from the 
theory that the demand elasticity should be quite high in equilibrium.
57The results do not change substantially if we use five lags instead.
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(columns 1 and 2), both the sum of the leads and the p-value from a joint F-test 
of all three leads together are statistically insignificant, indicating that there are no 
pre-trends. The only case where we find the sum of the leads to be significant is in 
column 5, which suggests that there may be differential trends in prices in the pre- 
decentralisation period (i.e., outside the main period we study). The p-value from the 
F-test of all of the leads is also jointly significant at 10% for both the quantity and 
price data in the balanced panel (columns 3 and 4). While there is scattered evidence 
of significant effects on the leads in alternate specifications, in the main time period 
and specification we examine -  2001 through 2007 -  we find no evidence of significant 
pre-period differential trends.
2.3.4 R esults using the satellite data at the province level
The results in the previous section were from official forestry statistics, and thus may 
not fully capture illegal logging.58 To gain a fuller measure of the impact on logging, 
we turn now to the satellite-based deforestation dataset, described in Section 2.2.2.1.
The main results axe displayed in Table 2.5, which reports the findings separately 
for each subcategory of the Forest Estate. Column 1 presents all categories of the 
Forest Estate together, column 2 presents results for the zones where legal logging 
can take place (i.e., the Production and Conversion Forest), and column 3 presents 
results for the zones where no legal logging can take place (i.e., the Conservation and 
Protection Forest).59 Columns 4-7 report the estimates for each zone individually.
The total estimated impact of district splits on deforestation is shown in column 
1 of Panel A. We find that deforestation increases by 3.61% if an additional district 
is formed within a province.
The results reported in columns 2 and 5 show that the overall effect is largely 
driven by logging in the Production Forest. In fact, deforestation increases by 5.33% 
for each additional district in the province. In addition, it is important to notice that 
the quantities data from official forest statistics analyzed in Section 2.3.3 above refers 
to logs harvested inside the Production Forest, so in theory the coefficients in Table
2.4 (Panel A, column 2) and Table 2.5 (Panel A, column 5) should be comparable. 
In fact, when comparing the estimated coefficients, it becomes clear that they are 
not statistically significantly different from each other. This finding enhances our 
confidence in the satellite-based forestry data, as it yields results that closely match 
those from an independently collected data source.
58 While one would expect that the official statistics would not capture any illegal logging whatso­
ever, this may not be the case. Each log needs a transportation permit (Surat Keterangan Sahnya 
Hasil Hutan or SKSHH) to be processed, which is signed at the origin and destination of the log. If 
concession wanted to transport illegally felled timber, they can obtain excess (illegal) transportation 
permits to do so (Casson et al., 2006). Once it obtains a transportation permit, the log is quasi-legal, 
so concessions may have included these logs in their official logging statistics.
59As discussed above, since the Poisson model weights each observation by the quantity, when we 
combine observations from multiple zones we obtain the correct weighted average effect.
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One great advantage of the new remotely sensed forestry data is that it provides 
a comprehensive picture of the changes on the ground beyond the legal production 
areas. This is clearly illustrated by the finding in column 6, which suggests that 
district splits do not only impact legal logging in production areas, but also activity 
in the rest of the Forest Estate. In particular, one more district increases deforestation 
in the Conservation Forest -  i.e., national parks -  by 7.86%. Given that illegal logging 
is often selective and therefore difficult to capture with moderate resolution sensors 
like MODIS, this will only present a lower bound estimate for the actual extent of 
deforestation in the Conservation Forest.
Panel B reports the estimates of the medium-run impact of district splits. As in 
the official logging statistics analyzed above, the estimated coefficients for the sum of 
the contemporaneous effect and the lags are generally larger and more significant. For 
instance, a district split increase deforestation in the entire Forest Estate by 7.89%. 
The estimates for deforestation in legal and illegal logging zones, reported in columns 
2 and 3 respectively, are now both significant and of similar magnitude. Logging in 
the Production Forest still seems to be one of the main drivers of the overall effect, 
as one additional district increases deforestation in this zone by 7.93% at the end of 3 
years. Deforestation in the Conservation Forest increases in the medium-run to 12.5%.
Table 2.6 test for the presence of differential trends in the data by including three 
leads of the NumDistrictsInProVpn  variable. We find that the our main results 
are robust to the inclusion of leads. Furthermore, and most importantly, the sum of 
the leads is insignificant across all forest zones. In addition, the p-value of the joint 
significance test for the leads is large and statistically insignificant for all samples. 
This is reassuring, as it is suggests that the results are indeed picking up the causal 
impact of district splits on both legal and illegal logging in the Forest Estate and are 
not being driven by unobserved trends.
2.3.5 R esults for the satellite data at the district level
Using the satellite data, we can disaggregate logging by district as well as forest zone. 
This allows us separately to estimate the direct effect of a district splitting -  i.e., the 
impact in the district that splits itself -  from the indirect effect of the split -  i.e., the 
impact on logging of other districts in the same province. While the direct effects may 
capture a variety of phenomena beyond the Cournot market forces described above, 
such as changes in enforcement regimes as the district forestry office is reorganized, 
the capital city moved, and new forestry offices are constituted, the indirect effect of 
a split on other districts in the province occurs only through market forces.
The results from estimating equation (6) are shown in Table 2.7, and paint a 
starkly different picture for direct and indirect effects of district splits. For direct 
effects the overall impact effect shown in Panel A is negative (though insignificant). 
This is driven by substantial decline in deforestation in the Production Forest -  a
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decline of 21.1%. On the other hand, there appears to be an increase in illegal logging 
when the district splits -  deforestation in the Conservation Forest (i.e., national parks) 
increases by 13.6%. Combined, these estimates suggest that in the year of the split, 
there may be turmoil in the local forestry offices, leading to a decline in legal logging 
(e.g., it may become temporarily harder to obtain log transport and cutting permits) 
and an increase in illegal logging (e.g., enforcement capacity declines).
Panel B shows, however, that the pattern of these direct effects begins to change 
over time. By the time the district has been in existence for three years, deforestation 
in legal logging zones begins to increase, partially offsetting the initial declines, so that 
the third lag on the number of district splits is positive and statistically significant. 
While the net effect (the sum of the lags) is not distinguishable from zero, the p-value 
on a joint test of the contemporary effect and all 3 lags in the legal logging zones (col­
umn 2) is < 0.01, suggesting that the pattern we observe -  a decline in deforestation 
initially, followed by an increase -  is indeed highly statistically significant. Meanwhile, 
deforestation in illegal logging zones continues to intensify, so that the net effect in 
illegal logging zones is an increase of 25.1% (Panel A, column 3, sum of lags), driven 
by a 37.0% increase in the Conservation Forest (column 6) and a 13.3% increase in 
the Protection Forest (column 7). On net, the total increase in deforestation after 3 
years (shown in column 1) is 3.23%, though this is not statistically significant.
For indirect effects, by contrast, the impact on deforestation is positive and imme­
diate, and is concentrated in the legal logging zones. The impact effect of a district 
splitting is to increase overall logging by 7.01% in all other districts in the province 
(Panel A, column 1); the medium-run impact is 9.51% (Panel B, column 1, sum of 
lags). There are no statistically significant impacts in illegal logging zones outside of 
the district that splits.
Table 2.8 includes three leads of the NumOwnDistrictSdit and NumOtherDis- 
trictsdit variable in the regression. The main results are robust to the inclusion of 
the leads and we do not find a significant sum of leads for the N um O ther D istricts dit 
variable. In almost all specifications in Table 2.8, we do not find statistically signif­
icant effects on either the sum of the leads, or on the joint test of significance of all 
leads. The only exceptions are the sum of the leads for own splits in the Conservation 
Forest (column 6) and for other splits in the Conversion Forest, but given that we find 
significance in only 3 out of the 28 lead tests we consider it is likely that these are just 
noise, rather than true differential trends.60
The difference between the direct and indirect effects of a new district forming 
suggests a consistent explanation for the results in this section along the following lines. 
When a district splits, the initial disorganization disrupts legal logging activities but 
leads to an increase in illegal deforestation. Other districts within the same province 
increase logging immediately, as they know that prices will fall once the new districts
60There axe 28 tests as follows: for each of the 7 columns, we examine both the sum of the leads 
and a joint F-test of significance of all leads for both own splits and other splits.
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are fully established and begin to log more. Combined, this leads to a relatively small 
fall in prices and increase in quantities immediately -  the 1.70% price drop and 3.61% 
logging increase shown in Panel A of Tables 2.3.3 and 2.5 -  and a larger fall in prices 
and increase in quantities in the medium run -  the 3.29% price drop and 7.89% logging 
increase shown in Panel B of Tables 2.3.3 and 2.5.
2 .4  P o litica l logg ing  cycles
2.4.1 Empirical tests
The literature on political business cycles suggests that politicians tend to increase 
expenditures and postpone tax increases in the years leading up to elections, both at 
the national level (e.g., Nordhaus (1975), MacRae (1977), Alesina (1987), Rogoff and 
Sibert (1988), Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004)) and at the local level (e.g., Poterba 
(1994), Besley and Case (1995), Levitt (1997), Finkelstein (2009)). This section ex­
amines whether political cycles affect not only the legal actions by the state, but the 
state’s permissiveness towards illegal activity. In particular, we examine whether log­
ging in general, and illegal logging in particular, increases in the years leading up to 
a district election.
To do so, we take advantage of the fact that the timing of district-level elections 
in Indonesia varies from district to district. As discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, prior to 
2005, the heads of districts (known as Bupati) were indirectly selected by the district 
parliament. Starting in 2005, Bupatis were to be directly elected by the population in 
special elections (ROI, 2004). Crucially, the direct elections of Bupatis were phased 
in as the prior BupatVs term expired, so that some districts had their first direct 
elections as early as 2005 while others had them as late as 2010.61 As documented 
in detail by Skoufias et al. (2010), the timing of these direct elections was determined 
exclusively by when a BupatVs term expired, which was in turn driven by idiosyncratic 
factors, such as retirements and appointments of existing Bupatis to other posts, that 
determined Bupati appointments under the pre-1998 Soeharto regime (Emmerson, 
1999). Skoufias et al. (2010) examine this empirically and verify that the resulting 
timing of local elections is uncorrelated with a host of economic, social, and geographic 
characteristics.62
61 No direct elections for Bupatis were held in 2009, as national Presidential elections were held that 
year. Those Bupatis whose term was ending in 2009 were extended on an interim basis and direct 
elections were held in 2010 instead.
62 Specifically, Skoufias et al. (2010) run a regression of the probability of holding a direct election 
by 2007 and regress it on the end date of the previous BupatVs term and the following variables: 
unemployment rate, log real per capita district GDP, log real per capita district GDP without oil 
and gas, share of minerals in the district GDP, share of energy in the district GDP, dummy for a 
district having oil and gas, share of population that is urban, share of asphalt roads in the district, 
share of rock roads in the district, access to telephones, distance to the provincial capital, dummy for 
being a split district, share of mountainous areas in the district, share of coastal areas for the district, 
share of valley areas in the district, a city dummy, and 5 island dummies. Other than the end date 
of the previous BupatVs term, only 1 of the 21 variables they consider (a Sulawesi island dummy) is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. See Table A -l of Skoufias et al. (2010).
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To estimate the impact of elections on logging, we use the satellite data and es­
timate fixed-effects Poisson QMLE models on the various subcategories of the Forest 
Estate that estimates the following equation:
/  t+2 \
E  (deforested) =  Vdi exp I ^  f3jElectiondij  +  rjit I (7)
\j= t- 2 )
where j  indexes leads and lags of the Election variable, which is a dummy for a Bupati 
election taking place. As in equation (6) above, we include district fixed effects and 
island-by-year fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the 1990 district level. We 
include up to 2 leads and 2 lags of the Election variable to fully capture the 5 year 
election cycle.63 Note that since the official forestry statistics are only at the province 
level, whereas our variation is in the timing of elections within provinces, we cannot 
use the official forestry statistics dataset for this purpose.
2.4.2 R esults
The results from estimating equation (7) are shown in Table 2.9. Panel A shows the 
impact effect of elections (i.e., no leads and lags); Panel B presents the results with 
2 leads and lags of the Election variable. As before, we present results for the entire 
Forest Estate, as well as broken down by land use zone.
The results show clear evidence of a political logging cycle in the illegal forest 
zones. Focusing on column 3 of Panel B, which shows the impact on the Conservation 
and Protection Forest where no legal logging is allowed, we find that illegal logging 
increases dramatically in the years leading up to an election: by 29.4% 2 years prior 
to the election and by 42.7% in the year before the election. Illegal logging then falls 
dramatically (by 36.4%) in the election year and does not resume thereafter. Look­
ing zone-by-zone, we see that the pattern is strongest statistically in the Protection 
Forest (column 7), but that the point estimates suggest a very similar pattern in the 
Conservation Forest as well (column 6).
There are several possible explanations for the increase in illegal logging in the 
years leading up to the elections. One potential explanation is that logging was per­
mitted or facilitated by district officials in return for campaign funds.64 A second 
explanation is that district officials simply reduced enforcement of logging in the Con­
servation and Protection Forest in order to increase their popularity and win votes. 
Since these two stories are observationally equivalent in terms of the predicted impact 
on deforestation, it is not possible to tease them apart empirically.
Turning at the zones where logging may be legal or illegal (the Conversion and 
Production Forest), we see a different pattern. In the Conversion Forest, we find
63The omitted category is therefore the years prior to 2 years before the first direct election.
64Although we know of no direct qualitative evidence for this link, Greenpeace Indonesia has as­
serted that political parties amassed campaign funds for the 2009 general election through facilitating 
illegal logging (Greenpeace, 2009).
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a 40.5% increase in logging in the year of the election and a 57.9% increase in the 
year following the election. We find no impact on the Production Forest. According to 
Barr et al. (2006), many district governments have redirected their interest towards the 
development of oil palm plantations and other agroindustrial estates in recent years. 
It is possible that the observed increase in clear-cutting in the Conversion Forest after 
the election is a repayment for favours during the election campaign. Alternatively, it 
could be an attempt to grab first rents upon being elected. Once again, these stories 
are observationally equivalent, so it is not possible to tease them apart empirically 
with the existing data. Since the effects in the Conservation/Protection Forest and the 
Production/Conversion Forest have different patterns, column 1 shows little impact 
overall.
2.5  S u b stitu te s  or com p lem en ts?  L ogging v s. o th er  sources o f  ren ts
2.5.1 Empirical im plem entation
An important question in the economics of corruption is how corrupt officials with 
multiple opportunities for rent extraction respond if one type of corruption becomes 
harder or easier. If corrupt officials behave like profit maximizing firms, and there are 
no spillovers from one type of corrupt activity to the other, then they would optimize 
separately on each dimension, and there would be no impact of a change in one type 
of corruption opportunity on the other type of corruption.
More generally, however, one could imagine effects going in either direction. If 
corrupt officials worry about being detected, and if being detected means the official 
loses both types of corruption opportunities, then the two types of corruption will 
appear to be substitutes, and increasing corruption opportunities on one dimension 
will lower them on the other dimension. On the other hand, if there axe fixed costs 
of being corrupt (for example, those with a low disutility from being corrupt selecting 
into the civil service), multiple corruption opportunities could be complements. The 
two existing studies that have examined this question empirically (Olken (2007) and 
Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2009)) have both found evidence that alternative forms of 
corruption appear to be substitutes.
In this section, we examine this question by examining how logging responds to 
changes in another source of local rents for district governments: oil and gas revenues. 
Under Indonesia’s Fiscal Balancing Law (ROI, 1999b), a fraction of all oil and gas 
royalties received by the central government is rebated back to districts, with half of 
the rebate going to the district that produces the oil and gas and the other half being 
shared equally among all other districts in the same province. This can amount to a 
substantial amount of revenue -  as much as US$729.63 per capita in the highest district 
-  which can in turn be a tempting source of rents for district officials.65 Moreover, the
65 District government officials have recently been exposed in a wide variety of strategies to capture 
rents from the oil and gas revenue sharing fund. In Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara, for example, the
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precise amount of oil and gas revenue allocated to each district varies substantially 
over time as oil and gas production fluctuates, oil and gas prices change, and district 
boundaries change.
A key distinction between our context and the existing literature is that while the 
latter (Olken (2007) and Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2009)) studies short-run substitu­
tion from one type of corruption to another, our setting allows us to examine both 
the short and medium run. If the fixed costs of corruption are important, adjustment 
may take time, and the short- and medium-run effects could be quite different.
To examine the short-run impact of oil and gas rents on illegal logging, we estimate 
a version of equation (6). Since district splits influence oil and gas revenue through 
the sharing formula, we control for district splits directly, and estimate the following 
equation:
E  {def orest du) =  Udi exp {fi PCOilandGaSdit +  7 Numdistrictsdu  +  Bit) (8)
where PCOilandGaSdit is the per-capita oil and gas revenue received by the district 
(in USS). Note that in computing Num districtsdu  when estimating (8), we count a 
district as having split only when it reports receiving its own oil and gas revenue.66 
As above, fidi is a district fixed effect, rjit is an island-by-year fixed effect, and robust 
standard errors axe reported, adjusted for clustering at the 1990 district boundaries. 
Since district oil and gas sharing revenue is, on average, 20 times larger than that 
generated by the forestry sector, one would not expect forestry decisions to influence 
oil and gas choices. Oil and gas revenue should thus be exogenous with respect to 
deforestation. To examine the medium-run impacts of oil and gas rents on illegal 
logging, we estimate (8) as above, but include 3 lags of PCOilandGaSdit-
2.5.2 R esults
The results from estimating equation (8) are shown in Table 2.10. Panel A, which 
shows the immediate impact of oil and gas revenue on logging, confirms evidence 
of short-run substitution between deforestation and oil and gas rents. Specifically, 
each US$1 of per-capita oil and gas rents received by the district reduces logging 
by 0.32%. These effects are found in both the legal logging zones (0.28% in Pro­
national Anti-Corruption Commission recently documented that in 2001 the Bupati simply issued 
a decree giving himself, top district government officials, and district parliamentarians an official 
monthly stipend equal to 3% of the amount the government received in oil and gas revenue, amounting 
to over US$9 million over a 4-year period (KaltimPost, 2009b,a). In Kabupaten Natuna, Sumatra, 
a former Bupati was arrested in 2009 by the Anti-Corruption Commission for allegedly embezzling 
US$8 million in oil and gas revenue funds, by appropriating the funds to a fake committee that he 
never set up (Kompas, 2009). In Kabupaten Karawang, West Java, in 2004 the Bupati allegedly 
deposited US$600,000 in oil and gas revenue sharing funds into his personal account rather than the 
district treasury (KoranTempo, 2006).
66As described above, the de facto establishment of a district takes 1-3 years after the official de 
jure implementation. Since we care about district splits in this case because they affect the oil and 
gas allocation formula, it is important to control here for the de facto date the district split took 
effect, as that is the date the oil and gas formula would be affected.
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duction/Conversion Forest; column 2) and in the illegal logging zones (0.59% in the 
Conservation/Protection Forest). To interpret the magnitudes, note that the stan­
dard deviation of PCOilandGaSdit after removing district fixed effects is 23.7; so a 
one-standard deviation change in PCOilandGaSdit decreases deforestation by 6.64% 
in the Production/Conversion Forest and by 13.98% in the Conservation/Protection 
Forest.
Panel B shows, however, that the short-run and medium-run effects axe quite 
different. While the immediate effect of oil and gas revenue on logging is still negative 
(0.49% per US$1, Panel B, column 1), the sum of the lags is now positive. That 
is, after three years, the total medium-run effect of US$1 of per-capita oil and gas 
rents is to increase logging by 0.63%. Once again, this shift occurs equally in the 
legal logging zones (0.64%, column 2) and illegal logging zones (0.54%, column 3), 
although the illegal logging zone effect is not statistically significant. Once again, these 
magnitudes are substantial: a one-standard deviation increase in PCOilandGaSdit 
leads to a medium-run increase in deforestation of 14.93%. This suggests that the 
short- and medium-run impacts are different, and in the medium run, oil and gas 
rents and rents from logging appear to be complements.
2 .6  C onclu sion s
This paper has demonstrated how the incentives faced by local politicians and bu­
reaucrats play an important role in determining the rate of deforestation in Indonesia. 
Using a novel MODIS satellite-based dataset that tracks deforestation on an annual 
basis across the whole of Indonesia, we have shown that the rates of deforestation are 
influenced by the return local officials face in the market for logs, by their short-term 
electoral needs, and by the availability of alternative sources of rent extraction.
More broadly, the results in the paper demonstrate that the pattern of forest 
cutting in Indonesia is not the result of some optimal forest management model im­
plemented by the Ministry of Forestry. The decisions that matter for whether trees 
are cut down or not take place not just in ministerial meeting rooms. They are a 
result of the push and shove of local politics.
To the extent one wants to slow the rate of tropical deforestation, these results 
matter. They suggest that unless the incentives of local politicians and bureaucrats 
are taken into account, then central or donor-driven policies to counter deforesta­
tion may be ineffective. In particular, the recently ratified Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) initiative provides countries with a 
source of funding to reduce deforestation that is likely to grow considerably over time. 
Indeed, Indonesia is to be the first recipient of REDD funds, having signed a US$1 
billion REDD agreement with Norway in 2009. However, unless REDD programs are 
designed to consider those local actors who currently derive considerable benefits from 
legal and illegal logging, they are unlikely to be effective.
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Though instructive in terms of revealing how political economy plays a central role 
in the deforestation process, our paper very much leaves open the central question of 
how to counter this process. Nonetheless, the results imply that taking the financial 
and electoral pressures upon local politicians and bureaucrats seriously is a crucial 
step to sustainable tropical forestry.
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B  D a ta  a p p en d ix
This appendix provides information complementary to Section 2.2 on the variables 
used in this paper. These variables will be constructed for all provinces and districts 
on the islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua. We use three differ­
ent samples. The first sample uses the 1990 province boundaries and comprises 21 
provinces.67 In addition, we have two district-level samples. The first sample uses the 
1990 boundaries and includes 146 districts and municipalities and the second uses the 
2008 boundaries for a total 311 districts and municipalities.
B .l  Government forestry data
The government forestry dataset has been compiled from the annual ‘Statistics of For­
est and Concession Estate’ (Statistik Perusahaan Hak Pengusahaan Hutan) published 
by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik). This data 
is available at the province level for 1994-2007. It reports the volume of logs cut in 
cubic metres and the value of production in 1,000 rupiahs for 114 wood types. We 
drop the ‘other’ (Lainnya) and ‘mixed wood’ (Rimba Campuran) category, since their 
composition varies considerably across provinces and over time.
We calculate the prices for the remaining 112 wood types by dividing the value 
of production with the volume produced. The price data is then converted into US 
dollars and deflated by the US Consumer Producer Index for 2000. Subsequently, we 
sum the volume and deflated price data for each wood type within the 1990 province 
boundaries. By taking logs we obtain our two dependent variables used in Section 
2.3.3. Note that the associated regressions will be weighted by the first volume of 
production reported for each wood type.
B .2 D istrict split data
We collect data on district and province boundaries from the publications on regency 
and municipality codes of the Central Bureau of Statistics. The most up-to-date list is 
available at h t tp : / /d d s .b p s .g o . id /eng/aboutus.php?m stkab= l. Since the coding 
of districts has been revised several times between 1990 and 2008, we create a master 
district dataset that only uses 2008 identifiers for all years and follows the original 
1990 districts as they split over time. Note that we use the 1990 boundaries as a 
reference point, because 17 new kabupaten and kota were formed between 1990 and 
1999.68
67These provinces axe Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Sumatera Utara, Sumatera Barat, Riau, Jambi, 
Sumatera Selatan, Lampung, Kepulauan Bangka Belitung, Kalimantan Barat, Kalimantan Tengah, 
Kalimantan Selatan, Kalimantan Timur, Sulawesi Utara, Sulawesi Tengah, Sulawesi Selatan, Sulawesi 
Tenggaxa, Gorontalo, Sulawesi Barat, Papua Barat and Papua
68 During the Soeharto regime, only 3 new kabupaten or kota were created outside of Jakarta prior 
to 1990: Kota Ambon (PPRI No. 13 Thn. 1979), Kota Batam (PPRI No. 34. Thn. 1983), and Kab. 
Aceh Tenggaxa (UURI NO. 4 Thn. 1984). Jakarta itself was split into 5 city parts in 1978.
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For our Cournot analysis we construct the following set of variables. For the 
province-level data, we simply count the total number districts and municipalities 
within the 1990 province boundaries. We also separately sum the number of kabupaten 
and kota for each province and year, which will be used as a robustness check. In 
addition, we construct two more variables at the district-level. Firstly, we count into 
how many districts and municipalities the original 1990 district split into in a given 
year. Secondly, we sum across all the remaining administrative units within the same 
province. Finally, we construct three leads and lags for each variable in turn.
B.3 D istrict election data
The district-level election schedules are obtained from the Centre for Electoral Reform 
(CETRO), which is an Indonesian NGO (h ttp ://w w w .ce tro .o r.id /n ew w eb /in d ex . 
php). We use the most up-to-date dataset on district head elections, which reports 
the dates of all of the direct Bupati and Walikota elections held since 2005. It also 
provides information on elections that are scheduled up to 2011. From this dataset 
we construct a dummy, which is equal to one in the year of the election. We also 
calculate two leads and lags of this indicator variable.
B.4 D istrict public finance data
The dataset on oil and gas revenue has been compiled from the webpage of the 
Indonesian Ministry of Finance (Menteri Keuangan), which is available at h t tp :  
//www. d jp k . depkeu. go . id /d a tad jp k /5 7 /. The revenue figures are reported for each 
district for 2001-2008. It is important to note that new districts often do not record 
their own share of revenue for the first few years after the split, as they are still set­
ting up their basic government functions. We therefore allocate each new district the 
revenue share of its originating district until it reports its own share for the first time.
The revenue data has then been converted into US dollars and divided by the 
district-level population figure for 2008. This yields the Oil and Gas Revenue per 
capita variable used in our analysis. The population data for 2008 has been down­
loaded from the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics.
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Figure 2.1: Forest cover change in the province of Riau, 2001-2008
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Figure 2.2: District-level logging in Indonesia using the 2008 district boundaries
(a) 2001
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Figure 2.2: District-level logging in Indonesia using the 2008 district boundaries
(b) 2008
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Figure 2.3: Total number of district splits using the 1990 district boundaries, 1990- 
2008
Legend 
Number o f district splits
□  2
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Figure 2.4: Oil and gas revenue per capita using the 2008 district boundaries, 2008
Legend
Oil and gas revenue (per capita)
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Table 2.1: Forest area in 1000 HA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Year Total land area 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Change 2000-08
All Forest 118,664 109,795 109,335 108,459 108,047 107,499 106,970 105,916 105,349 104,901 -4,894
Legal Forest 74,339 67,908 67,521 66,858 66,502 66,049 65,579 64,677 64,154 63,745 -4,163
Illegal Forest 44,325 41,886 41,814 41,601 41,545 41,449 41,391 41,238 41,195 41,156 -731
Conversion 19,363 16,576 16,460 16,294 16,197 16,065 15,912 15,704 15,566 15,455 -1,121
Production 54,977 51,332 51,061 50,564 50,305 49,984 49,667 48,973 48,588 48,290 -3,042
Conservation 17,074 15,720 15,692 15,564 15,537 15,490 15,472 15,381 15,357 15,343 -377
Protection 27,250 26,166 26,122 26,037 26,007 25,959 25,919 25,857 25,838 25,812 -354
Change all forest -459 -877 -412 -548 -529 -1,054 -567 -448 -4,894
Notes'. The forest dataset has been constructed from MODIS satellite images, as described in Section 2.2.2.1. It counts the total number of forest cells by year and forest zone. 
Note that 1000HA =  10 square kilometres.
00Cn
THE 
PO
LITICAL 
ECO
NO
M
Y 
OF 
TRO
PICAL 
D
EFO
RESTATIO
N
Table 2.2: Summary statistics of forest area cleared in 1000HA by districtXyear
(i) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Logging All Forest Production/
Conversion
Conservation/ Conversion 
Protection
Production Conservation Protection
Mean 0.704 1.269 0.199 0.947 1.451 0.248 0.165
Std. deviation 2.901 4.008 1.022 2.644 4.594 1.38 0.661
Observations 6952 3280 3672 1184 2096 1520 2152
Notes: The forest dataset has been constructed from MODIS satellite images, as described in Section 2.2.2.1. It counts the total number 
of forest cells by year and forest zone. Note that 1000HA =  10 square kilometres. The variable shown here is the key dependent variable 
analyzed in Sections 2.3-2.5.
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Table 2.3: Impact of Splits on Prices and Quantities: Legal Logging Data
(i) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2001-2007 2001-2007 1994-2007
All wood obs Balanced panel wood obs All wood obs
VARIABLES Log Price Log Q uantity Log Price Log Quantity Log Price Log Q uantity
(i) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2001-2007 2001-2007 1994-2007
All wood obs Balanced panel wood obs All wood obs
VARIABLES Log Price Log Quantity Log Price Log Quantity Log Price Log Quantity
Panel A
Number of districts -0.017* 0.089** -0.019* 0.106** -0.023** 0.081***
in province (0.009) (0.041) (0.010) (0.036) (0.009) (0.016)
Observations 1003 1003 532 532 2355 2355
Panel B: Lags
Number of districts -0.025** 0.098 -0.027** 0.126 -0.029*** 0.071***
in province (0.010) (0.074) (0.012) (0.078) (0.008) (0.023)
Lag 1 0.010** -0.041 0.009 -0.035 0.010** -0.001
(0.004) (0.036) (0.005) (0.041) (0.004) (0.035)
Lag 2 -0.001 0.041 -0.001 0.018 0 0.017
(0.008) (0.045) (0.009) (0.021) (0.004) (0.027)
Lag 3 -0.017** 0.033 -0.017** 0.043 -0.015* 0.029
(0.006) (0.044) (0.007) (0.040) (0.008) (0.037)
Observations 1003 1003 532 532 1960 1960
Joint p 0.00271 0.000533 0.00756 0.000583 0.000109 0.00645
Sum of lags -0.0329*** 0.131** -0.0361** 0.153** -0.0339** 0.117***
(0.0103) (0.0527) (0.0116) (0.0505) (0.0131) (0.0363)
Notes: The log price and log quantity data has been compiled from the ‘Statistics of Forest and Concession Estate’. The Number of districts 
in province variable counts the number of kabupaten and kota within each province. The regression also includes wood-type-by-province and 
wood-type-by-island-by-year fixed effects and are weighted by the first volume reported by wood type and province. The robust standard 
errors axe clustered at the 1990 province boundaries and reported in parentheses. *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1
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Table 2.4: Impact of Splits on Prices and Quantities: Alternative Specifications
(i) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2001-2007 2001-2007 1994-2007
All wood obs Balanced panel wood obs All wood obs
VARIABLES Log Price Log Quantity Log Price Log Quantity Log Price Log Quantity
P an el A: C ontem poraneous w eigh ts
Number of districts -0.017 0.096* -0.021* 0.108** -0.024*** 0.056**
in province (0.010) (0.045) (0.010) (0.045) (0.007) (0.019)
Observations 1003 1003 532 532 2357 2357
P an el B: N o  c ities
Number of districts -0.018* 0.088* -0.020* 0.106** -0.026*** 0.073***
in province (0.008) (0.042) (0.009) (0.036) (0.008) (0.020)
Observations 1003 1003 532 532 2355 2355
P an el C: C ities  on ly  (falsification)
Number of districts 0.098 0.420 0.157 0.494 -0.001 0.184**
in province (0.131) (0.353) (0.130) (0.319) (0.043) (0.084)
Observations 1003 1003 532 532 2355 2355
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Table 2.4: Impact of Splits on Prices and Quantities: Alternative Specifications (cont.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P anel D: Leads
Number of districts -0.020*** 0.111 -0.019** 0.151** -0.019* 0.098*
in province (0.006) (0.074) (0.007) (0.061) (0.009) (0.053)
Lag 1 0.007 -0.043 0.006 -0.038 0.006 -0.010
(0.006) (0.037) (0.008) (0.044) (0.006) (0.041)
Lag 2 -0.003 0.036 -0.004 0.002 -0.005 0.013
(0.004) (0.055) (0.005) (0.018) (0.004) (0.032)
Lag 3 -0.016** 0.040 -0.017* 0.048 -0.021** 0.037
(0.007) (0.050) (0.008) (0.044) (0.010) (0.040)
Lead 1 0.023 0.036 0.050* 0.236** -0.008 -0.007
(0.014) (0.121) (0.025) (0.088) (0.022)
Lead 2 -0.022 0.039 -0.032 0.040 -0.009* -0.035
(0.049) (0.249) (0.057) (0.270) (0.004) (0.059)
Lead 3 0.002 -0.088 0.000 -0.207 -0.018* 0.020
(0.029) (0.218) (0.042) (0.227) (0.009) (0.041)
Observations 865 865 456 456 1822 1822
Joint p 2.28e-06 8.16e-05 5.66e-08 7.09e-06 9.51e-05 0.000173
Sum of lags -0.0330*** 0.144** -0.0337*** 0.163** -0.0386** 0.138**
(0.0107) (0.0593) (0.00904) (0.0646) (0.0162) (0.0524)
Sum of leads 0.00272 -0.0129 0.0184 0.0684 -0.0354*** -0.0217
(0.0456) (0.211) (0.0376) (0.287) (0.00960) (0.0407)
Joint p leads 0.379 0.980 0.0639 0.0532 0.00614 0.907
Notes: The log price and log quantity data has been compiled from the ‘Statistics of Forest and Concession Estate’. The Number of districts 
in province variable counts the number of kabupaten and kota within each province. The regression also includes wood-type-by-province and 
wood-type-by-island-by-year fixed effects and are weighted by the first volume reported by wood type and province. The robust standard 
errors are clustered at the 1990 province boundaries and reported in parentheses. *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1
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Table 2.5: Satellite data on impact of splits, province level
VARIABLES
(1)
All Forest
(2)
Production/
Conversion
(3) (4)
Conservation/ Conversion 
Protection
(5)
Production
(6)
Conservation
(7)
Protection
Panel A
Number of districts 0.0361** 0.0424** 0.0391 0.0283 0.0533*** 0.0786* 0.00645
in province (0.0160) (0.0180) (0.0317) (0.0333) (0.0199) (0.0415) (0.0322)
Observations 672 336 336 128 168 144 168
Panel B: Lags
Number of districts 0.0370 0.0435 0.0833*** 0.0447 0.0523 0.0959** 0.0657*
in province (0.0284) (0.0332) (0.0299) (0.0420) (0.0350) (0.0417) (0.0377)
Lag 1 0.0405 0.0434 -0.129** 0.00823 0.0419 -0.170 -0.0732
(0.0446) (0.0461) (0.0651) (0.0641) (0.0434) (0.130) (0.0623)
Lag 2 -0.0717*** -0.0740*** 0.0186 -0.0883** -0.0625** 0.111 -0.0851
(0.0265) (0.0250) (0.0762) (0.0346) (0.0257) (0.153) (0.0679)
Lag 3 0.0731* 0.0654 0.117* 0.107 0.0476 0.0889 0.141**
(0.0397) (0.0399) (0.0610) (0.0880) (0.0357) (0.0614) (0.0610)
Observations 672 336 336 128 168 144 168
Joint p 4.75e-06 6.95e-08 0.0235 0.0428 0.000923 0.0486 0.0665
Sum of lags 0.0789*** 0.0783*** 0.0900** 0.0712 0.0793*** 0.125** 0.0484
(0.0200) (0.0190) (0.0400) (0.0616) (0.0214) (0.0611) (0.0357)
Notes: The forest dataset has been constructed from MODIS satellite images, as described in Section 2.2.2.1. It counts the total number of forest 
cells by year and forest zone. Note that 1000HA = 10 square kilometres. Number of districts in province variable counts the number of kabupaten and 
kota within each province. The regression also includes wood-type-by-province and wood-type-by-island-by-year fixed effects. The robust standard 
errors are clustered at the 1990 province boundaries and reported in parentheses. *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1
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Table 2.6: Satellite data on impact of splits with leads, province level
VARIABLES
(1)
All Forest
(2)
Production/
Conversion
(3) (4)
Conservation/ Conversion 
Protection
(5)
Production
(6)
Conservation
(7)
Protection
Number of districts 0.0406 0.0444 0.0882** -0.0105 0.0637 0.138*** 0.00976
in province (0.0396) (0.0460) (0.0352) (0.0304) (0.0491) (0.0490) (0.0614)
Lag 1 0.0244 0.0202 -0.105 -0.0126 0.0166 -0.124 -0.0517
(0.0480) (0.0511) (0.0692) (0.0834) (0.0473) (0.104) (0.0773)
Lag 2 -0.0603 -0.0547 -0.00237 -0.0712 -0.0395 0.0400 -0.0822
(0.0385) (0.0362) (0.0853) (0.0588) (0.0336) (0.122) (0.0819)
Lag 3 0.0856* 0.0755 0.135 0.148 0.0584 0.156* 0.134
(0.0518) (0.0494) (0.0884) (0.123) (0.0413) (0.0924) (0.0947)
Lead 1 0.0879 0.0925 0.0498 0.324* 0.0370 0.172 0.0444
(0.114) (0.120) (0.136) (0.173) (0.110) (0.138) (0.136)
Lead 2 -0.118 -0.156 -0.0141 -0.257 -0.149 0.132 -0.0897
(0.137) (0.136) (0.163) (0.180) (0.131) (0.180) (0.170)
Lead 3 0.0364 0.0635 -0.0432 0.117 0.0689 -0.157 0.0180
(0.107) (0.104) (0.103) (0.130) (0.103) (0.115) (0.112)
Observations 504 252 252 96 126 108 126
Joint p 0.000251 0 0.0129 0 0 2.72e-09 0.0817
Sum of lags 0.0903*** 0.0854*** 0.116* 0.0536 0.0992*** 0.210** 0.00992
(0.0281) (0.0239) (0.0663) (0.0677) (0.0223) (0.0944) (0.0774)
Sum of leads 0.00586 -5.16e-05 -0.00758 0.184 -0.0432 0.147 -0.0274
(0.0663) (0.0587) (0.0976) (0.132) (0.0566) (0.148) (0.0889)
Joint p leads 0.714 0.660 0.608 0.201 0.296 0.430 0.550
Notes: The forest dataset has been constructed from MODIS satellite images, as described in Section 2.2.2.1. It counts the total number of forest 
cells by year and forest zone. Note that 1000HA =  10 square kilometres. Number of districts in province variable counts the number of kabupaten 
and kota within each province. The regression also includes province and island-by-year fixed effects. The robust standard errors are clustered at 
the 1990 province boundaries and reported in parentheses. *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1
THE 
PO
LITICAL 
ECO
NO
M
Y 
OF 
TRO
PICAL 
D
E
F
O
R
E
STA
TIO
N
Table 2.7: Satellite data on impact of splits, district level
VARIABLES
(1)
All Forest
(2)
Production/
Conversion
(3) (4)
Conservation/ Conversion 
Protection
(5)
Production
(6)
Conservation
(7)
Protection
Panel A
Number of districts in -0.102 -0.172* 0.0663 -0.0174 -0.211** 0.136* -0.0284
original district boundaries (0.0778) (0.0913) (0.0519) (0.150) (0.0864) (0.0767) (0.0839)
Number of districts 0.0701** 0.0967*** 0.0336 0.0380 0.122*** 0.0677 0.0138
elsewhere in province (0.0275) (0.0311) (0.0308) (0.0486) (0.0326) (0.0452) (0.0315)
Observations 6872 3136 3544 1112 1952 1360 2040
Panel B: Lags
Number of districts in -0.0627 -0.0984 0.107** 0.0139 -0.133 0.151* 0.0421
original district boundaries (0.0830) (0.103) (0.0542) (0.154) (0.0969) (0.0874) (0.0576)
Lag 1 -0.0185 -0.0780 -0.0739 0.207 -0.140 -0.0828 -0.0259
(0.130) (0.159) (0.103) (0.239) (0.141) (0.138) (0.0806)
Lag 2 -0.0767 -0.129 0.0252 -0.438 -0.0625 0.153 -0.143
(0.115) (0.151) (0.0956) (0.287) (0.133) (0.161) (0.103)
Lag 3 0.190*** 0.218*** 0.193** 0.154 0.243*** 0.148 0.261**
(0.0669) (0.0737) (0.0794) (0.138) (0.0789) (0.0940) (0.106)
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Table 2.7: Satellite data on impact of splits, district level (cont.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Number of districts 0.0702* 0.0901** 0.0883*** 0.0356 0.116*** 0.105** 0.0771**
elsewhere in province (0.0371) (0.0434) (0.0316) (0.0599) (0.0384) (0.0436) (0.0357)
Lag 1 0.0582 0.0802 -0.140** -0.0296 0.0946 -0.194* -0.0803
(0.0584) (0.0643) (0.0572) (0.0872) (0.0619) (0.100) (0.0556)
Lag 2 -0.0656 -0.0535 0.0207 -0.00584 -0.0517 0.101 -0.0573
(0.0477) (0.0520) (0.0780) (0.0668) (0.0543) (0.119) (0.0973)
Lag 3 0.0322 0.0111 0.0935 0.0932 -0.0238 0.0732 0.0972
(0.0396) (0.0426) (0.0584) (0.0776) (0.0445) (0.0527) (0.0629)
Observations 6872 3136 3544 1112 1952 1360 2040
Joint p original 0.0632 0.00753 0.0555 0.119 0.00465 0.212 0.0120
Sum of lags original 0.0323 -0.0867 0.251*** -0.0623 -0.0929 0.370** 0.133**
(0.114) (0.115) (0.0964) (0.193) (0.115) (0.176) (0.0680)
Joint p elsewhere 0.0100 0.00331 0.0265 0.589 0.00118 0.00983 0.130
Sum of lags elsewhere 0.0951** 0.128*** 0.0622 0.0934 0.135*** 0.0851 0.0367
(0.0390) (0.0432) (0.0385) (0.0586) (0.0480) (0.0654) (0.0311)
Notes: The forest dataset has been constructed from MODIS satellite images, as described in Section 2.2.2.I. It counts the total number of forest 
cells by year and forest zone. Note that 1000HA =  10 square kilometres. Number of districts in original district boundaries variable counts the 
number of kabupaten and kota the district split into and the Number of districts elsewhere in province variable counts the number of kabupaten and 
kota all other districts within the same province split into. The regression also includes district and island-by-year fixed effects. The robust standard 
errors are clustered at the 1990 district boundaries and reported in parentheses. *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1
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Table 2.8: Satellite data on impact of splits with leads, district level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES All Forest Production/ Conservation/ Conversion Production Conservation Protection
Conversion Protection
Number of districts in -0.0291 0.0379 -0.00473 0.00271 0.0477 0.101 -0.0564
original district boundaries (0.110) (0.178) (0.0500) (0.309) (0.168) (0.0688) (0.0909)
Lag 1 -0.0660 -0.205 -0.0172 0.0381 -0.279 0.00135 0.0145
(0.152) (0.195) (0.0953) (0.323) (0.179) (0.112) (0.0801)
Lag 2 -0.0613 -0.107 -0.0248 -0.255 -0.0728 0.0493 -0.144
(0.139) (0.196) (0.0972) (0.328) (0.175) (0.121) (0.0949)
Lag 3 0.244*** 0.286*** 0.164 0.298** 0.305*** 0.200* 0.242*
(0.0720) (0.0900) (0.105) (0.148) (0.0921) (0.110) (0.128)
Lead 1 0.136 0.0859 0.395 0.800* 0.0237 0.907** 0.250
(0.243) (0.247) (0.281) (0.449) (0.234) (0.418) (0.179)
Lead 2 -0.306 -0.396 -0.0744 -0.624 -0.371 0.291* -0.301
(0.247) (0.296) (0.258) (0.401) (0.274) (0.175) (0.341)
Lead 3 0.0933 0.117 -0.154 0.405* 0.0268 -0.503** 0.224
(0.125) (0.122) (0.222) (0.213) (0.141) (0.231) (0.318)
Number of districts 0.0673 0.0563 0.109*** -0.00830 0.0813 0.148*** 0.0297
elsewhere in province (0.0485) (0.0657) (0.0372) (0.0921) (0.0645) (0.0419) (0.0603)
Lag 1 0.0541 0.0936 -0.115** -0.0157 0.115* -0.135** -0.0537
(0.0602) (0.0638) (0.0526) (0.0997) (0.0650) (0.0680) (0.0609)
Lag 2 -0.0559 -0.0364 -0.00989 -0.00795 -0.0293 0.0209 -0.0455
(0.0559) (0.0636) (0.0799) (0.0922) (0.0646) (0.0891) (0.0910)
Lag 3 0.0285 -0.00160 0.130* 0.103 -0.0338 0.153** 0.0827
(0.0372) (0.0402) (0.0675) (0.0972) (0.0423) (0.0740) (0.0686)
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Table 2.8: Satellite data on impact of splits with leads, district level (cont.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lead 1 0.0989 0.120 -0.0228 0.257** 0.0758 0.110 -0.0148
(0.0857) (0.100) (0.110) (0.124) (0.0986) (0.132) (0.103)
Lead 2 -0.0457 -0.0485 -0.00274 -0.235 -0.0293 0.0572 -0.0128
(0.103) (0.109) (0.109) (0.168) (0.110) (0.150) (0.128)
Lead 3 -0.00966 -0.0213 -0.00960 0.0814 -0.0185 -0.0654 -0.0398
(0.0855) (0.0897) (0.0946) (0.151) (0.0906) (0.123) (0.119)
Observations 5148 2352 2646 810 1464 990 1512
Joint p original 0.0756 0.000177 0.000515 0.0769 0.000632 8.78e-05 0.527
Sum of lags original 0.0874 0.0115 0.117 0.0830 0.00154 0.352** 0.0555
(0.127) (0.154) (0.107) (0.247) (0.154) (0.161) (0.101)
Sum of leads original -0.0771 -0.193 0.167 0.581 -0.321 0.695* 0.173
(0.262) (0.292) (0.311) (0.406) (0.296) (0.416) (0.174)
Joint p leads original 0.530 0.606 0.0655 0.154 0.559 0.0946 0.530
Joint p elsewhere 0.323 0.222 0.00978 0.0558 0.137 0.001000 0.609
Sum of lags elsewhere 0.0940** 0.112** 0.114** 0.0711 0.133** 0.187** 0.0132
(0.0477) (0.0570) (0.0579) (0.0948) (0.0602) (0.0787) (0.0663)
Sum of leads elsewhere 0.0435 0.0503 -0.0351 0.103 0.0280 0.102 -0.0674
(0.0660) (0.0832) (0.0724) (0.124) (0.0833) (0.119) (0.0768)
Joint p leads elsewhere 0.669 0.654 0.953 0.0485 0.881 0.854 0.663
Notes: The forest dataset has been constructed from MODIS satellite images, as described in Section 2.2.2.1. It counts the total number of forest 
cells by year and forest zone. Note that 1000HA = 10 square kilometres. Number of districts in original district boundaries variable counts the 
number of kabupaten and kota the district split into and the Number of districts elsewhere in province variable counts the number of kabupaten and 
kota all other districts within the same province split into. The regression also includes district and island-by-year fixed effects. The robust standard 
errors are clustered at the 1990 district boundaries and reported in parentheses. *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1
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Table 2.9: Elections
(1)
VARIABLES All Forest
(2) (3) (4) 
Production/ Conservation/ Conversion 
Conversion Protection
(5)
Production
(6)
Conservation
(7)
Protection
Panel A
ElectionYear -0.133 -0.0732 -0.593*** 0.124 -0.128 -0.398*** -0.658***
(0.0959) (0.112) (0.155) (0.156) (0.107) (0.117) (0.214)
Observations 6872 3136 3544 1112 1952 1360 2040
Panel B: Leads and Lags
ElectionYear 0.0277 0.0804 -0.364** 0.405* -0.00920 -0.125 -0.493***
(0.142) (0.155) (0.152) (0.241) (0.151) (0.187) (0.183)
Lead 1 0.200 0.173 0.427** 0.242 0.134 0.244 0.501**
(0.130) (0.140) (0.216) (0.226) (0.146) (0.171) (0.220)
Lead 2 0.131 0.120 0.294** 0.295 0.0869 0.223 0.300**
(0.166) (0.185) (0.130) (0.223) (0.184) (0.149) (0.134)
Lag 1 0.282* 0.305* 0.140 0.579** 0.235 0.352 -0.111
(0.155) (0.170) (0.217) (0.236) (0.186) (0.282) (0.201)
Lag 2 -0.0427 -0.0463 0.0180 0.0896 -0.0671 0.0892 -0.103
(0.173) (0.193) (0.266) (0.302) (0.205) (0.339) (0.236)
Observations 6872 3136 3544 1112 1952 1360 2040
Lags Joint p 0.00305 0.00447 0.000358 1.61e-06 0.0383 0.0695 0.0257
Sum of lags 0.267 0.339 -0.206 1.074 0.158 0.315 -0.708
(0.429) (0.470) (0.547) (0.733) (0.489) (0.664) (0.500)
Leads Joint p 0.291 0.458 0.0598 0.413 0.641 0.252 0.0418
Sum of leads 0.331 0.293 0.721** 0.536 0.221 0.468* 0.801**
(0.270) (0.295) (0.314) (0.418) (0.302) (0.283) (0.320)
Notes: The forest dataset has been constructed from MODIS satellite images, as described in Section 2.2.2.1. It counts the total number of 
forest cells by year and forest zone. Note that 1000HA = 10 square kilometres. ElectionYear variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the district 
holds a Bupati or Walikota election that year. The regression also includes district and island-by-year fixed effects. The robust standard 
errors are clustered at the 1990 district boundaries and reported in parentheses. *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1 co
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Table 2.10: The Income Elasticity of Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES All Forest Production/ Conservation/ Conversion Production Conservation Protection
Conversion Protection
Panel A
Oil and Gas -0.00316** -0.00284* -0.00596** -0.00912*** -0.00220 -0.00474** -0.00986***
Revenue pc (0.00160) (0.00164) (0.00252) (0.00165) (0.00146) (0.00218) (0.00148)
Observations 6872 3136 3544 1112 1952 1360 2040
Panel B: Lags
Oil and Gas -0.00494** -0.00429** -0.0118*** -0.0115*** -0.00370* -0.0112*** -0.0119***
Revenue pc (0.00205) (0.00205) (0.00311) (0.00212) (0.00191) (0.00436) (0.00215)
Lag 1 0.000621 -1.07e-05 0.00702*** 0.00462* 0.000240 0.00929*** -0.000758
(0.00129) (0.00155) (0.00121) (0.00273) (0.00134) (0.00180) (0.00238)
Lag 2 0.00195 0.00216 0.000913 -0.000364 0.00236 0.00284* -0.00103
(0.00142) (0.00160) (0.00158) (0.00266) (0.00167) (0.00159) (0.00248)
Lag 3 0.00863*** 0.00851*** 0.00926*** 0.0143*** 0.00680*** 0.00585 0.0129***
(0.00169) (0.00184) (0.00304) (0.00354) (0.00163) (0.00473) (0.00483)
Observations 5136 2322 2634 822 1428 972 1494
Joint p 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.17e-09
Sum of lags 0.00626** 0.00636** 0.00536 0.00707* 0.00571* 0.00674 -0.000821
(0.00304) (0.00308) (0.00458) (0.00365) (0.00305) (0.00491) (0.00466)
Notes: The forest dataset has been constructed from MODIS satellite images, as described in Section 2.2.2.1. It counts the toteil number of 
forest cells by year and forest zone. Note that 1000HA = 10 square kilometres. Oil and Gas Revenue per capita variable reports the value 
of per capita revenue from oil and gas extraction at the district-level in US dollars. The regression also includes district and island-by-year 
fixed effects. The regression also includes the Number of districts in the original district boundaries variable. A district split is recorded once 
the district reports its first own share of oil and gas revenue. The robust standard errors are clustered at the 1990 district boundaries and 
reported in parentheses. *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1
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3 An Amenity-based Theory of 
Squatter Settlem ents
3.1  In tro d u ctio n
There is a growing global concern about the living conditions of the urban poor, as 
924 million people were living in slums in 2001 (UN-Habitat, 2003). That is, about 
one third of the world’s urban population is currently facing poor housing quality, 
overcrowding, insecure residential status and inadequate access to safe water and san­
itation.69 The majority of these slum dwellers reside in developing countries and often 
account for a large proportion of their urban population.70 This situation is set to 
worsen, as anthropogenic climate change will destroy rural livelihoods in many de­
veloping countries (IPCC, 2007a), which will intensify the already rapid urbanization 
process. Given the limited scope of their formal construction programs (Simha, 2006; 
WB, 2002), the number of slum inhabitants is thus expected to rise by about 2 billion 
over the next 30 years.
The main policies suggested to tackle this looming housing crisis involve slum up­
grading programs and the provision of greater security of tenure (UN-Habitat (2003), 
chapter 7). Notwithstanding the beneficial impacts of these policies on market out­
comes71 , their consequences can only be fully understood if the analysis is integrated 
into a spatial context. This aspect has been neglected so far by the academic lit­
erature, despite the well-known fact that slum locations are not coincidental. For 
instance, squats are often intentionally set up on ‘low quality’ land to lower the risk of 
eviction.72 This is a major oversight, as any policy that changes the value of the slum 
location itself will not only affect the socioeconomic behaviour of its inhabitants, but 
also the equilibrium in both the formal and informal housing market. The following 
shows that the resulting distortion casts doubt on the economic efficiency of these 
policies.
This paper attempts to fill this gap by developing a new theoretical framework, 
which introduces both an informal housing market and heterogeneous space into the
69This is the operational definition of UN-Habitat (UN-Habitat, 2002a,b).
70The largest proportion of slum dwellers were recorded in Sub-Saharan Africa and South-Central 
Asia, where they make up 72% and 58% of the urban population respectively. Moreover, about one 
third of all urban residents live in slums in the rest of Asia, Northern Africa, Latin America and the 
Caribbean (UN-Habitat, 2003).
71 The rationale for the up-scaling of slums through investment in infrastructure, roads and waste 
management is immediate. In addition, the development literature on property rights makes a strong 
case for increasing the security of tenure, because of its beneficial impact on health outcomes, labour 
market participation and access to credit. See Besley (1995b) for a seminal microeconomics paper 
and Carter and Wiebe (1994), Galal and Razzaz (2001), Carter and Olinto (2003), and Field (2007) 
for an analysis of informal or de fa c to  property rights.
72 A prominent example are the squatters in Rio de Janeiro, who occupy the steep slopes surrounding 
the city and are thus frequently exposed to flooding and landslides (Bartone et al., 1994).
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standard urban Muth-Mills model.73 To keep the analysis tractable, I focus on squat­
ter settlements, which are the most important component of the slum housing stock 
in developing countries.74 More specifically, I build on the seminal work of Jiminez 
(1984) by modelling the informal housing market as an integral part of the urban 
residential equilibrium. In this setup, risk-averse households can either rent in the 
formal housing market or squat at a lower price. The latter will compensate them for 
the risk of eviction and make them indifferent between the two housing markets.
However in contrast to Jiminez (1984), I introduce a spatial dimension into the 
analysis, which is important for two reasons. First of all, it changes the squatter’s 
optimization problem, since the household now maximizes expected utility over two 
different states and locations; in the non-evicted state the household fives in the squat, 
whereas it has to move to a different location in the formal housing market if evicted. 
This lowers the slope of the squatter’s bid rent curve relative to the formal housing 
market, as she attaches less weight to the characteristics of the squat knowing that 
she has to relocate with a positive probability. The bid rent curve of the informal 
housing market, therefore, does not only fie below its formal market counterpart, but 
it is also flatter.
Secondly, by adding a spatial dimension to the model, I am able to endogenize 
the location of the squat. Note that squatters can only occupy land that is deemed 
uninhabitable by the formal housing market, as the latter always outbids them for 
every lot. Given that squatter settlements are usually established on ‘low quality’ 
land, this can be achieved by introducing heterogeneous space into the theoretical 
framework.75 In particular, I follow Brueckner et al. (1999) and allow for an exogenous, 
distance-varying amenity level that is meant to capture the geographical features of 
the parcel and the availability of basic infrastructure. A steep hillside or a swamp can 
then be represented by a significant drop in the amenity level over a predetermined 
range within the city boundaries.
If households derive utility from this amenity level, their bid rent curve will reflect 
the same discontinuity. Consequently, it is possible that the formal housing market 
bids so little for the ‘low quality’ parcel that landowners prefer to leave it vacant 
for speculative purposes. This outside option is motivated by the observation that 
inadequate regulation and rent control in developing countries (Jiminez, 1984; Firman, 
1997) as well as uncertain land rents (Bar-Ilan and Strange, 1996) limit investment
73This theory has originated from the pioneering work of Alonoso (1964), Mills (1967), Muth (1969), 
and Wheaton (1974).
74The other categories axe inner city slums, slum estates, and illegal subdivisions (UN-Habitat 
(2003), chapter 5).
75 The urban economics literature has provided other explanations for the presence of open space 
within the city boundaries. For instance, Turner (2005) has provided a preference-based theory 
of urban sprawl, whereas Katz and Rosen (1981) and Katz and Rosen (1987) have argued that 
exclusionary municipal zoning may lead to undeveloped land. Both lines of reasoning assume that 
the land is homogenous ex ante and only changes its value due to constraints imposed by preferences 
or institutions. However, these approaches are not suitable in this context, since our objective is to 
model open space of intrinsic low value.
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opportunities and can, therefore, make it profitable to postpone development.76 The 
vacant lot is then available for squatting77, so that the formal and informal housing 
market coexist in the residential equilibrium.
The set of residential equilibria becomes more complex, once income heterogeneity 
is introduced into the analysis. In the standard Muth-Mills model, the poor usually 
live in the city centre and the rich in the suburbs. Nonetheless, this pattern can 
be reversed, if the marginal valuation of the amenity level strictly increases with 
disposable income. If this is the case, the model replicates the residential equilibria 
found in many developing countries (UN-Habitat (2003), chapter 5). That is, the rich 
reside in the high amenity core, which is followed by a middle-income neighbourhood. 
The latter contains the ‘low quality’ plot and is thus interrupted by a squat. The 
informal settlement is largely inhabited by low-income households, who care least 
about the low amenity level. The remaining poor live on the outskirts of the city.
This new theoretical framework can then be used to analyse the impact of the two 
policy interventions mentioned above. I find that a slum-upgrading program can lead 
to conflict over the improved lot, as the bid rent increases in both the formal and 
informal housing market. It is, therefore, possible that a profit-maximizing landowner 
will then find it optimal to evict the squatters after the program and rent to more 
affluent, formal market residents. This can be prevented via a titling initiative, which 
will, however, be inefficient, if the rich value the land more. Consequently, it is 
important to assess on a case-by-case basis, if a slum-upgrading program is efficient or 
if resources should alternatively be channelled towards public investment in citywide 
infrastructure and the provision of housing for the displaced communities.
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is important to discuss briefly the related 
literature. As has already been mentioned above, no theoretical framework exists 
that would allows us to study squatter settlements in a spatial context. Most of the 
urban and regional economics literature has so far focused on developed economies.78 
It has only recently begun to study the effects of rapid urbanization in developing 
countries on regional and urban development (Venables, 2005; Henderson and Wang, 
2005; Henderson and Venables, 2009) or on city growth (Au and Henderson, 2006a,b). 
Yet none of these papers makes any reference to the informal housing market.
There does exist a small literature on squatting that started with the insightful 
analysis of Jiminez (1984), which is used as a starting point for this analysis. He 
was the first to develop a theoretical model of squatting and also provided empirical 
evidence that tenure insecurity affects the price of the informal housing market; a
76The literature on dynamic urban models (Ohls and Pines, 1975; Mills, 1981; Fujita, 1983; Brueck- 
ner and Rabenau, 1981; Turnbull, 1988; Braid, 1991) offers a closely related explanation. Their main 
argument is that if investment decisions are irreversible, it might be efficient to postpone development 
of a given parcel to ensure that it will better suit future needs.
77The landlord tolerates the squat until the profitable economic opportunity arises, since the eviction 
of the squatters is costly.
78As a case in point, there is not a single article on developing countries in the most recent volume 
of the Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics (Henderson and Thisse, eds, 2004).
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result that has been reconfirmed by Friedman et al. (1988) and, more recently, by 
Field (2007). A series of other papers studies the impact of eviction uncertainty on 
squatter behaviour (Jiminez, 1985) or endogenized the eviction probability (Hoy and 
Jiminez, 1991; Turnbull, 2004). All of these papers ignore the spatial context and 
assume that the existence of the squat is determined exogenously.
Even the most recent contribution by Brueckner and Selod (2008) does not deal 
with these concerns. They instead focus on the interaction between the community 
organizers of the squat and formal market residents, as they compete for land within 
the city. This competition leads to a ‘squeezing’ of the formal housing market, which 
is, however, limited by the community organizers, so that eviction is absent in equi­
librium. In their model, formalization will lead to a pareto-improvement, because the 
gains of existing formal market residents are large enough to compensate the losses of 
the squatters. Since their analysis applies to study long-established squats for which 
the risk of eviction is absent (Flood, 2006), it should be seen as complementary to 
this analysis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model 
set up with homogeneous agents in both the formal and informal housing market and 
derives the associated bid rent curves. The subsequent section introduces income 
heterogeneity into the model, which allows me to analyse a particularly rich set of 
equilibrium configurations. Section 3.4 turns to the policy analysis. The final section 
concludes.
3.2  B a sic  m od el
3.2.1 The setup
In the stylised city of the Muth-Mills model, each agent is assumed to work in the 
central business district (C B D ) and commutes from her residential location at x  to the 
CBD .79 In the context of informal settlements, on might argue tha t this assumption is 
not valid, since squats can provide employment opportunities in terms of servicing and 
public goods provision (Neuwirth, 2005; Davis, 2006). However, even if this is the case 
for some members of the community, squatter households still spend on average up 
to 30% of their income on transport (UN-Habitat, 2003). I thus keep this assumption 
for simplicity.
Furthermore, suppose that there exists an exogenously given function of the amenity 
level a(x), which declines with the distance x  from the CBD .  This assumption is mo­
tivated by the observation that most cities in developing countries have a well-serviced 
central area, after which the amenity level falls considerably. This is true for both 
the ‘colonial-style’ cities in Africa and South Asia as well as for the ‘multi-nucleated’ 
urban areas in Southeast Asia and Latin America (UN-Habitat (2003), chapter 5).
79For a comprehensive exposition of the model see, for example, Brueckner (1987) or Fujita (1989).
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This downward-sloping amenity function is thus meant to capture the ‘quality’ of the 
land at location x, e.g. its geographical features and access to basic infrastructure.
The key assumption is that the amenity level falls significantly over a predeter­
mined range, x <  x < x, to model ‘low quality’ land, such as a steep hillside, a 
floodplain or a garbage dump. At x  there is a discontinuous jump in a(x), as the 
amenity level reverts back to a higher level and then continues its previous downward 
trend. In fact, there exists a lot of anecdotal evidence that basic infrastructure often 
runs through squatter settlements to connect the neighbouring areas without servic­
ing the slum itself (UN-Habitat (2003), chapter 2 and 4). At the urban fringe x, the 
amenity level has reached a and remains constant thereafter.
For simplicity, let’s assume that a(x) can be summarized by equation (9)
\ a — bx if 0 < x < x
I a — bx — cx2 if x < x  < x
«(*) =  1 _ , . . . . . .  (9)a — bx it x <  x  <  x
a if x > x,
where a > a > 0 ,  6 > 0  and c > 0. Note that ‘low quality’ land is defined by 
a(x) < a.80 This is achieved if b and c are sufficiently large, i.e. if c > ^ — =L— — > 0
— X
and b < a w —. Figure 3.1 below shows an illustration of the amenity level a(x) as it
Jb
declines with distance from the C B D , where ‘low quality’ land ranges from x' to x. 
Figure 3.1: The amenity-level as a function of distance
dow quality 
\  land •
a ( x )
x  urban firinge= x
80The amenity level a(x) is allowed to be negative to model polluted or hazardous land. Examples 
include land along railways (Patel et al., 2002) or garbage dumps (Vliet, 2002).
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Finally, it is assumed that households are homogenous and risk averse. Their well- 
behaved preferences can be represented by u(c ,h (x) ,a (x)) , where c is the numeraire 
composite good, and a(x) and h(x) are the location-specific amenity level and hous­
ing services respectively. Households derive utility from all three components, such 
that Ui > 0 and uu < 0 for i = c, a(x), and h(x), where subscripts denote partial 
derivatives. Following the literature, I also assume that h'(x) > 0 and h"{x) < 0. The 
household then maximizes its utility subject to the budget constraints of either the 
formal or informal housing markets.
Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 now analyse the constrained utility maximization problem 
in both housing markets in turn.
3.2.2 The formal housing market
This section analyses the household’s utility maximization problem in the formal hous­
ing market and the associated bid rent curve. Since the following discussion is general, 
Appendix C .l provides a mathematical example by solving the problem for the Cobb- 
Douglas utility function.
The analysis mainly draws on Brueckner et al. (1999), who were the first to intro­
duce an exogenous, distance-varying amenity level into the standard urban model. In
this setup, households choose the optimal consumption and housing bundle (c, h(x)) 
to maximize u(c,h(x),a(x))  subject to their budget constraint
c +  pF(x)h(x) = y — tx, (10)
where pF(x) is the unit price in the formal housing market, y  is income and tx  is 
the linear commuting cost. In addition, it is assumed that all agents enjoy the same 
utility level u at every location within the city boundaries.81 Since disposable income 
falls as the household moves further away from the C B D , this implies that the bid 
rent pF(x) must decline with x.
The household then determines the optimal bid rent schedule pF{x) and level of 
housing services h(x) by solving the uniform utility condition
max u(jy — tx  — pF(x)h(x), h{x), a(x)) = u. (11)
h
To obtain the slope of the bid rent function in the formal housing market, equation 
(11) has to be differentiated with respect to distance x  and rearranged to yield
F, _  uht i ( x )  t pF(x)h'(x) uaa!{x)   t _  vaa'(x)
^  X uch(x) h(x) h(x) uch(x) h(x) h(x) ’
where the second equality uses the first order conditions of the constrained maximiza­
81 Note that in this context it is not important whether we deal with an open or closed city model, 
i.e. whether u is determined endogenously or exogenously.
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tion problem, uh = ucpF(x), and the fact that the marginal valuation of the amenity 
level (after an optimal adjustment for consumption) is equal to the marginal rate of 
substitution, i.e. va =
Equation (12) shows that the bid rent curve in the formal housing market is 
downward sloping for all values of x, if a'(x) < 0 and va >  0 as has been assumed 
above. Moreover, it is steeper than in the standard urban model, where agents do not 
derive utility from the amenity level a(x). Brueckner et al. (1999) provide an intuition 
for this result by arguing that households located at x  now have to be compensated 
for the greater commuting cost to the C B D  as well as for the lower amenity level.
Therefore, it is possible that the bid rent offered by the formal housing market is 
less than the landowner’s outside option, if the amenity level a(x) is very low. The 
landowner, who for simplicity is assumed to be absentee, then prefers to leave the 
land vacant for speculative purposes.82 This outside option seems to be particularly 
pertinent in a developing country context, as imperfect capital markets and inadequate 
regulation limit investment opportunities (Jiminez, 1984; Firman, 1997) and can thus 
make it profitable to postpone development, especially if land rents are uncertain 
(Bar-Ilan and Strange, 1996). Assuming that the present discounted value of the 
speculation is equal to p a , location x  is left unoccupied for all x' < x  < x, where x' is 
determined by pF{x') =  pa  and x' < x 88 (see Figure 3.2 on the next page.84)
Note that the discontinuity in the bid rent function creates a ‘paradox’, where the 
bid rent on the ‘low quality’ plot can be lower than on locations further away from 
the CBD .  This result is driven by the fact that the household’s disutility is larger, 
the steeper the amenity function a(x). This is in turn reflected in the slope of the 
d p F (x )  vbid rent curve, as > 0. It is, therefore, possible that the utility lossda(x)  h{x)
from the sharp drop in the amenity level is too large to offset the benefits of the lower 
commuting costs. The bid rent on the ‘low quality’ plot then has to drop accordingly 
to ensure that households enjoy the citywide utility level u.
Finally, as in the standard Muth-Mills model, the urban fringe x  is determined by 
the second intersection of the bid rent curve with the outside option, i.e. pF(x) = pa 
where x  > x'. The equilibrium price schedule p{x) is then the upper envelope of pF(x) 
and p a -
82 It is usually assumed that squatter settlements only form on public land. However, this is not 
generally the case (Buckley and Kalarickal, 2006; WB, 2007; Galiani, 2004; DiTella et al., 2007).
83Note that there is no vacant land if pF[x') =  pa  for x' <  x  or x' > x. The intersection would 
then merely determine the urban fringe x, since pF(x) <  pa  for all x > x' .
84Note that I have drawn p F(x) as a linear function for convenience. However, it is clear from
equation (12) that this is not necessarily the case, as p F'(x ) changes with x  as long as h'(x) ^  0 or
a"(x) ^  0 .
3 AN  AMENITY-BASED THEORY OF SQUATTER SETTLEM ENTS  105
Figure 3.2: The bid-rent curve in the formal housing market
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3.2.3 T he inform al (squatting ) housing m arket
This section now analyses the expected utility maximization problem of the informal 
housing market and discusses the associated bid rent schedule. However, this time 
I cannot provide an example in the appendix, since there is no closed-form solution 
for the Cobb-Douglas utility function or any other standard utility function used in 
economics. I am only able to solve the problem for the log utility, which is not suitable 
for this analysis, since it lacks a key property; namely that the marginal valuation 
of the amenity level changes with income. This will be crucial in determining the 
residential equilibrium later. Appendix C.2 thus only provides the technical details 
for the general derivation.
The basic set up is taken from Jiminez (1984), who has been the first to develop 
a theoretical framework of the squatter’s choice problem. More specifically, I adopt 
two of his key assumptions that establish the links between the formal and informal 
housing market. First of all, it is assumed that households can choose between being 
a formal market resident or squatting. As households are assumed to be risk-averse, 
they are only willing to squat, if they are compensated for the tenure insecurity. 
Therefore, the formal and informal housing market only coexist in equilibrium, if the 
unit housing price in the squatter settlement is considerably lower than its formal 
market counterpart. The size of this risk premium is determined by the uniform 
utility condition, which has to bind for both housing markets in equilibrium.
However, Jiminez (1984) has ignored the main implication of this result; namely 
that squatters can only settle on land, which is deemed uninhabitable by the formal 
housing market, as the latter outbids them for every other location. This has been
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rectified by the current framework through the introduction of the distance-varying 
amenity level. The vacant lot, which has been derived in Section 3.2.2 above, now 
accommodates the squat. It is assumed that the landowner tolerates the informal 
settlement until a profitable economic opportunity arises, since an eviction is expen­
sive.85
The second assumption borrowed from Jiminez (1984) is that squatters are able to 
find accommodation in the formal housing market if evicted. However, different to his 
analysis, I introduce a spatial component into the squatter’s choice problem. That is, 
the evicted household has to move from her location x s  in the squat, where x' < x s  < 
x , to a different site x F in the formal housing market. It should be noted that this 
second assumption is not crucial for the subsequent results.86 Yet, segmented housing 
markets can only be motivated in this framework through rationing by income.87 
I hence postpone any further discussion of this issue until income heterogeneity is 
introduced in Section 3.3.
The squatter thus maximizes her expected utility over two separate states and 
locations
E (us ) =  7r(xs )uE (cE, hE(xF), a(xF)) +  ( l — 7r(xs ))uN (c1*,hN (xs ),a(xs )), (13)
where (c^, hE(xF)) and (c^, hN (xs )) are the consumption and housing bundle of the 
evicted and not evicted state respectively, and ir(xs ) is the risk of eviction in the 
squat. It is assumed that the probability of eviction declines with distance from the 
C B D , as the authorities are more aware of slums closer to the centre (UN-Habitat, 
2003). In addition, once income heterogeneity is introduced in the model, I show in 
Section 3.3.1 that the rich prefer the central locations because of the low commuting 
cost and high amenity level. The higher eviction probability closer to the C B D  could 
thus also be explained by ‘gentrification’.
The budget constraint in the non-evicted state can be described as
cN +  ps {xs )hN (xs ) = y -  t x s , (14)
where ps (xs ) is the unit price in the informal housing market. Since the squatter 
settlement is illegal, ps (xs ) is not an actual rental payment to a landlord. However, 
living in squat is not costless. For instance, it could represent a protection fee paid to 
‘local people of influence’, such as the police or the mafia (Lanjouw and Levy, 2002;
85 As is explained in more detail below, the squatters have to be compensated when they are evicted.
86 This is true as long as long as the household still faces a downward sloping bid rent curve when 
evicted.
87 Alternatively, market segmentation can be introduced, if squatting carries a strong enough stigma. 
For instance, if formal employers ‘redline’ workers from undesirable areas in the city, squatting will be 
unattractive for formal market residents (Boccard and Zenou, 2000; Zenou, 2002). This assumption 
effectively removes the uniform utility condition and introduce differences in preferences for this kind 
of stigma across households. The same effect can be modelled more simply by allowing for rationing 
in income without substantially changing the model.
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WB, 2007) or could reflect the cost of contributing to the organization and patrolling 
of the squat (Jiminez, 1985; Brueckner and Selod, 2008). In addition, Field (2007) has 
shown that squatters devote a substantial amount of time to securing their tenancy
where F  > 0 is a lump-sum compensation the household receives upon its eviction. 
These type of compensations were uncommon during the 1970s and 1980s, when forced 
evictions were the usual policy response to squatter settlements (Cohen, 1983; Bad- 
cock, 1984; Murphy, 1990).88 However, nowadays evictions are usually more participa­
tory and often involve some form of compensation or resettlement to a formal housing 
block on the urban fringe (UN-Habitat, 2003). The latter can be captured by this 
framework, if we assume that households choose the new location x F , such that their 
disposable income is the same in both states, i.e. y — t x F + F  = y — tx s . This implies 
that evicted households essentially choose an accommodation further away from the 
C B D , as x F = x s  +  y  > x s . This seems to be a reasonable assumption, also because 
housing prices and population density axe higher closer to the city centre.89
The household then determines the optimal bid rent schedule ps (xs ) and level of 
housing services hN(xs ) and hE{xF) by solving the uniform utility condition
Similar to the formal housing market, the slope of the squatter’s bid rent function
lower commuting costs. This argument gains more weight once we introduce income heterogeneity
through formal and informal channels. Hence, ps (xs ) could also be interpreted as an 
opportunity cost in terms of foregone earnings.
If the squatters are evicted, their ownership cost ps (xs )hN (xs ) is lost, as the 
housing stock is demolished and they have to move to the new location x F. The 
budget constraint in the evicted state can then be written as,
cE +  ps {xs )hN (xs ) +  pF{xF)hE{xF) = y - t x F + F, (15)
max 7Ti
hE,h"
where x
(16)
is obtained by totally differentiating equation (16) with respect to x s . Appendix C.2
88In fact, Jiminez (1984) adds a fixed cost to the budget constraint in the evicted state, because 
households incur a penalty and moving costs.
89This assumption can be further rationalized if we argue that households are of a fixed size. Thus, 
it is possible that the bid price in the centre is so high that the evicted household might not be able to 
afford sufficiently large accommodation, even if they use the compensation and take advantage of the
and find that the rich outbid the poor in the centre and that the poor are those that live in the squat.
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provides the detailed steps, which yield
s' ( S} = t  , a '( xS) ( * (x s )ug + -  * ( x s j ) u *
hN (xS) hN (xS) \ 7 T (xs )uF +  ( l  — 7r(xS) ) u ^
_ VF,(x F) hE^x F ) A x S h c  (17)
hN (xS) 7r(xS)uF +  ( l  — 7r(xS) ) u ^
7Tf ( x S ) UE  — U N
hN(xS) 7 t ( x S ) u E  +  ( l  — 7T(xS) )u ^
The interpretation of the first two terms is analogous to what has been argued in 
Section 3.2.2. That is, households have to be compensated for the higher commuting 
cost and lower amenity level, the further they move away from the C B D .90 How­
ever, it is important to note that both terms are smaller in absolute value than their 
corresponding expressions in equation (12). This is due to the fact that unit housing 
prices in the squat are lower than in the formal housing market for every x  within 
the city boundaries. As a consequence, households in the non-evicted state have more 
disposable income than a formal market resident, who would bid for the same lot x s . 
Therefore, the squatter consumes more housing services if she is not evicted, because 
both the numeraire composite good and housing services are assumed to be normal 
goods. This implies that the first term in equation (17) is smaller in absolute value 
that its formal market counterpart.
The same is true for the first part of the second term. To determine the size of 
the numerator of the second ratio, it is helpful to notice that formal market residents 
enjoy the same marginal valuation of the amenity level ua at x s  as a non-evicted 
squatter. However, once the latter is evicted, she moves to a higher level amenity 
plot x F , such that uE < =  ua because of diminishing marginal returns and,
thus, 7r(xs )uE -f ( l — 7T(xs ))u% < ua. The overall size of the denominator is less 
likely to change; non-evicted households consume more of the composite good relative 
to a formal market resident at x s  because of lower unit housing prices. However, 
consumption is lower in the evicted state, since they have lost their investment in 
the squat. The second term in equation (17) should thus also be smaller in absolute 
magnitude.
Consequently, the first two terms yield a flatter slope than in the formal housing 
market. This effect is reinforced by two new terms, which both enter positively into 
the expression. The third term is positive, because pF\ x F) < 0 for all x. It captures 
the fact that squatter households are tied less to a given location; they know that 
they have to move to x F with a positive probability. The squatters thus weigh the 
characteristics of the squat relative to the scenario they encounter when evicted. For 
instance, if the bid rent curve in the formal market gets steeper, the unit housing price 
is lower in the evicted state. To maintain the uniform utility level u, the unit housing
}As before, this assumes that a’(x) <  0, >  0, and >  0.
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price in the informal market hence falls less with distance.
The fourth and final term is also positive, since ir'(xs ) < 0 for all x s  and uE < uN , 
because the household has to invest twice into the housing stock in the evicted state. 
The intuition of this result is that the decline in the risk of eviction with distance 
from the C B D  partly offsets the utility loss due to the lower amenity level and higher 
commuting cost. This further lowers the slope of the bid rent curve. Furthermore, 
note tha t as the probability of eviction declines with distance from the centre, the bid 
rent curves of the formal and informal housing market eventually intersect once the 
threat is removed.
Given that the first two terms in equation (17) are negative and the last two 
positive, the overall sign of the slope of the squatter’s bid rent curve is ambiguous. As 
has already been explained at the beginning of this section, I am, unfortunately, not 
able to sign this expression, as the common utility functions used in economics do not 
have a closed form solution. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the bid rent curve 
in the informal housing market is a ‘shadow’ bid rent curve, which is only relevant 
once a parcel is left vacant by the formal housing market. Since this is only the case 
for the low level amenity plot, where a'(x) «  0, it is likely that the bid rent curve 
slopes downwards. Summarizing yields:
R esu lt 1. The bid rent curve of the informal housing market lies below 
its formal market counterpart and is flatter. The two curves intersect at 
the point where the risk of eviction is equal to zero.
3 .3  T h e  ex ten d ed  m od el
This section introduces income heterogeneity into the model. I can thus analyse how 
the location by income of the standard Muth-Mills model changes in the presence of 
a discontinuous amenity function and an informal housing market.
I follow the literature by capturing income heterogeneity not only through differ­
ences in income y, but also in the value of time t. This assumption is based on the 
observation that skill-intensive jobs usually command a higher wage, so that richer 
households have a higher opportunity cost of leisure. I introduce a high- (H ), a 
middle- (M) and a low-income (L) class, where yn  > yM > Vl and tn  > tM > ^L- 
Furthermore, note that although the value of time t rises with y, disposable income 
can still be ranked, i.e. yn  — t ^ x  >  yM — > Vl — ^lx  for every x.
The above analysis has shown that each income group has a bid-rent curve for 
the formal and informal housing market respectively and that pE (x) > Pj (x) for all 
x  and j  = H ,M ,  or L. To determine the residential equilibrium, I first have to 
study the location by income in the formal housing market (Section 3.3.1) and the 
associated residential equilibria (Section 3.3.2). If a plot of land is then left vacant 
in equilibrium, a squat can be established and the informal housing market will come 
into existence. I can then proceed to do a similar analysis for the squatters and derive
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the final residential equilibrium configuration in the urban housing market (Section 
3.3.3).
3.3.1 The location by income in the formed housing market
In general, the location by income is determined by comparing the slopes of the bid 
rent functions of income group j  and k  at the intersection of the curves. Income 
group j  outbids group k for all locations closer to the C B D , if p f '(x )  < p^'(x)  at 
the intersection x, i.e. if income group j ’s bid rent curve is more negatively sloped. 
One complication that arises in my extended version of the standard urban model is 
that the bid rent schedules are not continuous. Therefore, several intersections are 
possible when comparing two income groups. However, if the bid rent curves can still 
be ranked in terms of their relative steepness, the number of possible configurations 
is reduced.
The following shows which assumptions are necessary to ensure such a ranking. 
Let us begin by analyzing the difference between the slopes of the high- and middle- 
income group, A h m ,  at the intersection x  of their bid rent curves P j j { x )  and p^I (x):
A h m { x )  =  Ph {x ) ~  Pm \ x )
tu tM
hH(x) hM(x) (18)
+  a'(x)
V g ( y H  - t Hx,p%(x),g(x)) V a ( y M  -  tMx ,p ^ (x ) ,a (x ))
Hh ( x ) 1i m ( x )
As in Brueckner et al. (1999), I assume that the conventional forces favour the location 
of the rich in the suburbs, i.e. A h m  > 0 if a'(x) =  0. This effect can be achieved if the 
time preference rate rises less with disposable income relative to the lot size, such that 
hij(x) ~  hJt{x) ^  however, as soon as we allow for a!(x) < 0, A h m  can be negative. 
This is the case if the amenity advantage of the city centre is sufficiently large, as is 
the case in this model, and the rich care more about the amenity level than the poor. 
To ensure the latter, Brueckner et al. (1999) assume that the ratio of the marginal 
valuation of the amenity level to the lot size strictly increases with disposable income, 
such that va(yH ~  tHX,Pn(x),a(x)) -  va(yM -  tMx ,p ^ (x ) ,a (x ) )  >  0. Appendix C.3 
shows that this the case for the Cobb-Douglas utility function.
If these assumptions are satisfied, then A h m  <  0. The number of possible inter­
sections is then determined by where the two bid rent curves cross for the first time. 
That is, if the first intersection occurs on 0 < x < x, no second crossing exists. This 
is due to the fact that the slope of the bid rent curve is increasing over the low level 
amenity plot and reverts back to the initial slope for all x > x  (Figure 3.3a on the 
next page). A less clear-cut prediction can be derived if the bid rent curves intersect 
for the first time on the steep hillside, i.e. if x < x  <  x. In this case, a second crossing
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x is feasible, where x < x (Figure 3.3b below).91
Figure 3.3: Possible intersections of the bid-rent curve for the high- and middle-income 
household
(a) Only one possible intersection
CBD x
(b) One or two possible intersections
CBD
Since the income difference between the poor and the rich is even larger, it is then 
also the case that A hl < 0 under these assumptions, where A hl is the difference in 
slopes of the high- and low-income bid rent schedules at their intersection. That is, 
the rich outbid both the middle- and the low-income class for locations closer to the
91 This depends on the slope and intercept of Ph (x ) and Pm {x ) and thiis on the characteristics of 
the income groups and the assumed functional form of a(x) and u(c, h(x),a(x)).
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C B D , i.e A h l  < A h m  < 0. A similar argument implies that the middle-income class 
always offers a higher bid rent for locations closer to the city centre than the poor, as 
A m l  <  0. To summarize:
R esu lt 2. Even in the presence of a discontinuous amenity function, the 
bid rent curves can be ranked by income as long as the marginal valuation of 
the amenity level increases more with disposable income than the lot size. 
Different to Brueckner et al. (1999), it is possible that bid rent curves 
intersect twice, i f  they cross for the first time on the low level amenity 
plot. I f  the amenity advantage of the city centre is sufficiently large, the 
rich always locate closer to the CBD after each intersection with the bid 
rent curve of the middle-income group, whereas the opposite is true for the 
poor.
3.3.2 Possible res id en tia l equ ilib ria  in  th e  form al housing m ark e t
This section discusses a set of possible residential equilibria in the formal housing 
market. Section 3.3.1 has just shown that the bid rent curves of the three income 
groups can intersect more than once in this theoretical framework. This depends on 
the slope and intercept of the bid rent schedules and, hence, on the characteristics of 
the income groups and the assumed functional forms of the amenity curve a(x) and 
utility function u{c, h(x),a(x)).
To keep the analysis as general as possible, I make no additional assumptions. 
Instead I discuss one particularly rich residential equilibrium, which is consistent with 
the ‘colonial-style’ cities and ‘multi-nucleated’ urban areas found in many developing 
countries. Figure 3.4 on the next page shows the equilibrium without a vacant plot, 
whereas the configuration in Figure 3.5 has the potential for squat formation.
In both scenarios, the rich only occupy a small neighbourhood close to the C B D , 
yn  q, as the intersection of the high- and middle-income bid rent curves at xjjm  occurs 
on 0 < xhm  <  x. We know from the analysis in Section 3.3.1 that there is no other 
intersection, since the P j j ' ( x ) < p^J{x) for all x  > x h m . Such a small neighbourhood 
for the rich is sufficient, if the high-income class is much smaller in comparison to 
the other two income groups. This seems to be a realistic assumption, especially in a 
developing country context.
In addition, I allow for a large income difference between the middle- and low- 
income groups, i.e. A m l  < <  0. Consequently, their bid rent curves intersect twice at 
x im l  and X2ML- We know from the above that the poor choose to locate further away 
from the C B D  after each crossing. Finally, the urban fringe x  is again determined 
by the intersection of the outside option pa with the bid rent curve of the low-income 
group P l  ( x ) .
The existence of a vacant plot of land is then determined by the outside option. 
For instance, Figure 3.4 on the next page illustrates a residential equilibrium, in which
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PA is so low that all the land within the city boundaries is used by the formal housing 
market. That is, the rich locate nearest to the C BD , the middle-class in the central 
urban area and the poor on the low-level amenity plot. After the discontinuous jump 
in amenity level at x , the middle-income class again outbids the poor and locate in 
the suburbs, whilst the remainder of the low-income group moves to the periphery.
Figure 3.4: Possible residential equilibria with no vacant plot
farmlandVM q
PA
CBD XHM
As the present discounted value of the outside option rises, the landlord finds it 
less and less profitable to rent out the land to the poor on the steep hillside. For 
example, pa has risen so high in Figure 3.5 on the next page that the poor solely live 
on the outskirts of the city. The ‘low quality’ plot is left vacant and thus becomes 
available for squatting.
If pa increases even further such that x < X2ml, the low-income class is crowded 
out of the formal housing market altogether. In that case, the entire low-income group 
has to find accommodation in the informal housing market. If the squatters are then 
evicted from the ‘low quality’ plot, they have to find other illegal accommodation. 
One possibility would be to allow for illegal subdivisions on the urban fringe, which 
is a phenomenon often observed in developing countries (UN-Habitat (2003), pp.83f). 
Since in this case the landowners rent out their farmland without having official per­
mission, there is no longer a threat of eviction. They only have to pay a fine, which
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is essentially a mark-up on the rent.
Figure 3.5: Possible residential equilibria: with a vacant plot
farmlandV H  q VM q V M  q VL q
vacant
land-
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CBD
Note that if the two housing markets are segmented, it has to be the case that the 
utility level of the squatters is lower than in the formal housing market. Otherwise 
the high- and middle-income class would have an incentive to squat. Therefore, the 
only difference introduced by market segmentation is that policy changes will affect 
the utility of the poor and the two upper classes separately; a point I discuss briefly 
in Section 3.4.1.1.
For now I continue to focus on the case of no market segmentation (Figure 3.5), 
because it allows me to study the location by income in the informal housing market 
to which I now turn.
3.3.3 T he location by incom e in th e  inform al housing m arket and  th e  final 
residen tia l equilibrium
To derive the residential equilibrium with squatters, I proceed as in Section 3.3.1 and 
first determine the location by income in the informal housing market. I then return 
to Figure 3.5 and discuss the final equilibrium configuration with squat formation.
I begin by signing the difference between the slopes of bid rent curve of the high- 
and middle-income class squatters, pfj(x) and p^j(x) respectively, at their intersection
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x s . Note that this intersection does not necessarily have to be on the land available 
for squatting, because the informal housing market can theoretically bid for every 
location within the city boundaries. That is, there is a ‘shadow’ bid rent curve of the 
informal housing market for all x, but we only observe it for x' < x s < x, as formal 
market residents outbid the squatters for all other locations.
& h m  =  P h (x S ) ~  Pm  ( x s ) =  ~
t n  tM
hNnM
+ o' 7r4 q +  o' + C1 ~ *)<&<■
. / $  ( jru g c +  (1 -  n)u%c) h%f +  ( l  -  ir)u & cJ
F 1 ______ 1TUHe_____________F ' _____ n u Mc__________
. H h H  ™ H c  +  U  -  * ) UHc M h M  ™ M c  +  ( !  ~  * ) u Mc-
(19)
+ Uh ~ uH *
-h H  +  C1 “  ” ) u Hc h M  ™ M c  +  ( !  -  * ) u Mc -
where the subscript j  =  M, H  indicates the income group, e.g. the marginal utility 
of consumption in the evicted state of the middle-income class is u f jc. Note that the 
dependencies on x s  are suppressed in the main expression for ease of notation.
The first two terms in this expression are analogous to what has been obtained 
for the formal housing market in equation (18). Therefore, under the maintained 
assumptions, they are both negative. This would suggest a location by income, which 
is similar to the formal housing market, where the rich locate in the city centre and 
the poor on the outskirts. The interpretation of the last two terms is more ambiguous. 
Nonetheless, I can still make some conjectures on the overall sign of the difference in 
slopes.
First of all, I am able to unambiguously sign the third expression, if the ratio of 
housing services in the two states and the share of marginal utilities are independent 
of income.92 The third term then enters positively into the expression, as I have 
already shown in Section 3.3.1 that A h m  < 0. If this is not the case, diminishing 
marginal returns should increase the marginal utility of consumption in the evicted 
state disproportionately more for the middle-income class relative to the rich. Simi­
larly, we would expect that housing services are more evenly spread across states for 
more affluent households. Both of these effects would work in the opposite direction 
and render the third term less positive and, thus, more in line with the results of the 
formal housing market.
Secondly, the sign of the fourth and final expression is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, it could be argued that the overall expression is negative, because the term for 
the middle-income class is most likely to be larger in absolute value. First of all, it is
assumed that housing services are a normal good, such that 7r'(xs )
hm (xS)
> 7r'(x^)
h%(xs )
Secondly, the difference in utilities in the evicted and non-evicted state should be
2This is true for the log and the CES utility function.
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larger for the middle-income households, since the utility function is concave. On 
the other, diminishing marginal returns imply that the expected marginal utility of 
consumption is lower for the high-income households. This in turn increases the size 
of the first term. The overall sign is hence ambiguous.
As a consequence, I am not able to unequivocally sign the difference in slopes in the 
informal housing market. However, I assume in the following that the ranking of the 
bid rent curves mimics the ordering.in the non-squatting housing market. Otherwise, 
the location by income could be reversed, such that the rich would choose to live close 
to the C B D  in the formal housing market, but prefer to squat in the periphery. Such 
a model feature is neither realistic nor consistent with monotonic preferences and is 
hence ruled out.
Let us now return to the residential equilibrium with squat formation, which has 
been reproduced in Figure 3.6a on the next page. Note that this figure shows the 
bid rent curves for the formal housing market as dashed lines over the ‘low quality’ 
plot, x i ml  <  x  < x, which is left vacant for speculative purposes. Figure 3.6b depicts 
the bid rent schedules for the informal housing market. They are only shown as solid 
lines over the vacant land, as they are outbid for every other location x  by the formal 
housing market.
I would now like to analyse which income groups are most likely to become squat­
ters on the ‘low quality’ plot left vacant by the formal housing market. First of all, 
it should be noted that the rich are least likely to join the squatter community, since 
they suffer the largest utility loss on the ‘low quality’ plot. In this particular example, 
their formal market bid rent curve p^j{xs ) is already so steep over the potential squat, 
x i ml  < x s  < x, that their bid rent curve for the informal housing market p%{xs ) is 
largely negative for most of the interval. We can, hence, exclude the rich from the 
analysis, as the bid rent has to be non-negative by definition.
Therefore, it is sufficient to compare the squatter bid rent curves of the middle- 
and low-income group, pf j ( xs ) and p^(xs ) respectively. In this equilibrium, their 
formal market counterparts intersect for the first time on the steep hillside. It is then 
likely that the bid rent curves for the two squatter groups will also cross over the same 
range, since both have a flatter slope. It is thus possible that a small fraction of the 
vacant land will be occupied by squatters of the middle-income class. In this case, 
they occupy xvml < x < x f ML. In fact, there is some anecdotal evidence that this is 
often the case in developing countries (UN-Habitat (2003), p.66f). Yet, if the income 
difference between the two groups is sufficiently large, most of the squat is occupied 
by the poor, who suffer least from the low amenity level and thus have the flattest bid 
rent curve. This is also shown in Figure 3.6b, where the poor live on x f ML < x  < x.
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Figure 3.6: The final residential equilibrium with squat formation 
(a) The formal housing market
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(b) The informal housing market
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3 .4  P o licy  an alysis
The main aim of this paper was to develop an analytical framework that explains 
under which conditions squatter settlements arise in the standard urban model. This 
set up can now be used to study the effects of the two main policies that are usually 
suggested to improve the livelihood of squatters, namely slum-upgrading programs 
and the provision of greater security of tenure (UN-Habitat (2003), chapter 7). The 
following analyses the impact of each policy on the residential equilibrium and discuss 
their economic efficiency.
3.4.1 The effect o f a slum-upgrading program on the residential equilib­
rium
This section carries out a comparative statics exercise to study how a slum-upgrading 
program affects the level and slope of the bid rent curves in the formal and informal 
housing markets and, thus, the urban residential equilibrium. I first discuss how the 
policy is modelled in this framework and then analyse the effects on the formal and 
informal housing market in turn. Appendix C.4 provides the calculations for the 
formal housing market using the Cobb-Douglas utility function, whereas Appendix 
C.5 derives the general solution for the squatters.
In the past, urban development programs have mainly concentrated on improve­
ments of the housing stock and the physical environment. More recently, the focus 
has shifted towards in situ slum-upgrading programs that usually involve slum-level 
investment in water and sanitation infrastructure, and the provision of electricity, 
waste management and better access to roads. However, within this model the effect 
of both policies can be captured by the same increase in the amenity level on the steep 
hillside, i.e. ✓
a — bx if 0 < :c < ±
a — bx — CnewX2 if x  < x  <  x
,(x) = < (20)
a — bx if x  <x<  x
a if x  > x,
where Cnew < c in equation (9). Note that the discontinuity in the amenity level is 
removed completely, if Cnew =  0. Therefore, a slum-upgrading program increases the 
amenity level a{x) available on the steep hillside, x  < x  < x, and the slope of its curve 
over the same range. (Figure 3.7 on the next page).
I begin the analysis by studying how these two changes affect the bid rent curve 
of income group j  in the formal housing market. As has already been shown in 
Section 3.2.2, the optimal bid rent is determined by the uniform utility condition 
max u(yj  — t j X—p f  (x)hj (x) ,h j(x ) ,  a(:r)) =  u. By using the implicit function theorem,hj
I can then determine the change in the bid rent curve in response to an increase in
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Figure 3.7: An improvement in the amenity level for x <  x  <  x
C B D  a
the amenity level
lajd p f (x) _
da(x) —ucjhj(x) +
> 0, (21)
dh ■ (x)since the own price effect is negative, p ; < 0, and the marginal utilities are
dp- (x)
positive, uaj  > 0 and u cj  >  0. This result is highly intuitive, because it implies that 
households are willing to bid more for locations with a higher amenity level, all other 
things being equal.
The slum-upgrading program also changes the slope of the bid rent curve in the 
formal housing market through an increase in the amenity level and a flatter slope 
of the amenity function anew{x). First of all, the increase in the amenity level itself
lowers the slope of the bid rent curve, i.e. =  vaaj ^ ^  > 0 since the utility
function exhibits diminishing returns, Vaaj < 0, and a!{x) <  0. The intuition for 
this result is that households have to be compensated more for a decline in a(x), the 
lower its initial level. A slum-upgrading program thus leads to a flatter bid rent curve 
through increasing the overall quality of the land.
This effect is further reinforced, because changes in the slope of the amenity func-
tion directly translate into a change in the bid rent schedule, as =  k°^x ) >
Again this is highly intuitive, since households no longer have to be compensated for
a sharp decline in the amenity level by a lower rent. Finally, it is important to note
*1) *that this effect is larger for richer households, because it has been assumed that 
is increasing in disposable income. As a consequence, the effect on the bid rent curve 
of the high-income group should be largest, whereas we should observe the smallest
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increase for the poor.
These results axe summarized in Figures 3.8a and 3.8b on the next page, which 
show the residential equilibrium in the formal housing market before and after the 
policy change respectively. The response illustrated in Figure 3.8b is extreme, as 
the formal housing market would now want to occupy all of the land within the city 
boundaries. Nonetheless, it is generally the case that an improvement in the amenity 
level reduces the size of the plot, which is deemed uninhabitable by the formal housing 
market. That is to say, the program will lead to conflict over at least parts of the land 
occupied by the squatters.
The squatters themselves also value the land more after the program, as analogous 
results can be obtained for the informal housing market (for more details see Appendix 
C.5). This is not surprising, since households in both markets derive the same utility 
from an increase in the amenity level. Yet, even if the squatters are now willing to pay 
more for the improved parcel, we know from our earlier analysis that they are always 
outbid by the formal housing market, if the latter takes an interest in the same plot.
The key question thus becomes under which conditions the squatters are allowed 
to remain on the improved land. Moreover, we would like to know if such an equi­
librium configuration is efficient. The answer ultimately depends on the institutional 
framework in which the investment has been made. Sections 3.4.1.1 and 3.4.1.2 now 
in turn discuss the consequences of a private and public investment in the amenity 
level on the residential equilibrium.
3.4.1.1 Scenario 1: private investm ent into the am enity level o f th e squat
This section discusses how the residential equilibrium changes when a private invest­
ment is made into the amenity level of the squat. As has already been argued in 
Section 3.2.2, the landowner prefers to leave the land vacant for speculative purposes 
if the bid rent offered by the formal housing market is particularly low. A private 
landowner thus only improves the amenity level of the squat if a profitable economic 
opportunity arises, e.g. if there is an unexpected increase in the urban population or 
an industry has signalled an interest in the parcel. It is assumed for simplicity that 
the improved lot is sufficient to accommodate this new demand.
The entire squatting community is then evicted and has to move to the low-income 
neighbourhood on the outskirts. Note that the effect of this policy on the residential 
equilibrium is essentially identical to an increase in the population of the poor; pre­
viously only a fraction ir of the squatters moved to the low-income neighbourhood, 
whereas now the entire community has to relocate there. Such a population increase 
has already been analysed in the standard urban model (see Fujita (1989), chapter 4 
for an extensive analysis) and I thus only briefly discuss the main result here.
W hat will happen is that an increase in the housing demand of the poor will shift 
out their bid rent schedule and increase the rent in the low-income neighbourhood. 
In our set up, this parallel shift will push out the urban fringe and squeeze the neigh-
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Figure 3.8: The effect of an investment in the amenity level of x <  x  <  x  on the bid 
rent curves in the formal housing market
(a) Before the policy
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bouring middle-income quarter. The increased population density in the latter will 
then bid up their rents and start squeezing the adjacent central urban area, where the 
rich live. This process will then be repeated over and over again, until the bid rent 
in the entire city will have increased, making the total urban population worse off. 
Figure 3.9a on the next page shows the residential equilibrium before the increase in 
the housing demand, whereas Figure 3.9b depicts how it changes after the shock and 
a private investment into the amenity level of the squat.
Note that even the new urban residents now have to pay a higher rent. However, in 
their case this is not due to the squeezing process, but because the profit maximizing 
landowner wants to recover the fixed cost of the investment, which includes the eviction 
cost of the squatters. It is assumed that the private investor passes on the entirety of 
the cost to the new tenants in the terms of a premium to the agent’s first bid for the 
plot (the latter was derived for the old utility level in Figure 3.8b above). Hence, the 
uniform utility condition again holds for each location within the city boundaries, but 
at a lower level than before the policy change.
It is important to note at this point that the increase in the housing demand has to 
be satisfied in any case. Hence, if the landlord had not made the investment into the 
‘low quality’ plot, then the urban population would have been made even worse off. 
That is, without the investment the new residents would have needed accommodation 
in the neighbourhoods of their respective income groups and would have thus increased 
the population density and rent in the entire city. If the average new resident is richer 
than the average squatter, they would have demanded larger lot sizes, which would 
have increased the population density even more. Therefore, although the utility level 
is now lower than before the policy change, it will still be higher than under the 
alternative scenario of no investment.
Finally, note that this result is subject to an important caveat. Up to now, it has 
been assumed that the poor are able to find accommodation in the formal housing 
market when evicted. However, if the two housing markets are segmented, the evicted 
squatters will be crowded into illegal subdivisions on the urban fringe. This will make 
the entire low-income class worse off without any effect on the formal market residents. 
In this case, a private investment into the squat’s amenity level will enhance welfare 
inequalities between the income groups.
Summarizing yields
R esu lt 3. A private investment into the amenity level of the squat is effi­
cient if  the average new urban resident is richer than the average squatter.
Since the bid rent for the improved lot increases in both the formal and 
informal housing markets, (most of) the squatters will be evicted and will 
have to relocate to the low-income neighbourhood on the urban fringe. The 
subsequent increase in the bid rent will make the total urban population 
worse off, but less so than if no private investment had been made. I f
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Figure 3.9: The effect of a private investment in the amenity level of x  <  x  <  x  on 
the residential equilibrium
(a) Before the increase in housing demand
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(b) After the increase in housing demand with the private investment
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housing markets are segmented, the poor bear the entire cost, which will 
increase welfare inequalities.
3.4.1.2 Scenario 2: public investm ent into the am enity level o f the squat
This section discusses the second possible scenario under which the amenity level of the 
squat could be improved, namely a slum upgrading program. Different to the private 
investment example above, this policy is not undertaken in response to an exogenous 
increase in the housing demand. Instead these programs are often driven by egalitarian 
motives and are financed by an international aid agency or the government.
This implies that the improved lot is not rented out to the highest bidder after 
the program, which would be the middle-income class of the formal housing market in 
this example (the residential equilibrium before and after the policy is shown on the 
next page in Figures 3.10a and 3.10b respectively93). On the contrary, a commitment 
is made to the squatters that they can stay on the improved lot.94 They will choose to 
hold on to the plot, even if they could sell it at a higher price, if the housing stock in the 
formal market is scarce (Simha, 2006; WB, 2002) or if there are positive externalities 
to living in a squat (Neuwirth, 2005; Davis, 2006). Naturally, this efficiency loss will 
be larger, the greater the improvement in the amenity level.
Due to this commitment, no relocations occur within the residential equilibrium as 
long as the uniform utility condition is satisfied. However, we know that the squatters 
are made better off by an improvement in the amenity level. We can, thus, only 
maintain the original residential equilibrium if the squatters are obliged to pay the 
difference between their old and new valuation of the squat, for instance, in the form 
of a tax. This contribution could then be used to cover at least part of the fixed 
investment cost. If this is the case, there is no welfare gain for the urban population, 
since they are all as well off as before the policy. Furthermore, it is even possible that 
the slum-upgrading program leads to a social welfare loss, if the contribution of the 
squatter community is not large enough to cover the fixed investment (Buckley and 
Kalarickal, 2006).
Alternatively, no tax could be imposed on the squatters. Since they then enjoy a 
higher utility level than their poor counterparts in the outskirts, the latter have an 
incentive to move to the informal settlement. The effect of this relocation is opposite 
to what has been argued in the Section 3.4.1.1. More specifically, the population 
density in the periphery will fall, which will lower the bid rent curve in the low- 
income neighbourhood. This effect will be transmitted throughout the city making all 
income groups better off. However, in this scenario the fixed cost of the investment 
will not be recovered at all and society will, consequently, incur a welfare loss. To 
summarize
93 Note that the bid rent curves for the formal and informal housing markets are only drawn as solid 
lines when they apply. Otherwise they are represented as dashed lines.
94The effect of the commitment itself is studied in more detail in the next section.
3 A N  AMENITY-BASED THEORY OF SQUATTER SETTLEM ENTS 125
Vl  <7 : fa rm la n d
x h m  x X2 M L
Figure 3.10: The effect of a public investment in the amenity level of x <  x <  x on 
the residential equilibrium
(a) Before the slum upgrading program
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R esult 4. A public investment into the amenity level of the squat is 
inefficient, as long as squatters are allowed to remain on the improved 
lot and richer formal market residents value the lot more. I f  attempts 
are made to recover the cost of investment via a tax on squatters, the 
household’s utility remains unchanged. I f  such attempts are not made, 
the total urban population will be made better off, since some low-income 
households will relocate to the improved lot, which will lower the bid rent 
throughout the city. Yet, society will incur a social welfare loss, since the 
investment will not be recovered.
Finally, it is important to note tha t a slum upgrading program is not merely an 
improvement in the amenity level. That is, if a commitment is made that the squatters 
cannot be evicted, this is equivalent to increasing their security of tenure. As a 
consequence, I am only be able to make a final statement on the size of the efficiency 
loss created after having studied how the bid rent curves in the informal market 
respond to a lower risk of eviction. The subsequent section gauges the size of this 
effect.
3.4.2 The effect o f greater security o f tenure on the residential equilibrium
This section analyses the effect of increasing the security of tenure on the residential 
equilibrium. To do this, I simply have to study how the squatter’s bid rent curve and 
its slope respond to a reduction in the probability of eviction, tt( x s ) ,  for each location 
In particular, it is interesting to see how it changes relative to its formal market 
counterpart, as 7r(xs ) is reduced. We already know from Section 3.2.3 that it lies 
below the bid rent curve of the formal housing market, p j(x ) , and is flatter. Now I 
would like to determine how it approaches this curve when the threat of eviction is 
reduced.
Since the bid rent offered by squatter household type j  has to satisfy the uniform 
utility condition in equation (16), I use the implicit function theorem to obtain
9P?(*S) =    (22)
9” (xS) T(XS)(U£ _  uEjhf ( x s )) +  (1 -  tt(i-s)) -  u%h?(xs ))
dh?
This expression is negative, as the own price effects are negative, — -3 , 5 7 < 0 and
&Pj )
dh?
• <  0, and since households are made worse off in the evicted state, i.e. u f  <
dP j(xS) J
u?  for all j  = L, M  or H. This result is highly intuitive; households attach a lower 
value to a plot of land on which they face a higher risk of eviction. Consequently, an 
improvement in the security of tenure increases the households’ willingness to pay for 
a given location.
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Furthermore, to find out how the slope of the squatter’s bid rent function changes 
with the threat of eviction, I simply have to differentiate P j ' ( x s )  with respect to tt( x s ) .  
After a few simplifications this yields
, E N _  N E
L aj cj aj cjf f i V )   ___________________________________
dn{xs ) h f ( x s ) (tt{x s )u^ , +  (l -  7r(xs ) )u ^ )2
- pF 'ixF ) W * D .  __________  (23)
3 h ^ (x s ) (tt(xs )uF. +  ( l  -  n(xs ))u £ )2
7T'(XS) (u f  ~  U f){u^ -  U%)
hN (xs ) (7r(xs )ufj +  (l -  ir(xs ) )u ^ )2
To sign this expression, I use two observations about the evicted and non-evicted 
state. Firstly, the amenity level in the evicted state is larger than in the non-evicted 
state. Section 3.2 has shown that the squat is only established on ‘low quality’ land 
that is deemed uninhabitable by the formal housing market. Therefore, the amenity 
level in the evicted state has to be higher, as the squatters find accommodation in the 
formal housing market. Diminishing marginal returns thus imply that the marginal 
utility of the amenity level is larger in the non-evicted state, i.e. u^  >  u^j for all 
j  = L, M  or H.
Secondly, it is important to note that households consume less in the evicted 
state despite having the same disposable income. This is due to the fact that their 
investment in the squat’s housing stock is lost when they are evicted. Consequently, 
the marginal utility of consumption in the non-evicted state is lower, such that < 
u^j for all j  = L, M  or H. Moreover, this implies that their overall utility level is 
higher in the non-evicted state, i.e. Uj' < for all j  =  L, M  or H; a result that has 
already been used above.
Since the amenity function, the bid rent curve of the formal housing market, and 
the probability of eviction all decline with distance from the C B D , I am now able 
to sign the expressions in equation (23). The overall sign of the partial derivative is 
ambiguous, because the first two terms are positive and the third negative. Given 
that there are no closed form solutions for the conventional utility functions, I can 
again only make conjectures about how the slope of the squatter’s bid rent curve will 
change, as the threat of eviction falls from 1 to 0.
Note that the expression is most likely to be positive on the low quality plot, where 
a! (x) is large and negative. If this is indeed the case, a reduction in the risk of eviction 
makes the bid rent curve in the informal housing market steeper and more negative. 
This is intuitive, as the squatter attaches a greater value to location in the squat, 
knowing that she is less likely to move to the higher amenity parcel in the formal 
housing market. Therefore, she has to be compensated for the characteristics of the 
squat with a lower bid rent, i.e. the slope has steepened. As the risk of eviction falls 
further, the slope approaches its formal market counterpart from below.
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Combining these results with the discussion of slum upgrading programs above 
yields
R esu lt 5. The efficiency loss of a slum upgrading program can be reduced 
i f  the security of tenure is enhanced for the squatters. Their bid rent curve 
then approaches its formal market counterpart from below, as the risk pre­
mium falls and the slope becomes steeper. However, i f  a richer income 
group exists that values the improved lot more, a pareto improvement is 
still possible, even if  the risk of eviction is removed completely.
3 .5  C onclu sion
This paper has offered a new theoretical framework to study the presence of squatter 
settlements in a spatial context; a dimension which has been ignored so far by the 
existing literature. More specifically, I have introduced both an informal housing 
market and heterogeneous space into the standard urban Muth-Mills model. This 
allows me to derive a residential equilibrium, where the formal and informal housing 
markets compete for land within the city boundaries. In addition, the existence of a 
squat is endogenously generated on ‘low quality’ land.
The main policy implication from this analysis is that slum upgrading programs 
are inefficient. That is, the improved lot does not only become more attractive for the 
squatters, but also for the formal market residents. Since the latter always outbid the 
informal housing market, the squatters will be evicted unless they are granted greater 
security of tenure. If this is indeed the case, they derive utility both from the higher 
amenity level and the lower risk of eviction. It is then possible to recover (at least 
part of) the investment through taxation.
Nonetheless, the equilibrium is still inefficient if the rich value the amenity level 
more than the poor. The squatters are then still outbid by the rich for the improved 
parcel, even if the threat of eviction is removed completely. However, the poor might 
be reluctant to sell for a higher price, if there is a housing deficit in the formal market 
or there are positive externalities to being located in a squat. There is anecdotal 
evidence that both of these factors are important and more efforts should be directed 
towards understanding their root causes.
In the context of this model, a relocation policy of the entire squat would be more 
economically efficient. However, these policies have had mixed success in the past (UN- 
Habitat, 2003). It is, therefore, crucial to determine the circumstances under which 
these programs can be successfully implemented. Alternatively, investment could 
be made in city-wide infrastructure to improve the amenity level for every location. 
Eventually, the appropriate policy will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
However, it should be borne in mind that this model is highly stylised. One 
possible extension would be to introduce a dynamic framework. This would allow 
for an explicit modelling of the landowner’s outside option and of the shocks that
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would lead to a private investment in the parcel. Moreover, it would then be possible 
to study the progression of the neighbourhood after the policy change and how this 
is influenced by the socioeconomic characteristics of the squatter community, and 
possible congestion or spillover effects.
One additional step could then be to introduce urban population growth and rural- 
urban migration into the model. This is particularly important with a view to the 
climate change debate, as the loss of rural livelihoods through rising temperatures 
will increase the pressure on urban areas. Given that many developing countries are 
ill-equipped to expand their formal construction programs, most of these new urban 
residents will then have to locate in the informal housing market. To avert a major 
urban housing crisis, research in this field should be given high priority to help shape 
an effective policy agenda.
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C A p p en d ix
C .l  Derivation o f the bid rent curve and its slope in th e formal housing  
market; example: Cobb-D ouglas utility
This section solves the constrained maximization problem in the formal housing mar­
ket for the Cobb-Douglas utility function. It then proceed to derive the equilibrium 
bid rent schedule and its slope.
It is assumed that the utility function takes on the Cobb-Douglas functional form, 
such that
u(c,h (x),a (x)) = cah{x)Pa{x)l~a~P, (24)
where a  > 0, /3 > 0 and a + f3 < 1.
Using the budget constraint of equation (10), I can then set up the Lagrangean L 
to solve for the optimal consumption and housing bundle
max L  =  cah{x)Pa{x)l~a~P +  A(y — tx  — c — pF(x)h(:r)) (25)
c,h{x)
The associated first order conditions are
acQ-1/i(:r)^a(:r)1-Q!_i8 =  A (26)
f3cah(x)P~l a(x)l~a~P = ApF(x), (27)
which can be solved for h{x) to yield
=  <28>
Equation (28) is then substituted into the budget constraint and rearranged to yield 
the optimal c and h(x):
c =  ^ ( y ~ tx)  (29)
h(x) =  (a  +  / ? V ( * ) f a ~ te) (30)
Since households enjoy the same utility level u in equilibrium, the bid rent has to 
decline with distance x  to offset the rising commuting costs. To find the bid rent 
curve in the formal housing market, I therefore only have to express the uniform 
utility condition at the equilibrium consumption and housing bundle
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and rearrange it for pF(x) to yield
a+P
p . . I a a \ p  . ( y — t x \  & , . 1-0-/3
P ( * ) = (  —  I “ W  e • (32>u
To obtain the slope of the bid rent curve, I simply differentiate equation (32).
PF{ x ) (  {a + /3)2t , ^  n r i
p  W  =  — +  J  (33)
The bid rent curve is thus downward sloping, as a'(x) <  0.
C.2 D erivation o f the slope o f the bid rent curve in the informal housing
market
This section explains the derivation of the slope of the bid rent curve in the informal 
housing market. Since the bid rent curve is determined for the optimal choices of 
the housing and consumption bundle, I first have to solve the constrained expected 
utility maximization problem of the informal housing market. That is, I maximize the 
Lagrangean L with respect to cE, c^, hE and hN, where
L  = ( l  — 7r(x5)) [uN (cF, hN (xs ), a(xs )) 4- AN (y — tx s  — ps (xs )hN(xs ) — c^)]
+  ir(xs ) \uE (cF, hE(xF), a(xF)) +  XE (y — tx F + F  — ps (xs )hN (xs ) (34)
- p F(xF)hE(xF) - c E)].
The associated first order conditions are
u fE =  Ae  (35)
u e e  = XEpF(xF) (36)
t A  =  XN (37)C1
.N \ N S t „ S \  , n ( x S )= ^ / ( ^ )  +  r - ^ A Y ( ^ ) ,  
which can be summarized to yield
(38)
u e e  =  u Ee P F {x f ) (39)
=  PS(*S) ( « ^  +  (4°)
Secondly, the informal housing market only coexists with the formal housing mar­
ket, if households enjoy the same level of expected utility u. Therefore, the slope of
the bid rent function of the informal housing market can be found by totally differ­
entiating the uniform utility condition described in equation (16) with respect to x s .
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This yields
0 =ir(xs ){uEE[—t — ps ' (xs )hN (xs ) — ps  (xs )hN' (xs ) — pF' (xs )hE (xs )
-  pF(xs )hE'{xs )] +  uEEhE'{xs ) +  uEa'(xs )}
+  ( l  -  7T(xs )){u^N[ - t  -  ps '(xs )hN(xs ) -  ps (xs )hN'(xs )]
+  u%NhN'(xs ) +  Ua a'(xs )} +  ir'(xs )(uE -  uN)
Equation (41) can then be rearranged and simplified with the help of equations
(39) and (40) to yield
=  * | ( ^ xS)u% + {l  ~ '* (xS j)ua
hN(xs ) hN (xS) \ 7 v(xs )uj? +  (l — tt( x s ) ) u £
pF’(xF) hE(xF) _______________  (42)
hN (xs ) ir(xs )uf? +  ( l  — tt( x s ) ) u %
7r'(xS) U E  — U N
hN(xS) 7r(xS)u§ +  ( l — 7r(xS))u^
C .3 T h e  effect o f a  change in  incom e on th e  slope o f th e  b id  re n t curve 
in  th e  form al housing  m ark e t; exam ple: C obb-D ouglas u tility
To determine how the slope of the bid rent curve changes with income, I simply have 
to partially differentiate pF'(x) with respect to y
dpF\ x ) _ d p F{x) i f  (a +  P)2t +  ^  _  ^ ' { x )
dy dy P \  y — tx a(x)
pF(x) (a + P)2t
(43)
+ P ( y -  tx)2 ’
dp (x) foca \  & * „s f y  — t x \ p  , ■. l~a-&
-  h r  +  h r  «(*) p (44)
where
\
dy \ u j  ' r'/ Va +  P
The partial derivative can be simplified further to yield
dpF'(x) _ ( a a\ i a  + p ( , i -a- g f y - t x \ i  t - t { (ct  + P)2 - P )  q.a'(x)
- f l r ' - ( T )  — a{x) \ z + p )  { — — +{1- a ~ p ) « x )
(45)
Equation (45) is unambiguously negative, if (a  +  P)2 — P > 0.
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C .4 The effect o f a slum -upgrading program on the bid rent curve in the  
formal housing market; exam ple: C obb-Douglas utility
To determine the effect of a slum-upgrading program on the bid rent curve in the 
formal housing market, I partially differentiate pF(x) with respect to a(x)
dpF(x) { a a \  & „ f y  — t x \  1 — a  — (3 , i-a -2/?
pF(x) 1 - a - p  
a(x) P
where the second equality uses equation (32). Consequently, the bid rent offered in 
the formal housing market increases after a slum-upgrading program. Note that this 
effect is increasing in income y , because
= dpF(x) 1 - a - p  
dy dy pa{x) ’ 1 >
dpF(x) { a a \ P ,  — x i-a-P
= I —  ) (ot + P ) \ --------- ) a(x) 0 > 0 . (48)
where
\
dy \  u J  \  a
To determine the effect of a slum-upgrading program on the slope of the formal 
housing market, I partially differentiate pF'(x) with respect to a(x)
dp?'(x) _ d p ? (x )  I f  (a + 0  f t
da(x) da(x) P \  y - t x  a(x) J P a{x)2
This expression can be further simplified with equation (46) to yield
dpF\x )  _  pF(x) 1 - a - P  (  (a +  P)2t +  ^  _  2p )a' ^  1 (50)
da(x) a(x) ft2 \  y — tx  a(x)
The overall sign of this expression is ambiguous, as the first term in the brackets is 
negative and the second positive given that 1 — a — 2(3 < 0 and a'(x) < 0. However, 
the first term in brackets is very small, since 0 < o < l ,  0 < / 3 < l  and y — tx  is 
large. Furthermore, the second term is larger, the smaller the amenity level a(x) and 
the steeper its slope a! (x). Therefore, it is likely that the slope of the bid rent of the 
formal housing market increases after a slum-upgrading program on the ‘low quality’ 
plot.
This effect is further reinforced as pF'(x) increases with a'(x), because
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Note that both of these effects are also increasing in y, since
d (% tfxT ) _  dpF(x) (1 - a - 0) (  (a +  /3)2t  +  ^  o!{x)
dy dy P2a(x) \  y — tx  a(x)
if (  ~ -  fts 1 + ( ! - « -  > 0 and dPByX^' > °- Moreover>
d ^ d a ' i x )  ) dpF(x) (1 -  a  -  P )
(52)
dy dy j3a(x)
> 0, (53)
C.5 The effect o f a slum -upgrading program on the bid rent curve in the  
informal housing market
To determine the effect of an increase in the amenity level of the squat a(xs ) on the 
bid rent curve in the informal housing market ps (xs ), I use the implicit function, 
which yields
dps (xs ) = _______________ - ( t t ( x s ) u e  +  (1 -  ir(xs ))u%)_______________
da(xs ) ir(XS)(u£$j£ -  uEhE(xF)) +  ( l  -  tt( x s )) (u% -  u?hN{xs ))
rru- • • -4.- dhE{xF)  ^n j  dhN(xs ) ^ nThis expression is positive, as -■ q) <  0 and q ' < 0.
dp ( x )  d p { x )
To determine the effect of a slum-upgrading program on the slope of the informal 
housing market, I partially differentiate pF'(x) with respect to a'(xs )
dps \ x s ) _  1 ( tt(xs )uE +  (1 -  n{xs ))u%\  > Q
da'(xs ) hN (xs ) \7r(xs )uE +  (l — tt(xs )^u^
The partial derivative of the slope of the pF'(x) with respect to a(xs ) has been 
omitted, since the expression is unwieldy and difficult to sign without a closed-form 
solution.
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